jim@pnet01.cts.COM (Jim Bowery) (03/10/89)
Bob Pendleton writes: > ... What do you mean by "MX booster segment?" > The MX is a 3 stage booster, none of the stages are segmented. The configuration table I gave was incorrect. Bob is correct that the MX is a 3 stage configuration. E'Prime (after talking directly to a company representative) is using the first 2 stages of the MX configuration exactly as currently manufactured. The third stage will be contract/mission specific. The strap-ons will be the same as the first stage. I'm curious as to how E'Prime gets away with saying that out of 17 test flights none have failed when Bob claims that the MX booster produced by Thiokol has killed several people. Were the ground tests a disaster followed up by a streak of good luck? What sort of quality controls were imposed by Thiokol on the flight-bound boosters to make them so reliable? What additional safety measures were imposed by the Air Force? Since a decent solid rocket inspection system costs a small fraction of a launch (only about $2million amortized over many launches) I would guess E'Prime could afford to put all Thiokol's boosters through their own inspections. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Jim Bowery Phone: 619/295-8868 PO Box 1981 Join the Mark Hopkins Society! La Jolla, CA 92038 (A member of the Mark Hopkins family of organizations.) UUCP: {cbosgd, hplabs!hp-sdd, sdcsvax, nosc}!crash!pnet01!jim ARPA: crash!pnet01!jim@nosc.mil INET: jim@pnet01.cts.com
bpendlet@esunix.UUCP (Bob Pendleton) (03/15/89)
From article <8903091638.AA05474@crash.cts.com>, by jim@pnet01.cts.COM (Jim Bowery): > I'm curious as to how E'Prime gets away with saying that out of 17 test > flights none have failed when Bob claims that the MX booster produced by > Thiokol has killed several people. Were the ground tests a disaster followed > up by a streak of good luck? It was a manufacturing accident. While pulling the casting core out of a motor something happened. Some how the crew running the operation wound up un the bunker with the pulling equipment. Somehow the motor fired. All the men on the crew were killed. Morton Thiokol settled out of court. They also paid some large federal fines for safety violations. What it comes down to is that no one seems to know what happened because all the equipment that was supposed to be monitoring the operation was broken. Based on the little that was in the local papers all the safety equipment was broken and had been for some time. It seems the Air Force contract required the equipment to be their, but didn't require it to work. So Morton decided to risk the lives of the crew to save the cost of a repairs. > What sort of quality controls were imposed by > Thiokol on the flight-bound boosters to make them so reliable? What > additional safety measures were imposed by the Air Force? Since a decent > solid rocket inspection system costs a small fraction of a launch (only about > $2million amortized over many launches) I would guess E'Prime could afford > to put all Thiokol's boosters through their own inspections. I don't know. I believe that the Air Force refused delivery on some motors. Not all the MX motors that were manufactured for flight testing were actually launched. At least once the Air Force stopped progress payments on MX to Morton Thiokol. They were not resumed until acceptable motors were shipped. Bob P. -- - Bob Pendleton, speaking only for myself. - UUCP Address: decwrl!esunix!bpendlet or utah-cs!esunix!bpendlet - - Reality is stranger than most can imagine.