henry@utzoo.uucp (Henry Spencer) (11/04/88)
The Astro ultraviolet/X-ray telescope payload has slipped four months, to March 1990, on the new shuttle manifest. It was originally set to go immediately after Challenger in 1986, but is now #11 in the queue because of DoD and planetary-science priorities. First extended-duration shuttle mission set for March 1992, the first US Microgravity Lab mission (Spacelab aboard Columbia). It is planned to run 9-12 days, against the current norm of 5-7. NASA is looking at mounting a shuttle wheel and strut assembly on its Convair 990 testbed aircraft to run more realistic tests on the shuttle landing gear. White House will approve limited use of Long March by US satellites, given assurances on technology transfer, a limit of four commercial launches per year, and Chinese willingness to talk about pricing policy. German aerospace firms have begun basic technology work for the proposed Sanger two-stage spaceplane, with special emphasis on propulsion for the lower stage (a large Mach 5-6 hypersonic aircraft). Titan blows it again. Titan 34D launch from the Cape Sept 2 goes fine until the Transtage upper stage fails to re-ignite for the apogee maneuver. The payload, believed to be a Vortex snoopsat which would deploy a large antenna for communications eavesdropping from Clarke orbit, is considered a writeoff. The Vortex (nee Chalet) satellites currently in orbit are aging and in bad shape. The Transtage failure may have been a broken feed line or a minor structural failure that damaged crucial components. USAF Sec. Aldridge has egg on his face, since about 30 minutes after the launch he cited it as a shining example of "robust, flexible launch capability". Titan 2 launch from Vandenberg Sept 5 successful, deploying multiple satellites -- probably a US Navy "White Cloud" ship-tracking cluster -- into polar orbit. One minor blemish: the first stage oxidizer tank appears to have ruptured after (note, *after*) staging. This has happened occasionally before; it does not affect the second stage or the launch. It is thought to be due to shock waves from second-stage ignition. [I could be wrong, but I vaguely remember that the Titan is a bit unusual in that the second stage ignites just *before* stage separation, so the first stage really gets hit hard.] Soyuz TM-5 lands safely, nearly a day behind schedule, after equipment problems abort the first two attempts at retrofire. The crew left Mir on Sept 6, and then ejected their orbital module to prepare for retrofire. (This commits them to retrofire, since the orbital module carries the docking system.) The problem appears to have been stray sunlight in a horizon sensor used to determine whether the Soyuz is oriented correctly for retrofire. This shut the engines down sixty seconds into the first attempt. The engines restarted automatically seven minutes later [not clear why the delay], but the crew then shut them down after only 3 seconds to avoid landing in China. Another attempt, three hours later, failed due to use of the wrong reentry program, one meant for another mission. It's not clear why that happened. The crew spent nearly a day waiting for the right orbital position for a third try; they had oxygen for 48 hours, although things were a bit cramped. When ground controllers asked about food, the cosmonauts said food was not a problem but they were worried about the waste disposal system [which probably means there wasn't one aboard]. The third attempt, about 0400 Moscow time on the 7th, succeeded. Formal signing of the Space Station agreement set for Sept 29. ESA is not entirely happy, but says at least it's a better deal than Spacelab was. Canada gets 3% use of the whole station in return for providing the servicing equipment. Europe and Japan each get 51% of their own laboratory modules. The US gets all else. Station resources, like power and crew time, go first to basic necessities for keeping the station functioning; after that, the US gets about 70%, Europe and Japan each 13%, and Canada 3%. The partners may buy or trade resource use from each other. Each nation pays for maintaining its user hardware, plus a portion of "common" costs (divided the same way as resources), plus fees for any use of the shuttle and the TDRS network. All partners provide astronauts, to be certified and grouped into crews by NASA. Astronauts do not work exclusively on their own partner's equipment: they all work on all areas of the station, although there are provisions for protecting secret or proprietary work. Consensus management will be attempted, but NASA resolves disputes, with appeal processes terminating in the White House. The station plan continues to assume use of the shuttle for assembly and resupply, but partners will be allowed to use their own launchers and the US will supply necessary interface information. Similarly, TDRS is the base communications system but Europe can use its own relay network [currently being thought about] if it wants. China launchs a weather satellite into polar orbit from a new launch site south of Beijing. The Phobos 1 Mars probe is out of contact due to an erroneous ground command that caused loss of attitude control; its antenna lock on Earth is broken and it is feared lost. NASA's Deep Space Network cannot assist, because it is not yet ready for L-band operations and that's the band the Phobos probes use. (DSN is being equipped with L band to help receive data from the Phobos missions.) If the probe is tumbling, as is thought likely, it has largely lost solar power, and its batteries will only last two days. [It has now been written off.] Ariane launches two US comsats Sept 8. Rockwell is examining the LOX valves that showed sluggish operation during the shuttle flight-readiness firing. United Technologies drops out of the new-SRB competition; the RFP has finally been released, and certain clauses could require the winning contractor to make major investments out of its own money in some circumstances. Geostar increases capitalization to $80M with stock offering to Sony and other investors. Geostar says this will bring it to profitability. NATO signs for a Delta 2 launch for the NATO 4A military comsat. McDonnell Douglas signs deal with NASA for use of facilities at the Cape and Goddard to support Delta launches. Japan launches one-stage sounding-rocket test model of the H-2 booster. Courtney Stadd, ex-director of the Office of Commercial Space Transportation, urges next administration not to start yet another review of space policy; setting priorities and goals is urgent. He says "this business of trying to trickle up to the Oval Office assessments of where the nation ought to go" doesn't work; leadership is needed. He opposes full cost recovery for the shuttle, saying it is needed to provide experience in space activity and establish the existence of commercial opportunities. He is concerned that issues of risk management and foreign competition for commercial launchers are still unsettled, two years after the basic policies were set. Government use of commercial launchers will be especially important in 4-5 years, when the satellite backlog starts to taper off. He has changed his mind and now supports the Congressional launch-insurance approach (government takes over after a specific liability ceiling) rather than the White House one (absolute limit on liability), citing government insurance aid to foreign competitors and use of launch facilities that the companies have no input to. He says commercial operators would undoubtedly prefer a commercial launch facility which didn't have very expensive government payloads and launchers nearby; he says Kourou is a good example. Heavily-flawed SRB joints pass Aug 18 test firing completely. NASA and Morton Thiokol originally didn't want to run this test, since the flaws were far beyond anything realistic, but a failure would nevertheless have caused major political problems. Fortunately, it all worked. NASA has put plans to use the pre-Challenger booster segments on hold. The oxidizer shortage is not looking as bad as was thought. The old plan, of burning out some or all of them to make the casings available for re-use (only one end was changed in the redesign, and the "bad ends" can still be used in the factory joints in mid-segment, which have no leak problems) is back on track. NASA would like to spend a small amount of money on a bunch of minor production changes, like qualifying second sources for more of the parts, but there is concern that the ASRM program may interfere with funding for this. There is considerable sentiment that the small payload increase from ASRM is not worth the money, which should be spent on Shuttle-C instead. [I am of two minds about this. On the one hand, I tend to agree: since NASA has managed to frame ASRM in terms that prohibit really radical redesign, like a jointless SRB, I doubt that it's worth it. On the other hand, I would *really* like to see Morton Thiokol out of the SRB business -- they deserve to get their tails kicked from here to the Moon, not to go on getting lucrative contracts into the next century. I'd have preferred to see NASA put top priority on qualifying a second source, and a THIRD source, for SRBs, and then ban M-T from all NASA programs forever.] G. Gubanov, chief designer of Energia, says a heavylift derivative of Energia will be needed "to organize industrial production in space, research the moon... and to organize an international expedition to Mars". [Lord God of Undershorts, as if Energia wasn't heavy enough to start with... Probably he's thinking of going from four strap-ons to six or eight, which would be perfectly practical if you move the payload from the back to the top.] He says Energia development work is now focusing on long-term bulk production. He says they are using a "specially modified heavy aircraft" to carry the Energia core, 8m by 40m, from the plant to Baikonur. The Soviets displayed a model of such an aircraft, carrying a huge cargo pod resembling the Energia core, at the 1987 Paris airshow. The payload is nearly three times the diameter of the fuselage. [Now *that* must be something to see; never mind this wimpy business of carrying a little shuttle orbiter!] He says there are plans for both different upper stages and different numbers of strap-ons for the existing Energia. [Okay, so he *wasn't* talking about just more strap-ons. Lordy.] He says Energia/shuttle can do a survivable abort even with a strap-on failure or core-engine failure in flight. He says maximum launch mass can go as high as 2400 metric tons, 20% higher than Western observers believed. It can put 18 tons in Clarke orbit, 32 into a lunar trajectory, and up to 28 into Mars or Venus trajectory. The first launch was from the pad used for static firings, several miles from the *main* Energia/shuttle launch complex. [There is only one spacefaring nation on Earth. And it looks like they're going to keep their lead. Either start praying for one of the more ambitious US private-launch firms to hit it lucky, or start learning Russian.] A striking photo from a NASA/USAF/UMinnesota sounding-rocket experiment: an actual picture of electrons spiraling in the Earth's magnetic field at high altitude. "We know that beams spiral like this, but to actually see it for the first time is a remarkable thing." The pictures were strictly an accident: the equipment, including a low-light-level camera intended for other purposes entirely, continued functioning after its main work was done, and the beam became visible just before reentry. -- The Earth is our mother. | Henry Spencer at U of Toronto Zoology Our nine months are up. |uunet!attcan!utzoo!henry henry@zoo.toronto.edu
tneff@dasys1.UUCP (Tom Neff) (11/12/88)
In article <1988Nov4.065730.10761@utzoo.uucp> henry@utzoo.uucp (Henry Spencer) writes: > ... On the other hand, I would >*really* like to see Morton Thiokol out of the SRB business -- they >deserve to get their tails kicked from here to the Moon, not to go on >getting lucrative contracts into the next century. I'd have preferred >to see NASA put top priority on qualifying a second source, and a THIRD >source, for SRBs, and then ban M-T from all NASA programs forever... Very easy to bash Thiokol after the fact, but remember it was Thiokol engineers protesting the decision to launch Challenger and NASA's mid-level managers browbeating the vendor into going along. Would you rather have Roger Boisjoly on your team, or Larry Mulloy? Perhaps Henry has forgotten these immortal words: "My God, Thiokol, when do you want me to launch, next April?" The blame for Challenger is precisely NASA's. If they are permitted to remain in the shuttle business, so should Thiokol be. -- Tom Neff UUCP: ...!cmcl2!phri!dasys1!tneff "None of your toys CIS: 76556,2536 MCI: TNEFF will function..." GEnie: TOMNEFF BIX: t.neff (no kidding)
henry@utzoo.uucp (Henry Spencer) (11/15/88)
In article <7594@dasys1.UUCP> tneff@dasys1.UUCP (Tom Neff) writes: >> ... On the other hand, I would >>*really* like to see Morton Thiokol out of the SRB business -- they >>deserve to get their tails kicked from here to the Moon, not to go on >>getting lucrative contracts into the next century... >Very easy to bash Thiokol after the fact, but remember it was Thiokol >engineers protesting the decision to launch Challenger and NASA's >mid-level managers browbeating the vendor into going along... And Thiokol managers who ultimately made the decision to ignore the engineers and tell the customer what he wanted to hear. Don't forget, what NASA eventually heard was not "well, we disagree but we'll go along", it was "we've reconsidered and now see no problem". NASA is hardly blameless for the pressure it applied, but it was Thiokol, not NASA, that ultimately decided to ignore the problem. Would NASA have gone ahead if Thiokol had stuck to its guns? Impossible to be sure, but I don't think so. Being honorable under pressure is difficult, yes. It's ever so much simpler to take the easy way out and say "I vas chust following orders". -- Sendmail is a bug, | Henry Spencer at U of Toronto Zoology not a feature. | uunet!attcan!utzoo!henry henry@zoo.toronto.edu
tneff@dasys1.UUCP (Tom Neff) (11/17/88)
In article <1988Nov14.214139.1892@utzoo.uucp> henry@utzoo.uucp (Henry Spencer) writes: -In article <7594@dasys1.UUCP> tneff@dasys1.UUCP (Tom Neff) writes: ->Very easy to bash Thiokol after the fact, but remember it was Thiokol ->engineers protesting the decision to launch Challenger and NASA's ->mid-level managers browbeating the vendor into going along... - -And Thiokol managers who ultimately made the decision to ignore the -engineers and tell the customer what he wanted to hear. Don't forget, -what NASA eventually heard was not "well, we disagree but we'll go -along", it was "we've reconsidered and now see no problem". NASA is -hardly blameless for the pressure it applied, but it was Thiokol, not -NASA, that ultimately decided to ignore the problem. Would NASA have -gone ahead if Thiokol had stuck to its guns? Impossible to be sure, -but I don't think so. - -Being honorable under pressure is difficult, yes. It's ever so much -simpler to take the easy way out and say "I vas chust following orders". Thiokol was concurrently negotiating a contract renewal. The pressure to "go along" under those circumstances is unbearable. Also note that Rockwell had doubts and withdrew them (although the decision process was quite controversial). Until and unless we put every contractor in the excruciating position Thiokol was in and compare their performance, I consider it unfair to single out Thiokol for not dealing well with improper NASA pressure. -- Tom Neff UUCP: ...!cmcl2!phri!dasys1!tneff "None of your toys CIS: 76556,2536 MCI: TNEFF will function..." GEnie: TOMNEFF BIX: t.neff (no kidding)
bpendlet@esunix.UUCP (Bob Pendleton) (11/17/88)
From article <1988Nov14.214139.1892@utzoo.uucp>, by henry@utzoo.uucp (Henry Spencer):
> In article <7594@dasys1.UUCP> tneff@dasys1.UUCP (Tom Neff) writes:
Tom Neff and Henry Spencer arguing over how much blame Thiokol
deserves over the Challenger disaster.
I hate to even sound like I'm defending Thiokol, but I know a number
of engineers, and some managers who work there. I know a few people
who quit in disgust over the whole mess too. Being active in AIAA can
put you in contact with a lot of interesting people.
Look at a little history. Thiokol has been building rocket motors for
years. Some of them (the booster motors for Delta for example) have a
100% success rate. Not one failure, ever. But then Thiokol got this
huge lucrative contract for SRMs. And Morton bought them out.
One of the first things that happened was that Morton moved all the
top level management from Utah, to some place back east. A thousand
miles or so from the engineers and middle management that built the
SRMs. The whole structure of the company changed. The top managers of
the company didn't know salt from SRMs, literally. The managers that
did understand rockets were no longer in contact with the people doing
the work.
After Challenger blew up and it didn't look like Thiokol was such a
nice cash cow, Morton started trying to sell it. They did move the
managers back to Utah.
Remember the name of the comany that won the SRM contract was THIOKOL.
The company that built the SRMs that blew up the Challenger was MORTON
(best known for salt, you know, "When it rains it pours") Thiokol. Not
the same thing at all.
Somebody made a lot of money out of all this. I think it was Morton.
Bob P.
--
Bob Pendleton, speaking only for myself.
UUCP Address: decwrl!esunix!bpendlet or utah-cs!esunix!bpendlet
Reality is what you make of it.billa@cvedc.UUCP (Bill Anderson) (11/21/88)
In article <7734@dasys1.UUCP> tneff@dasys1.UUCP (Tom Neff) writes: >In article <1988Nov14.214139.1892@utzoo.uucp> henry@utzoo.uucp (Henry Spencer) writes: >-Being honorable under pressure is difficult, yes. It's ever so much >-simpler to take the easy way out and say "I vas chust following orders". > >Thiokol was concurrently negotiating a contract renewal. The pressure >to "go along" under those circumstances is unbearable. Also note that >Rockwell had doubts and withdrew them (although the decision process >was quite controversial). Until and unless we put every contractor in >the excruciating position Thiokol was in and compare their performance, >I consider it unfair to single out Thiokol for not dealing well with >improper NASA pressure. Unfair? More than 2 1/2 years delay in shuttle launching, 7 fine people killed, 7 families in sorrow, etc. and you would consider it unfair to deal harshly with Thiokol? I'm afraid those families (and I) don't share your compassion for Thiokol. You think it's better to let them get away with caving in under pressure than to make an example of them? I think it would be better to do a good deal of "house cleaning" and give the very clear message that honor and integrity are more valuable than any schedule, contract, or $. In my opinion, anything less is unfair and demoralizing. OK - Rockwell made the same mistake and got away with it. You can bet they would be less likely to try to get away with it a second time if Thiokol had been badly "burned"! =============================================================== _____ __ Bill Anderson ..tektronix!reed!cvedc!wanderson | __| / / Computervision ..sun!cvbnet!cvedc!wanderson | ( / / 14952 NW Greenbrier Parkway FAX (503) 645-4734 | \_/ / Beaverton, Oregon 97006 Phone (503) 645-2410 \______/
tneff@dasys1.UUCP (Tom Neff) (11/22/88)
In article <644@otto.cvedc.UUCP> billa@otto.UUCP (Bill Anderson) writes: >In article <7734@dasys1.UUCP> tneff@dasys1.UUCP (Tom Neff) writes: >>Thiokol was concurrently negotiating a contract renewal. The pressure >>to "go along" under those circumstances is unbearable... >> Until and unless we put every contractor in >>the excruciating position Thiokol was in and compare their performance, >>I consider it unfair to single out Thiokol for not dealing well with >>improper NASA pressure. > >Unfair? More than 2 1/2 years delay in shuttle launching, 7 fine >people killed, 7 families in sorrow, etc. and you would consider it >unfair to deal harshly with Thiokol? Bill should respond to the points in the article, not to a strawman. I will reiterate, Thiokol should not be *singled out* for vengeance because it gave in to *improper* NASA pressure. There is no reason to suspect other key NASA contractors would have done any better under the circumstances. Nor is Thiokol solely responsible for the 51L disaster as Bill well knows. Improper leak check pressure probably holed the putty, and additional flaws may have been induced by the Rockwell crew in the VAB bay. Should we shoot everyone involved? Will that bring back the dead? > I'm afraid those families (and I) >don't share your compassion for Thiokol. You think it's better to let >them get away with caving in under pressure than to make an example of >them? The program can ill afford your "examples." We need new boosters to get the program back on track. NASA should have second sourced the SRMs years ago but didn't -- now it's too late. Second sourcing is a much handier stick to beat a vendor with than contract renewal. > I think it would be better to do a good deal of "house cleaning" >and give the very clear message that honor and integrity are more >valuable than any schedule, contract, or $. In my opinion, anything >less is unfair and demoralizing. Hey, pass that over here, don't bogart it. Thanks <nnnpphhhhttt! O-O-O>. Seriously, contracts and $$ are *pre-requisites* for honor and integrity in the aerospace biz! These vendors have oodles of integrity but they only get to apply it if they're W-O-R-K-I-N-G. You cannot teach them by "example" that it's better to put their corporate life at risk than to put a flight at risk, when NASA wants it the second way. A couple such "examples" and you simply won't get bids... meanwhile Ivan is blasting off weekly. -- Tom Neff UUCP: ...!cmcl2!phri!dasys1!tneff "None of your toys CIS: 76556,2536 MCI: TNEFF will function..." GEnie: TOMNEFF BIX: t.neff (no kidding)
phil@diablo.amd.com (Phil Ngai) (11/23/88)
In article <1091@esunix.UUCP> bpendlet@esunix.UUCP (Bob Pendleton) writes: |Remember the name of the comany that won the SRM contract was THIOKOL. Seems to me that the Thiokol proposal was a design which had the joint rotation problem. In other words, the technical problem was there from the beginning. Didn't Thiokol have enough experience to know this wouldn't work? Or were they just trying to make something cheap enough to win the bid? -- Phil Ngai, phil@diablo.amd.com {uunet,decwrl,ucbvax}!amdcad!phil
bpendlet@esunix.UUCP (Bob Pendleton) (11/29/88)
From article <23618@amdcad.AMD.COM>, by phil@diablo.amd.com (Phil Ngai): > In article <1091@esunix.UUCP> bpendlet@esunix.UUCP (Bob Pendleton) writes: > |Remember the name of the comany that won the SRM contract was THIOKOL. > > Seems to me that the Thiokol proposal was a design which had the joint > rotation problem. Yes, but we were discussing management problems. > In other words, the technical problem was there from > the beginning. Didn't Thiokol have enough experience to know this > wouldn't work? Or were they just trying to make something cheap enough > to win the bid? My understanding is that the Thiokol joint design allowed them to come up with the lowest bid, which won them the contract. The new joint design is, in fact, the joint design proposed by Hercules in their bid. NASA rated the Hercules joint to be technically superior, but too expensive. I don't know much about other bidders designs because I don't know people who work for the other bidders. What can I say? You get what you pay for. Thiokol bid it, but NASA bought it. Didn't NASA have enough experience to know this wouldn't work? After all, no one had ever built anything like it before. As for Thiokols' level of experience. They have built MANY large (and small) solid rocket motors. First stage on all the Minutemen, first stage Peacekeeper (that name still makes me cringe), and first stage on most of the submarine launched missiles. The Thiokol/Hercules joint venture has been so good on the sub launched missiles that the Navy has trouble getting other companies to even bother to bid. Though, I think Hercules got D5 (Trident II) all to it self. They claim that the sub scale (1/4 scale is what I remember) prototypes for the SRMs were the largest solid rocket motors built, until they built the first set of full scale SRBs. So I guess they have most of the experience there is to be had in the area of very large solid rocket motors. Of course whoever (CSD?) builds the Titan-3 families solid rocket motors has about 10 times the experience with large segmented rocket motors. And Hercules grabbed about half the Titan-4 solid propulsion contract away from them! Bob P. -- Bob Pendleton, speaking only for myself. UUCP Address: decwrl!esunix!bpendlet or utah-cs!esunix!bpendlet Reality is what you make of it.
dsmith@hplabsb.HP.COM (David Smith) (12/01/88)
In article <1110@esunix.UUCP> bpendlet@esunix.UUCP (Bob Pendleton) writes: >Of course whoever (CSD?) builds the Titan-3 families solid rocket motors I think it is United Technologies. Is CSD the Chemical Systems Division of UTC? At any rate, there is an argument/discussion going on about the notion of barring Thiokol (or at least Morton) from future work. I'd like to know how that fits in with other companies' failures. What penalties were imposed on UTC/CSD for the Titan 34D explosion? What happened to Beech as a result of Apollo 13? Did Rockwell (still North American at the time?) suffer from Apollo 204? The Titan and Apollo 13 failures may not have been due to fundamental design faults, but Apollo 204 was. -- David Smith HP Labs dsmith@hplabs.hp.com