biep@cs.vu.nl (J. A. "Biep" Durieux) (05/25/87)
In article <2152@hoptoad.uucp> laura@hoptoad.UUCP (Laura Creighton) writes: >In article <4568@milano.UUCP> wex@milano.UUCP writes: >>I agree that there are certain classes of thoughts I have (call them I) >>which are about what might be called "imaginary" things. These are thoughts >>about courage or God or unicorns, etc. These thoughts are distinct from >>others in that I recognize a priori that there is no physical manfiestation >>of the thing I am thinking of. Therefore, it is reasonable to postulate a >>mental object which is the target of I-class thoughts. >> >>However, there is another class of thoughts (call them R) which are about >>what might be called "real" things. These are thoughts about, for example, >>the chair I sit in, the keyboard I type at, or that `unicorn' that Ringling >>Brothers have in their circus. These R-class thoughts are distinct in that >>I recognize a priori that there is a physical manifestation of the thing I >>am thinking of. Even in cases where I am mistaken (the object is not what I >>thought it was or it fails to exist altogether), I still think that the >>intentionality of R-class thoughts is a real thing. (answer about how thoughts can conflict with reality) >(Plus the existence of 2 classes of objects offends me. My thoughts >are my thoughts.) > >Laura >-- I think you are right, but miss something from wex' definition: I-class thoughts are meant to be thoughts *labelled* with the notion that they do not refer to the real world. Conceps of real things are needed to explain unexpected happenings, but that doesn't mean thoughts about them are the same as thoughts about I-class objects. It vaguely reminds me of the ontologic existence-proof of God. BTW, I have cross-posted this to sci.philosophy.tech. As long as the main thread of the discussion is about the meaning of language it clearly belongs there. If the discussion drifts away to consciousness and the like, the "Newsgroups: "-line should be edited again. I have also left off the talk.philosophy.tech newsgroup, not because I think this discussion doesn't belong there, but because we don't receive it in Europe, and so we're not able to post to it either (I tried, but inews rejected my article). >(C) Copyright 1987 Laura Creighton - you may redistribute only if your > recipients can. Never heard recursion needs a base-line? Should I have called all recipients of this first to ask them whether they can redistribute this if I send it to them, only to hear "well, wait a moment, I'll have to check with *my* recipients first..." Another question: what does "can" mean in your copyright notice? The same as the "may"? Or not, and does that make the copyright notice non-recursive? -- Biep. (biep@cs.vu.nl via mcvax) Unix is a philosophy, not an operating system. Especially the latter.