henry@utzoo.uucp (Henry Spencer) (11/19/88)
In article <7734@dasys1.UUCP> tneff@dasys1.UUCP (Tom Neff) writes: >-...NASA is >-hardly blameless for the pressure it applied, but it was Thiokol, not >-NASA, that ultimately decided to ignore the problem... >-Being honorable under pressure is difficult, yes. It's ever so much >-simpler to take the easy way out and say "I vas chust following orders". > >Thiokol was concurrently negotiating a contract renewal. The pressure >to "go along" under those circumstances is unbearable... Et tu, Tom? I really fear for mankind's future when damn near everybody who discusses this issue seems to feel that Thiokol was right to go along just because it would have been difficult and painful not to. The trouble with having an unpopular opinion is that everybody claims you don't understand the problem. I understand, fully and completely, that Thiokol was in a very awkward spot where there was great incentive to cave in to NASA's pressure. THAT DID NOT MAKE IT RIGHT. Nor should it excuse them from taking responsibility for their cowardice, and its disastrous consequences. The greatest tragedy of the Challenger disaster is that seven people died, a near-irreplaceable billion-dollar orbiter was destroyed, the US manned space program was nearly ruined... and nobody was held responsible for it in any meaningful way. >... Until and unless we put every contractor in >the excruciating position Thiokol was in and compare their performance, >I consider it unfair to single out Thiokol for not dealing well with >improper NASA pressure. Ah, the other Nuremberg defence (in addition to "I vas chust following orders"): "if I did not do it, someone else would have". Are you claiming that just because most contractors would behave the same way, that somehow makes it right for Thiokol to do so? Name one other contractor who has, in fact as opposed to hypothesis, caused that much damage. Actually, have no fear -- if the message we send those people is that screwing up massively results in billions of dollars of new contracts and no significant penalties, then there *will* be more. -- Sendmail is a bug, | Henry Spencer at U of Toronto Zoology not a feature. | uunet!attcan!utzoo!henry henry@zoo.toronto.edu
tneff@dasys1.UUCP (Tom Neff) (11/21/88)
In article <1988Nov18.182613.1823@utzoo.uucp> henry@utzoo.uucp (Henry Spencer) writes: -In article <7734@dasys1.UUCP> tneff@dasys1.UUCP (Tom Neff) writes: ->-...NASA is ->-hardly blameless for the pressure it applied, but it was Thiokol, not ->-NASA, that ultimately decided to ignore the problem... ->-Being honorable under pressure is difficult, yes. It's ever so much ->-simpler to take the easy way out and say "I vas chust following orders". -> ->Thiokol was concurrently negotiating a contract renewal. The pressure ->to "go along" under those circumstances is unbearable... - -Et tu, Tom? I really fear for mankind's future when damn near everybody -who discusses this issue seems to feel that Thiokol was right to go along ^^^^^^^^^ -just because it would have been difficult and painful not to. I come to bury Thiokol, not to praise it. <grin - couldn't resist, Spencerius> The reason we're still disagreeing is that Henry has shifted ground. He started by saying that Thiokol should be DUMPED forever as a shuttle contractor because of their role in the Challenger disaster. Now he's just saying they weren't RIGHT to yield to NASA pressure. I agree, they weren't. Going from there to Henry's suggested remedy is another question altogether. I claim that any of the major NASA contractors would have done nearly the same thing under similar circumstances, especially considering the contract renewal. If we want to dump the contractor system as a whole, OK; if not, NASA has to be held responsible for managing that system effectively. "My God, Thiokol, when do you want me to launch, next April?" The virtuous answer to Mulloy's question would have been "yes, if necessary." You would have to be a Keebler Elf to believe that any NASA contractor could have been expected to give that answer. The crime is that the question was even asked. -The greatest tragedy of the Challenger disaster is that seven people died, -a near-irreplaceable billion-dollar orbiter was destroyed, the US manned -space program was nearly ruined... and nobody was held responsible for -it in any meaningful way. On the gut level I agree with this, but in a certain sense the outcome we got may have been better. By blaming the "system as a whole" for the tragedy while most of the specific people under fire quit or were transferred elsewhere, we spread the hurt (I think) where it will do the most good. It might have been counterproductive to have had someone like the doped-up Amtrak switcher to pillory publicly. The flawed system itself might have been permitted to plow on unaffected in the aftermath. -- Tom Neff UUCP: ...!cmcl2!phri!dasys1!tneff "None of your toys CIS: 76556,2536 MCI: TNEFF will function..." GEnie: TOMNEFF BIX: t.neff (no kidding)
bpendlet@esunix.UUCP (Bob Pendleton) (11/22/88)
From article <1988Nov18.182613.1823@utzoo.uucp>, by henry@utzoo.uucp (Henry Spencer): [Discussion of the lack of punishment for Morton Thiokol] > Actually, have no fear -- if the message we send those people is that > screwing up massively results in billions of dollars of new contracts > and no significant penalties, then there *will* be more. I wish I didn't have to agree with Henry on this, but I do. If you want to see something that will make you puke, take a real close look at the politics surrounding the ASRM contract. ASRM is NASAs attempt at a politically viable way to take the SRM contract away from Morton Thiokol. Morton Thiokol could compete for the contract, but has chosen not to. Best bet is that they will use political pressure to try to kill funding, delay purchases, ... of ASRM after the contract is awarded. And if you can't buy ASRM, well, Morton is still willing to sell SRM. Trouble with ASRM, is that it isn't Advanced enough to really justify its cost. Bob P. -- Bob Pendleton, speaking only for myself. UUCP Address: decwrl!esunix!bpendlet or utah-cs!esunix!bpendlet Reality is what you make of it.
henry@utzoo.uucp (Henry Spencer) (11/25/88)
In article <7825@dasys1.UUCP> tneff@dasys1.UUCP (Tom Neff) writes: >... If >we want to dump the contractor system as a whole, OK; if not, NASA has >to be held responsible for managing that system effectively... Right. And one very important part of managing it effectively is to make it clear to contractors that appropriate behavior will be rewarded and inappropriate behavior will be punished. Do we really want to prevent a recurrence of Challenger? If so, the next time a contractor is faced with the decision of whether to cut corners or not, and the engineers say it's not safe, and the management is tempted to overrule them, what can the engineers say? Remember, management is MBAs and stuffed shirts, whose notions of honor and professional ethics and duty could be inscribed on the head of a pin in large type: what matters to them is money. Will the engineers be able to say "but look what it *cost* Thiokol when they cut corners"? If they can't say that, then management will overrule them. And right now, you better believe that they can't say that. Thiokol made large profits out of killing seven astronauts, not least the indefinite postponement of the second-sourcing issue. The right thing to do would have been to bring other contractors in on the SRB fixes, since Thiokol had demonstrated that it values money over safety, and shift production away from Thiokol as quickly as possible. And lay some criminal charges against those directly responsible (in NASA as well as Thiokol) too. That might perhaps send the right message. What was actually done sure hasn't. >Thiokol, when do you want me to launch, next April?" The virtuous >answer to Mulloy's question would have been "yes, if necessary." You >would have to be a Keebler Elf to believe that any NASA contractor >could have been expected to give that answer. The crime is that the >question was even asked. By the same argument, though, would you really expect that low-level NASA management, under the pressures they were under, would have asked the question any differently? That argument can be applied to almost any length, leading to the conclusion that nobody is responsible. Which is certainly the implicit conclusion that was reached this time, to judge by the results. But if nobody was responsible for Challenger, nobody is really, personally responsible for making sure it doesn't happen again. What we want is for *everybody* to feel responsible. That means holding *all* involved parties responsible when something screws up. And doing more to them than just slapping their fingers in public, too. -- Sendmail is a bug, | Henry Spencer at U of Toronto Zoology not a feature. | uunet!attcan!utzoo!henry henry@zoo.toronto.edu