henry@utzoo.uucp (Henry Spencer) (03/18/88)
Editorial praising Pete Aldridge (sec of air force) for his efforts at
getting expendable launchers going again, but ending with a caution:
"USAF is now threatening to turn ALS into a technology program instead
of a project that can provide the US with a heavy lift capability by
the late 1990s. Sending ALS into the bureaucratic black hole in which
so many technology efforts disappear will not help the US recover the
heavy lift capability it lost when NASA abandoned the Saturn V..."
Arianespace puts in a bid to launch the next pair of NATO military
comsats, pointing out that 60% of NATO's infrastructure budget now
comes from Europe.
Small study contracts for multimegawatt space reactors put out by DOE.
Aussat is showing a strong preference for launching the next-generation
Aussats on Long March (!). The business may end up being split between
Long March and either Titan or Ariane, because Aussat will probably want
a backup launcher and the Western launch companies may not be interested
in serving only as backups (i.e. they may want to be first in line for
one of the launches in return for being backup for the other).
White House finally releases the new National Space Policy. Of note are
provision of shuttle external tanks in orbit free to commercial projects,
and competitive procurement by NASA of something like ISF.
Big article on SDI's Delta 181 space test mission, launched Feb 8. There
were some tracking problems and a partial failure of one important sensor,
but on the whole the mission was successful. The launch was very carefully
done, including a supervisory team whose sole job was to watch for things
the launch team might overlook. Weather criteria were tight, and so was
security: a USAF gunship circled the pad area for several hours before
launch, among other things. (Officially it was there to keep the range
clear of boats, but note that the AC-130 aircraft is heavily armed and
carries sensors that can pick up intruders by their body heat.)
The third SDI Delta will fly early in fall. Delta will officially become
a USAF launcher after that mission, but the USAF has asked NASA for the
lead role on that one too; "the issue is being negotiated".
Picture of a Hermes model in a wind tunnel.
Formal space-station negotiations concluded Feb 6, not entirely successfully.
Informal negotiations will continue to try to sort out the remaining issues.
Canada is still the only partner that has agreed to the US's memorandum of
agreement. [Late news: Canada's participation is now considered to be in
serious jeopardy, because Congressional budget cuts may remove most of
Canada's role. If you have a station-related job, on either side of the
border, I would recommend bringing your resume up to date...]
Veteran cosmonaut Vladimir Solovyov among those presenting papers at an
AIAA conference this week. He says that greater attention to crew comfort
is needed on Mir, and better automation of routine housekeeping would also
be useful (he appears to mean monitoring and control, not robotics). He
also notes that the crew wants to be able to vary the vehicle's climate
from time to time, and that private rooms are needed.
Aerojet tests a small ultra-high-thrust rocket engine for final maneuvering
of missile interceptors.
SDI outlines a proposed operating structure for an initial missile-defence
system; of note is that contrary to assorted alarmist claims, top control
would remain with humans.
Big advertiser-funded supplement: "Space Industries". Front page is a
satellite photo of Seattle, supplied by Soyuzkarta. The content is pretty
lightweight except for two items: a statement from Eosat that Spot has
had no effect on Landsat revenues (apparently it has expanded the market
instead), and a near-full-page ad for the only heavy booster "AVAILABLE
RIGHT NOW!": Proton.
[Yes, Soyuzkarta is who you think it is: the USSR.]
Target for next Ariane launch slips a week (to March 11) because Matra is
making urgent changes to one of the payloads. Telecom 1C is being fixed
to ensure that it doesn't have the same disastrous attitude-control failure
that hit Telecom 1B.
Stacking of the first Ariane 4 (launch tentatively May) is underway.
JPL studies feasibility of a specialized space telescope for hunting
extrasolar planets; it would combine ultraprecise optics (developed for
the semiconductor industry, not for spy satellites!) with a new design
of coronagraph to block the light from the star.
Design selected for astronaut memorial at KSC, a slab of granite that will
track the sun, with astronaut's names cut into it, illuminated by mirrors
behind it.
Retiring DepSecCommerce Clarence Brown slams government mismanagement of
space programs (especially by NASA) and hostility to commercial space.
In microgravity programs, "Optimistic folks think we're in third place;
the pessimists think we're in fourth or fifth." Recent DoC study says
industrial interest is space is very high; Brown observes that most of
the interested companies are European or Japanese.
The competing mobile-satellite companies have finally merged into an
uneasy consortium and have submitted a joint bid to the FCC.
DARPA to award small contracts for lightweight-launcher programs,
including an air-launched vehicle for small payloads, a Standard Small
Launch Vehicle (1500 lbs to low orbit in mid-1990), and an Interim
Launch Vehicle (400 lbs to low orbit in mid-1989). All the obvious
companies are interested.
Hearings to begin on limiting liability for US commercial space launches.
Congress backs a scheme in which liability over $500M is assumed by
government, paralleling an arrangement used by NASA in pre-Challenger days.
Liability for damage to government property will be limited, all parties
involved will be required to sign waivers renouncing claims against each
other, and launch-date commitments will not be subject to government
preemption except in cases of "imperative national need" [whatever that is].
Also bundled in may be provisions giving special discounts and liability
reductions to owners of satellites bumped from the shuttle, *if* they
launch them on a US launcher. Reagan administration also wants limits on
commercial-launch liability, but is proposing it as a flat limit on
liability, rather than having the government assume responsibility after
a limit is reached; this is arguably a fundamental change to liability
law and may not be popular with Congress.
Two-page letter column with reactions to AW&ST's facelift and style change,
perhaps half of it negative. "If I wanted Newsweek -- I don't -- I would
have subscribed to Newsweek." [I agree.]
--
Those who do not understand Unix are | Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
condemned to reinvent it, poorly. | {allegra,ihnp4,decvax,utai}!utzoo!henrykarn@thumper.bellcore.com (Phil R. Karn) (03/19/88)
> SDI outlines a proposed operating structure for an initial missile-defence > system; of note is that contrary to assorted alarmist claims, top control > would remain with humans. Considering that the human involved would have to decide whether to commit the United States to nuclear war, I would hope that by "human control" they mean the President of the United States. Considering that the President would have to make the decision in less than a minute, let me know when you find a (human) candidate for president that can stay awake, alert and "plugged in" to the system 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, for at least four straight years. For that matter, try finding one that can stay awake during important meetings... Phil
kevin@cit-adel.Caltech.Edu (Kevin Van Horn) (03/21/88)
In article <993@thumper.bellcore.com> karn@thumper.bellcore.com (Phil R. Karn) writes: >> SDI outlines a proposed operating structure for an initial missile-defence >> system; of note is that contrary to assorted alarmist claims, top control >> would remain with humans. > >Considering that the human involved would have to decide whether to >commit the United States to nuclear war, I would hope that by "human >control" they mean the President of the United States. What kind of imbecilic nonsense is this? Deciding whether or not to shoot down something that looks like a missile has nothing to do with committing the United States to a nuclear war. The Soviets shot down something that merely looked like it might be a spy plane (flight KAL 007) and we didn't even come close to any kind of conventional military conflict over the incident, much less a nuclear war. Kevin S. Van Horn
steve@siemens.UUCP (Steve Clark) (03/22/88)
In article <5856@cit-vax.Caltech.Edu> kevin@cit-adel.UUCP (Kevin Van Horn) writes: >[...] The Soviets shot down something that merely >looked like it might be a spy plane (flight KAL 007) [...] > >Kevin S. Van Horn You touched a nerve here. The Soviets never NEVER said the 747 looked like a spy plane. They said it was on a spying mission. Our President and our news did not present evidence that it was on a spying mission (all lights were out etc.) and made it appear that the soviets claimed it was a spy plane rather than a spying mission. The distortion by our press and President was itself a news item in Germany at the time. (I went to Germany on a short business trip at the time, and I was amazed at the difference in the story here and there. I no longer believe we have a completely free press in the US.) Steve Clark, steve@siemens.com
karn@thumper.bellcore.com (Phil R. Karn) (03/22/88)
> >Considering that the human involved would have to decide whether to > >commit the United States to nuclear war, I would hope that by "human > >control" they mean the President of the United States. > > What kind of imbecilic nonsense is this? Deciding whether or not to shoot > down something that looks like a missile has nothing to do with committing the > United States to a nuclear war... Take a look at the X-ray laser program, widely credited with infatuating Ronald Reagan with his strategic defense fantasy. An X-ray laser is pumped by the detonation of a nuclear bomb. Deciding to shoot down what appears to be a Soviet missile with an X-ray laser therefore involves the detonation of a nuclear device in space within line of sight of the USSR. Considering that many nuclear attack scenarios begin with the detonation of nuclear weapons in space near the target country to generate EMP and blind sensors, the already paranoid Soviets could well believe that a US nuclear attack was underway and respond by launching their own missiles in a "pre-emptive" strike. Voila, nuclear war started by the defensive system that was supposed to protect against it. Even a non-nuclear "defensive" weapon, if accidentally used against a non-threatening Soviet launch, could create a crisis that could well trigger a nuclear war. Remember that most Soviet launches involve highly sensitive military C3I payloads that the Soviets consider important to their "deterrent". (Perhaps "we" know that we would never attack the USSR first, but the Soviets don't feel that way. It's their *perception* of our intent that's important here.) The Soviets might well feel that the "mistake" was in fact a deliberate precursor to a sneak attack, in which destroying the opponent's "eyes and ears" is the natural first step. Again, the temptation to "pre-empt" might become irresistable. So I suggest that next time you do a little research before you use phrases like "imbecilic nonsense". Phil
news@cit-vax.Caltech.Edu (Usenet netnews) (03/24/88)
<5856@cit-vax.Caltech.Edu> <1001@thumper.bellcore.com> Sender: Reply-To: kevin@cit-adel.UUCP (Kevin Van Horn) Followup-To: Distribution: Organization: California Institute of Technology Keywords: From: kevin@cit-adel.Caltech.Edu (Kevin Van Horn) Path: cit-adel!kevin In article <1001@thumper.bellcore.com> karn@thumper.bellcore.com (Phil R. Karn) writes [in reference to Henry Spencer's comment that the proposed first-generation missile defense using kinetic-energy weapons would have a man in the loop]: >> >Considering that the human involved would have to decide whether to >> >commit the United States to nuclear war, I would hope that by "human >> >control" they mean the President of the United States. >> >> What kind of imbecilic nonsense is this? Deciding whether or not to shoot >> down something that looks like a missile has nothing to do with committing >> the United States to a nuclear war... > >Take a look at the X-ray laser program, ... We weren't talking about the X-ray laser program, we were talking about a system using kinetic energy weapons. But I'll tackle this anyway. >An X-ray laser is pumped by the detonation of a nuclear bomb. Deciding to >shoot down what appears to be a Soviet missile with an X-ray laser therefore >involves the detonation of a nuclear device in space within line of sight of >the USSR. Well... within line of sight of a missile coming from the USSR, which may or may not entail being within line of sight of the USSR itself. Either way, you don't have to be anywhere near the missile to be within line of sight -- for example, if both the missile and the X-ray laser are 500 miles above the surface of the earth, the missile can be over 4000 miles away and still be within line of sight (the U.S. itself is only about 3000 miles from coast to coast). And you're going to want your X-ray laser to be a good distance from its targets anyway, since it has to simultaneously aim its 1000 lasing rods at as many different targets as it can, and those targets are not going to be bunched together. >Considering that many nuclear attack scenarios begin with the >detonation of nuclear weapons in space near the target country to >generate EMP and blind sensors, the already paranoid Soviets could well >believe that a US nuclear attack was underway and respond by launching >their own missiles in a "pre-emptive" strike. As already mentioned, the explosion would not take place near the USSR. Furthermore, X-ray lasers involve the explosion of very small nuclear devices, whereas for an effective EMP attack you want to use very large nuclear weapons. The two are very easily distinguished. In addition, since X-ray lasers are one-shot weapons intended to knock out ~100 targets at a time, they would only only be used against a presumed full-scale nuclear attack, i.e. a situation in which hundreds or thousands of launches are observed within minutes of each other. In such a case you can be superbly confident that you are indeed observing a full-scale nuclear attack, and not something else. >Even a non-nuclear "defensive" weapon, if accidentally used against a >non-threatening Soviet launch, could create a crisis that could well >trigger a nuclear war. Remember that most Soviet launches involve highly >sensitive military C3I payloads that the Soviets consider important to >their "deterrent". [...] The Soviets might well feel that >the "mistake" was in fact a deliberate precursor to a sneak attack, in >which destroying the opponent's "eyes and ears" is the natural first >step. Again, the temptation to "pre-empt" might become irresistable. Come on, give the Soviets credit for *some* modicum of intelligence and rationality! Do you really think they're going to push the button over *one* destroyed C3I launch? Especially when all of their C3I assets already in orbit remain untouched? If the Soviets really did have such itchy trigger fingers we would have had our nuclear holocaust already. Kevin S. Van Horn
adrian@cs.hw.ac.uk (Adrian Hurt) (03/24/88)
In article <505@siemens.UUCP>, steve@siemens.UUCP (Steve Clark) writes: > In article <5856@cit-vax.Caltech.Edu> kevin@cit-adel.UUCP (Kevin Van Horn) writes: > >[...] The Soviets shot down something that merely > >looked like it might be a spy plane (flight KAL 007) [...] 007? It must have been a spy plane, then! :-) > You touched a nerve here. The Soviets never NEVER said the 747 looked like > a spy plane. They said it was on a spying mission. Well now, what about the genuine spy planes, on spying missions? The SR-71's, for example? And what about the "Bears", those huge prop-driven Russian planes we often see photos of, being escorted out of your airspace by your fighters? Even if the 747 was on a spying mission, does that entitle the Russians to shoot it down? If so, why doesn't the USAF (or RAF, for that matter - we get them too) shoot down these intruders - with much less loss of civilian life. I imagine there would be much more of an outcry if a USAF Phantom shot down an airliner, even if there were clear evidence it was up to no good. -- "Keyboard? Tis quaint!" - M. Scott Adrian Hurt | JANET: adrian@uk.ac.hw.cs UUCP: ..!ukc!cs.hw.ac.uk!adrian | ARPA: adrian@cs.hw.ac.uk