KFL@MX.LCS.MIT.EDU (11/15/86)
From: "Keith F. Lynch" <KFL@MX.LCS.MIT.EDU>
From: rutgers!princeton!mind!harnad@Seismo.arpa (Stevan Harnad)
> All scientific beliefs are in principle falsifiable by experiment.
For example, I suppose, the scientific belief that all scientific
beliefs are in principle falsifiable by experiment...
That is not a scientific belief, but a definition.
...Keith
harnad@mind.UUCP (Stevan Harnad) (11/19/86)
In article <247@sri-arpa.ARPA>, KFL@MX.LCS.MIT.EDU "Keith F. Lynch" writes: > > "All scientific beliefs are in principle falsifiable by experiment" > ...is not a scientific belief, but a definition. And what argument is there for adhering to that definition? What other issues can be settled by proffering a definition? (This problem is at least as old as Hume; I recommend reading Lewis Carroll on Achilles and the Tortoise.) -- Stevan Harnad (609) - 921 7771 {allegra, bellcore, seismo, rutgers, packard} !princeton!mind!harnad harnad%mind@princeton.csnet