henry@utzoo.uucp (Henry Spencer) (05/14/89)
In article <11316@polyslo.CalPoly.EDU> jmckerna@polyslo.CalPoly.EDU (John McKernan) writes: >>Why the *(&) did we throw away Saturn V???? > >We threw away the Saturn V because it was a very expensive, virtually hand >built rocket that was thrown away after every use... This is a fairly circular statement. The Saturn V was expensive, hand-built, and non-recoverable because of the decision in the mid-60s to throw it away! When Congress capped Saturn V production at 15, (a) all hopes of reducing cost through volume went away, (b) it was no longer worth mechanizing the production process as had been planned, and (c) all work on making Saturn V stages recoverable stopped because it would never be done. The original plans for the Saturn V envisioned mechanized volume production and possible recovery of at least the first stage in the long run. This was when the Saturn V was going to be NASA's heavy launcher well into the 1980s, launching lunar missions, a space station or three, heavy planetary probes, and so on. Blaming the NASA of the 70s for throwing away the Saturn V is pretty much a mistake. The real culprit is the Congress of the 60s. -- Mars in 1980s: USSR, 2 tries, | Henry Spencer at U of Toronto Zoology 2 failures; USA, 0 tries. | uunet!attcan!utzoo!henry henry@zoo.toronto.edu
jmckerna@polyslo.CalPoly.EDU (Dr. Dereference) (05/14/89)
In article <1989May13.201437.23217@utzoo.uucp> henry@utzoo.uucp (Henry Spencer) writes: >In article <11316@polyslo.CalPoly.EDU> jmckerna@polyslo.CalPoly.EDU (John McKernan) writes: >>We threw away the Saturn V because it was a very expensive, virtually hand >>built rocket that was thrown away after every use... > >This is a fairly circular statement. The Saturn V was expensive, hand-built, >and non-recoverable because of the decision in the mid-60s to throw it away! >When Congress capped Saturn V production at 15, (a) all hopes of reducing >cost through volume went away, (b) it was no longer worth mechanizing the >production process as had been planned, and (c) all work on making Saturn V >stages recoverable stopped because it would never be done. > >Blaming the NASA of the 70s for throwing away the Saturn V is pretty much >a mistake. The real culprit is the Congress of the 60s. It's hardly surprising that congress refused to guarantee long term funding for the Saturn program, few if any large procurment contracts are or have been long term. If the "experts" would have told congress to stick with the Saturn V post Apollo, congress most likely would have funded more of them. Although probably with another expensive, short term, and low volume contract. The Saturn V was fairly expensive and a lot of people thought changing to a fully reusable (that was the original plan) vehicle would save money over the long run. As things worked out these people were tragically wrong, and the US space program has been severely damaged for the last 15 years. I think the major principle NASA violated in deciding to build the shuttle was developing brand new technology when developing existing technology would have worked very well. John L. McKernan. Student, Computer Science, Cal Poly S.L.O. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The future is rude and pushy. It won't wait for us to solve today's problems before it butts in with tomorrow's.
web@garnet.berkeley.edu (William Baxter) (05/15/89)
In article <11401@polyslo.CalPoly.EDU>, jmckerna@polyslo (Dr. Dereference) writes: >It's hardly surprising that congress refused to guarantee long term funding >for the Saturn program, few if any large procurment contracts are or have >been long term. If the "experts" would have told congress to stick with the >Saturn V post Apollo, congress most likely would have funded more of them. >Although probably with another expensive, short term, and low volume contract. Then as now, while members of Congress raise some objections to proposals from NASA, they usually deviate little from the advice of the "experts." The record of NASA in providing the appropriate leadership is so poor, there is a clear need for an alternative source of information, ideas, and proposals--a need for space activists. How many readers consider themselves space activists? How many have debated the question of what constitutes a rational space program? No one bothered to reply to my question about the appropriate role of private industry in a space program. William Baxter ARPA: web@{garnet,brahms,math}.Berkeley.EDU UUCP: {sun,dual,decwrl,decvax,hplabs,...}!ucbvax!garnet!web
henry@utzoo.uucp (Henry Spencer) (05/16/89)
In article <11401@polyslo.CalPoly.EDU> jmckerna@polyslo.CalPoly.EDU (John McKernan) writes: >>... The Saturn V was expensive, hand-built, >>and non-recoverable because of the decision in the mid-60s to throw it away! >>When Congress capped Saturn V production at 15... > >It's hardly surprising that congress refused to guarantee long term funding >for the Saturn program, few if any large procurment contracts are or have >been long term. If the "experts" would have told congress to stick with the >Saturn V post Apollo, congress most likely would have funded more of them... >The Saturn V was fairly expensive and a lot of people thought changing to a >fully reusable (that was the original plan) vehicle would save money... You've missed my point slightly, I fear. Note the date I gave. This particular decision was made long before the shuttle was seriously looked at, and long before any serious post-Apollo planning was done. The fateful decision was made in the middle of Apollo, over NASA's strenuous objections. The NASA administrator of the time -- Webb? -- had to fight hard just to get authorization for 15. It wasn't a refusal to guarantee long-term funding, it was a specific decision that there would be no long-term Saturn program at all. Many people date the decline of the Saturn V to NASA's post-Apollo decision not to retain Saturn V launch capability. This is wrong; the original Congressional decision to terminate production after 15, made much earlier, was the real killer. The loss of production capability made the inability to launch the last two Saturn Vs a relatively minor issue. (Admittedly it would be useful now to have them, but realistically it just wouldn't have happened.) -- Subversion, n: a superset | Henry Spencer at U of Toronto Zoology of a subset. --J.J. Horning | uunet!attcan!utzoo!henry henry@zoo.toronto.edu
jmckerna@polyslo.CalPoly.EDU (Dr. Dereference) (05/16/89)
In article <1989May15.171856.2563@utzoo.uucp> henry@utzoo.uucp (Henry Spencer) writes: >You've missed my point slightly, I fear. Note the date I gave. This >particular decision was made long before the shuttle was seriously looked >at, and long before any serious post-Apollo planning was done. The fateful >decision was made in the middle of Apollo, over NASA's strenuous objections. > [deleted] >Many people date the decline of the Saturn V to NASA's post-Apollo decision >not to retain Saturn V launch capability. This is wrong; the original >Congressional decision to terminate production after 15, made much earlier, >was the real killer. The loss of production capability made the inability to >launch the last two Saturn Vs a relatively minor issue. I believe I understood the point you were making Henry. My points, right or wrong, were: 1. Congress (for whatever reasons) rarely funds a long production run for an expensive item. Thus while it was certainly both desirable and possible for congress to fund a true production line, it's not surprising that congress only funded 15 Saturns. 2. While congress refused to fund a true Saturn production line, it was certainly possible for congress to restart Saturn production when post Apollo launchers were being considered. 3. Given that the Saturn was expensive, the idea that moving to a reusable launcher would save money in the long run had some theoretical merit. Congress would very likely have funded only a short production run again, and with reusable launchers you only need a short production run. I don't think these points are strictly wrong, but I now agree with those who have posted that abandoning an already proven and capable technology for one difficult to develop was a very bad idea. That bad decision has done immense damage to the US space effort. John L. McKernan. Student, Computer Science, Cal Poly S.L.O. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The future is rude and pushy. It won't wait for us to solve today's problems before it butts in with tomorrow's.
henry@utzoo.uucp (Henry Spencer) (05/18/89)
In article <11483@polyslo.CalPoly.EDU> jmckerna@polyslo.CalPoly.EDU (John McKernan) writes: >2. While congress refused to fund a true Saturn production line, it was > certainly possible for congress to restart Saturn production when post > Apollo launchers were being considered. In theory. In practice, the costs of the restart rise steadily with the length of the shutdown... especially when the shutdown decision was not "stop production for now" but "there will be no further production". -- Subversion, n: a superset | Henry Spencer at U of Toronto Zoology of a subset. --J.J. Horning | uunet!attcan!utzoo!henry henry@zoo.toronto.edu