henry@utzoo.UUCP (Henry Spencer) (10/26/86)
Federal Express, which has both Ariane and Titan launch reservations already,
will issue a public request for proposals for launch services in October.
Bidding will be open to all; interest from the Chinese is expected, also
possibly other new suppliers.
NASA is preparing to release new transcripts of prelaunch conversations
among the Challenger crew. The tape is about an hour long, starting at
the time the crew entered the orbiter. There are some references to cold
weather, but nothing relevant to the launch decision. The recording was
not transcribed and released before because it provided no accident-relevant
information, and such conversations are normally confidential in deference
to crew privacy.
NASA space-station management recommends a redesigned station for launch
starting in 1993, focussing initially on a single crossbeam with manned
modules at the center and solar panels on the ends. Many systems planned
for external mounting on the "dual keel" station will now be inside enlarged
"resource nodes" connecting the manned modules, to reduce EVA requirements.
Extensive external structure resembling that of the "dual keel" station
might eventually evolve out of the initial configuration.
The redesign will probably delay attachment of the ESA lab module, and
possibly the Japanese module. The Canadian servicing facility might also
be affected. There are few assembly sequences that *don't* delay arrival
of the international components. The international partners might get
increased privileges in the US module group in compensation, although
doing this could make US users unhappy. Europe and Japan are pushing to get
their modules up as early as possible.
The redesign endorsed a crew escape module as desirable, but didn't make
it a formal part of the configuration. The intent here is probably an
attempt to separate the expensive escape module from the already-tight
budget.
The redesign will have a useful man-tended capability by the fifth assembly
flight (early 1994?) and will be permanently manned by the seventh or eighth
(mid 1994?). Full assembly of the previous configuration could have taken
31 launches over eight years.
The key changes that Fletcher might adopt are:
- Revision of assembly sequence to defer EVA until later missions.
- Change from the dual-keel configuration to the single-boom configuration,
at least for the first three years of operations. Automatic deployment of
the trusswork by robots is suggested as preferable to astronaut assembly.
The transverse boom may have disadvantages, such as pointing constraints
for instruments.
- Shortening of the pressurized modules to fit them better to reduced
shuttle lift limits.
- Emphasis on deployed rather than assembled utilities, again to reduce EVA.
- Use of expendables during assembly. This would probably require an
automated rendezvous and docking system, such as the Soviets have. The
polar platform may also need redesign to fly on the Titan 4, if there
won't be any polar Shuttle launches for a while.
- Basing the Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle in space during assembly, to give
more payload on shuttle flights. The OMV could also provide stationkeeping
and reboost during early assembly, before the station can do these for itself.
The review group found that shuttle launch rates will be a problem, given
that there will still be a backlog of missions from the launch hiatus. A
four-orbiter fleet is considered marginal in the circumstances.
Atlas E successfully launches NOAA weather satellite from Vandenberg Sept 17,
first successful US civilian satellite launch since shuttle 61C on Jan 12.
The satellite, NOAA-10, replaces the aging NOAA-6, which was called back into
service after NOAA-8 failed in orbit late last year. It also restores
Sarsat capability that was lost when NOAA-8 failed; NOAA-6 was too old to
have the search-and-rescue package. Launch was trouble-free when it finally
went off. It had been delayed a total of about a year due to scheduling
conflicts and problems with both satellite and booster. 12 Atlas E's remain
in inventory, assigned to military and civilian weather satellites through
about 1990. NOAA is concerned, however, that the USAF may stop using the
Atlas E, putting all the overhead costs in NOAA's lap. NOAA is studying
the cost of launching its satellites on Titan 2, just in case.
New report on problems of radioactive space debris calls it a serious
problem. There are about 50 reactors and isotope generators now in orbit,
mostly from the Soviet military radar satellites. The Teledyne Brown
report also says there is cause to worry about the possibility of one of
those satellites being fragmented by a debris collision; most of them are
in high-traffic orbital regions. The Soviets did speculate that the Cosmos
954 incident might have involved a debris collision. Another ominous item
is that the only US reactor in orbit, the experimental SNAP-10A launched
in 1965, has spawned pieces of debris on at least six occasions in the last
seven years; nobody knows what the debris is or why it's being released.
Launch failures are also a concern. The US has had two isotope generators
go into the ocean after launch failures, one later recovered intact and the
other believed to have survived intact. The Soviets have dropped two radar-
satellite reactors into the Pacific from launch failures, also a Lunokhod
with an isotope heat source.
NASA delays rollout of Atlantis for weather-protection tests two weeks to
Oct 7. This will be the first time a shuttle has been rolled out since
51L, and probably the last until launches resume. The main purpose is to
check new weather-protection shields on Pad 39B. NASA also is taking
advantage of the only time it will have a shuttle on the pad any time
soon to run assorted other tests of pad procedures and facilities. The
delay is because a jammed payload-changeout-room door must be repaired if
some of the auxiliary tests are to be run, and because wind instrumentation
for a hydrogen-trapping test must be in place before Atlantis returns to
the VAB if that test is to be run. The door repair is taking longer than
expected, and the wind-measuring gear won't be ready until mid-November.
Among the auxiliary tests are a crew-escape simulation, to evaluate the
escape procedures and train support crews on them.
Doubts are being expressed that the shuttle will be ready to go in the
first quarter of 1988. Testing and verification of the booster redesign
is a problem area, although Truly says that the worst part of clearing
the shuttle to fly again is the huge task of reviewing all the flight-
critical items from scratch. One thing that would necessarily involve
a major delay would be a vertical test firing of a full SRB. At the
moment all full tests are to be horizontal, although there has been a
strong recommendation for a new test stand at Morton Thiokol to permit
testing under dynamic loads that the current stand can't provide.
[Editorial for the week: I support the recommendation in "America: A
Spacefaring Nation Again" that military shuttle launches using volunteer
military crews should resume *immediately*, to meet immediate needs and
keep the launch crews in practice. -- HS]
House adopted and sent to the Senate an Administration-backed bill which
extends US patent law to cover space activities about US space vehicles;
essentially it makes a US space vehicle part of the US for patent purposes.
Senate action this year is unlikely due to lack of time.
Intelsat buys another Ariane for the third Intelsat 6, formerly contracted
for the Shuttle. The first and second Intelsat 6's have already made the
switch.
Intelsat plans to self-insure launch of the first two Intelsat 6 comsats,
and has cancelled partial launch insurance already obtained. Full coverage
for $200M satellites was unobtainable, and the premiums for partial coverage
were approaching the value of the coverage itself.
--
Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
{allegra,ihnp4,decvax,pyramid}!utzoo!henryalex@xios.UUCP (Alex B Laney) (10/30/86)
In article <7254@utzoo.UUCP> henry@utzoo.UUCP (Henry Spencer) writes: >[Editorial for the week: I support the recommendation in "America: A >Spacefaring Nation Again" that military shuttle launches using volunteer >military crews should resume *immediately*, to meet immediate needs and >keep the launch crews in practice. -- HS] ... I volunteer Henry. -- - + - + - Alex Laney, Xios Systems Corp, 105-1600 Carling Av, Ottawa (613)725-5411x402 utzoo - > !dciem allegra!ihnp4!utcsri -- > nrcaer!xios!lib!alex ucbvax!hplabs -- / > !seismo!hadron!netex!prcrs/ decvax --
henry@utzoo.UUCP (Henry Spencer) (11/03/86)
> >... military shuttle launches using volunteer > >military crews should resume *immediately*... > > ... I volunteer Henry. I volunteer me, too! Given some care -- warm weather, careful booster stacking, avoiding high pressures in leak tests -- there is no real doubt that unmodified Shuttles could be launched with little chance of disastrous failure. There wouldn't be the slightest problem finding qualified volunteer crews. -- Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology {allegra,ihnp4,decvax,pyramid}!utzoo!henry
chiaraviglio@husc2.UUCP (lucius) (11/04/86)
In article <7275@utzoo.UUCP>, henry@utzoo.UUCP (Henry Spencer) writes: > Given some care -- warm weather, careful booster stacking, avoiding high > pressures in leak tests -- there is no real doubt that unmodified Shuttles > could be launched with little chance of disastrous failure. How can you be sure that the chance of disastrous failure is little? Our track record only suggests that the chance of a disaster isn't greatly over 1 in 25, which seems to me to be unacceptable without taking precautions to reduce it. Considering NASA's internal track record, I think those things should stay grounded until they are checked over by people who are not being pushed to gloss things over, and a full technical report of the checkout comes out. Otherwise, we might have as many as 25 more flights, and then another disaster, which would even further cripple our space capability. Also, you propose getting launches going for military missions. Why so much interest in running military missions in such haste? Further militarization of space is one of the things we _l_e_a_s_t need. Why should the military get priority in recovery efforts after something goes wrong? It is _c_r_i_m_i_n_a_l that, after the shuttle has been presented to the taxpayers as a commercially viable venture, the commercial ventures and all but a handful of scientific missions have been kicked off it in favor of the military. -- -- Lucius Chiaraviglio lucius@tardis.harvard.edu {insert your favorite brave system here}!seismo!tardis!lucius Please do not mail replies to me on husc2 (disk quota problems, and broken mail system won't let me send mail out). Please send only to the address given above.
karn@ka9q.bellcore.com (Phil Karn) (11/04/86)
> Given some care -- warm weather, careful booster stacking, avoiding high > pressures in leak tests -- there is no real doubt that unmodified Shuttles > could be launched with little chance of disastrous failure. There wouldn't > be the slightest problem finding qualified volunteer crews. According to the Rogers commission, "O-ring thermal distress" has occurred during launches in temperatures as high as 75 deg F (STS-61A, two different joints). Anomalies also occurred on STS-41D and STS-2, which were both launched at 70 F, despite a lower leak check pressure (100 psi on the nozzle joint on 41D, 50 psi on STS-2). It would be mad to launch an unfixed SRB with that kind of track record. Perhaps I'd approve of a military flight of an unmodified shuttle if the DoD FIRST turned over its SDI funding for a year and built another orbiter (and possibly another launch pad) to cover NASA in the event of another disaster. Unfortunately, though, it's always NASA who gets to eat the risks. Phil
henry@utzoo.UUCP (Henry Spencer) (11/05/86)
> How can you be sure that the chance of disastrous failure is little? > Our track record only suggests that the chance of a disaster isn't greatly > over 1 in 25, which seems to me to be unacceptable without taking precautions > to reduce it... Have you read the Rogers Commission report? The problems generally show a strong correlation -- not a perfect one, but pretty strong -- with cold temperatures and high-pressure leak tests. (The incidence of O-ring trouble jumped *spectacularly* when NASA increased leak-test pressure; the Rogers people were appalled that nobody had noticed.) Admittedly I should probably have said "little doubt" rather than "no real doubt", but it seems like a good bet to me. At the very least, given the correlations, it's safe to say that SRB reliability with warm joints and low-pressure leak tests should be rather better than the overall current record. > ... stay grounded until they are checked over by people who are not being > pushed to gloss things over... If the basis for this is that it's unacceptable to risk crews, all I can say is that qualified volunteers should not be hard to find. If the basis is excessive risk to payloads, see comments below. If the basis is risk of losing another orbiter, I *do* agree that it is not realistic to fly more Shuttle missions without a commitment to prompt replacement of orbiters lost due to accident. (You will note that the previous sentence does *not* limit itself to missions prior to the safety overhaul.) > Also, you propose getting launches going for military missions. Why > so much interest in running military missions in such haste? ... When it comes to keeping the launch crews in practice, the nature of the payload is pretty irrelevant. And I personally think that a lot of other payloads are more important. However, flying the Shuttle before the safety changes are complete must be considered slightly risky. Not risky enough not to do it, but risky enough to think twice about launching one-of-a-kind payloads like the Space Telescope. The loss of a single military payload wouldn't be a tenth of the disaster that losing the HST would be. Other reasons are that the public is more willing to accept risks on military missions flown by military crews -- look at the death rate in military flying if you doubt this -- and that the current climate in Washington is more favorable to strong backing of risky undertakings when there are military motives. (This may not be pleasant, but we have to live in the real world, folks.) > Further militarization of space is one of the things we least need. It is going to happen whether we like it or not; have you seen the current notions of what the Shuttle cargo manifest will look like when launches resume? Given that those payloads *will* fly, let them take the risks and keep the system going while its problems are fixed. > Why should the > military get priority in recovery efforts after something goes wrong? They aren't getting priority in recovery efforts, they are being asked to assume the responsibility and risks of keeping a flawed system going *before* the recovery effort is complete. They are, after all, sworn to give their lives for their country if needed. > It is criminal that, after the shuttle has been presented to the taxpayers > as a commercially viable venture, the commercial ventures and all but a > handful of scientific missions have been kicked off it... Yup. But the taxpayers, or rather their elected representatives, didn't feel like funding a commercially viable venture. The Shuttle program survived by appealing to the military for help; we are now paying the piper. (And the tune he played wasn't even all that good, dammit! Not even a fifth orbiter, much less a fifteenth.) -- Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology {allegra,ihnp4,decvax,pyramid}!utzoo!henry
henry@utzoo.UUCP (Henry Spencer) (11/05/86)
> According to the Rogers commission, "O-ring thermal distress" has occurred > during launches in temperatures as high as 75 deg F... Agreed that I overstated the case a bit, but only a bit. Being careful with the O-rings will not reduce risk to zero, but it will improve the odds a lot. Yes, there were O-ring problems in favorable conditions, but the points on the graphs cluster awfully heavily on the "unfavorable" side. > ... It would be mad to launch an unfixed SRB with that kind of track record. Not mad, just a little daring in a good cause. There is no such thing as a zero-risk mission. Remember "if we die, we want the program to continue; the conquest of space is worth the risk of life"? The continuation of the shuttle program is receding steadily farther into the future. > Perhaps I'd approve of a military flight of an unmodified shuttle if the DoD > FIRST turned over its SDI funding for a year and built another orbiter (and > possibly another launch pad) to cover NASA in the event of another disaster. Sounds like a fine idea to me; pity it won't happen. > Unfortunately, though, it's always NASA who gets to eat the risks. I do agree that flying the shuttle again immediately is unacceptable without a firm commitment to replacing further losses. That's the biggest reason why, unfortunately, it's not going to happen. -- Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology {allegra,ihnp4,decvax,pyramid}!utzoo!henry
desj@brahms (David desJardins) (11/07/86)
In article <7279@utzoo.UUCP> henry@utzoo.UUCP (Henry Spencer) writes: > [...] Not risky enough not to do it, but risky enough to think twice >about launching one-of-a-kind payloads like the Space Telescope. The >loss of a single military payload wouldn't be a tenth of the disaster >that losing the HST would be. As much as I agree with your sentiment (that shuttle launches should resume ASAP), the above makes no real sense, except perhaps politically. The $1G HST doesn't add significantly to the risk of losing the $2.5G orbiter (certainly not "ten times"!). -- David desJardins
gelfand@valid.UUCP (Brooks Gelfand) (11/07/86)
> > >... military shuttle launches using volunteer > > >military crews should resume *immediately*... > > > > ... I volunteer Henry. > > I volunteer me, too! > > Given some care -- warm weather, careful booster stacking, avoiding high > pressures in leak tests -- there is no real doubt that unmodified Shuttles > could be launched with little chance of disastrous failure. There wouldn't > be the slightest problem finding qualified volunteer crews. > -- > Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology > {allegra,ihnp4,decvax,pyramid}!utzoo!henry I agree, finding crews would probably not be a problem. The problem is we cannot aford to loose any more shuttles. These things are not mass produced; the lead time to replace one is several years. They are very expensive. Loose another one and our glorious congress may not appropriate the money needed to replace it. Brooks Gelfand
henry@utzoo.UUCP (Henry Spencer) (11/09/86)
> As much as I agree with your sentiment (that shuttle launches should > resume ASAP), the above makes no real sense, except perhaps politically. > The $1G HST doesn't add significantly to the risk of losing the $2.5G > orbiter (certainly not "ten times"!). I was comparing payloads, not orbiters. Any immediate resumption of launches clearly demands a commitment to replace any further orbiter losses. But replacing the HST would be difficult and very expensive; remember that a new one would probably cost a good deal more than the existing one. Replacing an orbiter could be justified in terms of strongly-supported (well, relatively strongly-supported) things like military space activity and the Space Station. Replacing the HST would be harder. Better we should launch something we can afford to lose. -- Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology {allegra,ihnp4,decvax,pyramid}!utzoo!henry