sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) (03/21/88)
In article <968@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu> vu0112@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu (Cliff Joslyn) writes: >I can certainly accept that in your >example, I construct a representation (in whatever modality) of the >state of the world such that there is a purple car in the driveway, and >then present that representation to my consciousness. On this view, a >"possibilitiy" or a "concept" is a representation of that which is >possibile, or of that which is conceptualized. However, you assert that >concepts and possibilities exist *in and of themselves*, and *not >mediated by any form of representation*. I do not see how this >hypothesis can be tested. Indeed, it seems equivalent to an idealist or >theist position on mental entities. >.... >So, my questions are: >1) Why do you feel a non-representationl theory of concepts is necessary? >2) How would you test a "possibilitistic" theory of concepts? >3) If there is no answer to 2, how do you propose to proceed scientifically? I really appreciate your comments and questions, because they help illuminate all the areas in which I have not been entirely clear (either in my thoughts, or in how these thoughts are expressed). And I do appreciate and agree with your statement that an hypothesis should be testable. Let me back up a step and give you a little more of the theoretical background of my position. My interest is in building up an accurate account of the ways in which an individual person builds up his own world-view, and what the nature of an individual's world is. Pioneers in this effort are Michael Polanyi ("Personal Knowledge") and Nelson Goodman ("Ways of World Making"). I consider individual experience to be the ultimate empirical basis for all hypotheses, scientific and otherwise. So what are the constituents of a world, as experienced by an individual directly? In other words, what are the entities that make up an individual world? They are (in my view): 1. Phenomena. 2. Facts. 3. Ideas or concepts. Anything that exists for a person would fall into one of these categories. A phenomenon is anything that is directly perceived, either physically or by way of "mental representation". So there are mental and physical phenomena. A perceived physical chair would be a physical phenomenon, and a mental picture (such as a visual representation of a chess game in blindfold chess) would be a mental phenomenon. Both would count as phenomena, because both are perceived in one way or another. However, at any given moment, certain things exist for an individual, even though he is not viewing them at that time. These entities are *known*, rather than being *perceived*, and I refer to them as "facts". I do not *perceive* that there is a kitchen in my house (I'm not currently in my kitchen); I simply *know* that there is. I do not *perceive* that 2 + 2 = 4; I simply *know* it. So that's the second constituent of a person's world. Facts are often inferred from phenomena by interpretation. If a person looks pale, unsteady, and drawn, and feels hot I may infer that that person is sick, even though I cannot perceive the sickness (bacteria, etc.) directly. Finally, there are certain things that are neither known or perceived, but are simply *conceived*. I refer to these as "ideas". An idea is the *possibility* of a thing that might or might not exist, for a certain person, i.e., a possible fact. It might also be called a "proposition", a "theory", or an "hypothesis", in that it is something to which it makes sense to attribute existence or nonexistence. "A unicorn in the garden", though not a fact, is something about which one could wonder whether or not it exists. Experientially, it is by considering possibilities (ideas) that one arrives at facts. An idea is converted into an (experienced) fact by an act of assent. Anything that exists for a person at a particular time can be fit into one of these categories. >I don't think there's much utility in lumping [different kinds of mental >representation] all together under the heading "picture" (your >usage), since we will get confused between general mental >representations and specifically visual ones. Instead, what we need is >a term which describes all these modalities together. I think there is >such a term: "mental representation". I can go with that phraseology. I prefer the term "mental phenomenon", though, since perceived mental entities could appear that don't represent anything. >I was presenting three views: > 1) a word refers to an object or class of objects (classical semantics); > 2) a word refers to a mental representation of an object or class of objects > (cognitive, representational view); > 3) a word refers to an idealistic "concept" or "possibility" (Sarge's view). >I was asserting (2), not (1). Using my above schema (which may or may not be a form of idealism -- I think of it more as "phenomenology", because it does not postulate entities that are not directly knowable, conceivable, or perceivable by an individual), I would say that a word *represents* some entity, and serves to pull a person's attention to that entity, whether the entity be an idea, a fact, or a phenomenon. Thus if you wanted to share a certain experience with another person, you could use words to draw that person's attention to that experience. Or, if you wanted to remember a certain entity, or keep it in mind long enough to consider, you might use words for that purpose. You could also use gestures, pictures, etc. for reminding oneself or communicating with others. In itself, a word (or picture, etc.) is a phenomenon, mental or physical. I have used the word "token" to refer to a phenomenon that "means" something (i.e. that directs attention to something), but perhaps the word "representation" would work well for this purpose. >Mathematically, we can see that if X is "associated" >with (a different thing) Y, this means that there exists a "associative" >relation R such that (X,Y) is in R. Thus, X and Y are similar, in that >they are different (different symbols, X <> Y), but also the same (they >are both in the relation R). It's been awhile (about thirty years) since I studied the theory of sets and relations, but, in my understanding, a relation is a set of pairs of entities (or, I suppose, it might be a set of triads, etc. -- I'm not sure). The elements of a relation are not the individual members of each pair, but the pairs themselves. Thus the similarity amongst elements of a relation is amongst the pairs that make up the relation, not between the elements of each pair, one to the other. To illustrate this point, consider the relation called "dissimilarity". The pairs of such a relation are alike, in that they contain dissimilar elements. But, ex hypothesi, the elements of each pair are dissimilar from each other. Therefore, I don't think it would be correct to say that a word must be "similar" to what that word represents. To be effective as a word, it need only be *associated* with some entity, such that a person hearing the word is reminded of that entity. -- "Absolute knowledge means never having to change your mind." Sarge Gerbode Institute for Research in Metapsychology 950 Guinda St. Palo Alto, CA 94301 UUCP: pyramid!thirdi!sarge
bwk@mitre-bedford.ARPA (Barry W. Kort) (03/22/88)
Some writers like to distinguish noumena from phenomena. Although my dictionaries differ in their definitions, the definitions that captured my imagination came from the World Book: Phenomenon: that which is captured through the senses. Noumenon: that which is captured through thought. --Barry Kort "I don't entertain ideas. Ideas entertain me."
sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) (03/22/88)
In article <27472@linus.UUCP> bwk@mbunix (Kort) writes: > >Some writers like to distinguish noumena from phenomena. > >Although my dictionaries differ in their definitions, the definitions >that captured my imagination came from the World Book: > >Phenomenon: that which is captured through the senses. > >Noumenon: that which is captured through thought. > Thanks!! In the first draft of my book, this was exactly the phraseology I used. But then I decided (perhaps wrongly) that "noumenon" had other, conflicting meanings, and that the essence of the concept was captured by the more common word, "fact". -- "Absolute knowledge means never having to change your mind." Sarge Gerbode Institute for Research in Metapsychology 950 Guinda St. Palo Alto, CA 94301 UUCP: pyramid!thirdi!sarge