chi9@quads.uchicago.edu (Lucius Chiaraviglio) (10/27/90)
In article <1050400042@cdp> dyurman@cdp.UUCP writes: >This is a reply to a posting from Daniel Mocsny on the subject >of THEORIES NEEDED FOR LIFE. I would like to add a couple of >points. > >1st: in order to develop technology, the creature must have the >ability to store information external to its brain, or >equivalent, in a nonperishable form. While "pixel-addressable >pigment cells" is a wonderfully creative idea, an alphabet and >printing are more useful. Actually, information storage does not absolutely have to be external, as long as it is sufficiently non-perishable to support the development of a technological civilization. >2nd: the creature must be a predator, otherwise it's species will >spend too much time avoiding being something else's supper. This >will not leave any time for rocketry. Does not follow. Perhaps avoiding being someone else's supper might be a strong selection for intelligence and the development of technology (to be used against whomever was trying to make supper out of the technological species). This doesn't seem to have been the primary selective force for the development of intelligence and technology on Earth, but that doesn't mean it couldn't be. > It must be at or very near >the top of the trophic web not only for its niche, but also for >the planet. Why? See above. > Given the interstellar nature of DNA building >blocks, its meals must be the products of concentrated protien >and other nutrients from intermediate steps in the food chain. Silicate grains seem to be a pretty common interstellar material. Maybe these are someone's building blocks. Note: I am NOT talking about using silicon as an analog of carbon. It has been shown that that will not work. What I am talking about is the use of polysilicates and their derivatives (silicones, which are very stable, for instance) as a basis for building blocks. Also, some uses of organic chemistry to form things other than amino acids and nucleic acids are a possibility. An aside here: not only do people trying to imagine life on other worlds have the problem of their imagination tending to be channeled towards things such as exist on Earth, their imagination tends to be channeled towards the very small subset of Earth life that they know of. The great majority of science fiction and serious science (-: well, they try anyway :-) imagination of life on other worlds imagines things homologous to what most of us see: plants, animals eating either plant or animal matter, and occasionally fungi. Mention of microorganisms is generally restricted to diseases, if they are mentioned at all -- and then often the more serious thought assumes that none of these would be able to eat anything from Earth, which is likely wrong given the extraordinary variety of substances that microorganisms can metabolize -- I mean, we really have to do a considerable amount of work to make completely unmetabolizable organic compounds, and a significant number of inorganic compounds can serve as food for various organisms. Even among life using only biochemical pathways found on Earth (almost certainly less diverse than the biochemical pathways which actually exist on Earth) a staggering variety of ways to live exists, and an environment different from that which we live in (but similar to some environments found on Earth) could conceivably select for a planet-dominating organism very different from us and the organisms we know with respect to the TYPE of food chain it is in, let alone the position. Such organisms may have not developed high-order multicellularity and/or intelligence on Earth simply because their environments are too restricted. (Actually, one possible such environment we do not know the nature of is the hydrothermal environment beneath the surface of the mid-ocean ridges, which take up a substantial fraction of the surface area of our planet -- I forgot what the number is, but I am pretty sure it is up in the 10% - 20% range. Maybe a Lovecraftian mass of slime is brooding down there, waiting. . . :-)) >3rd: assuming carbon-based life, sensory organs must be seated as >close as possible to the brain in order to provide the shortest >possible response time between reception of input and reaction to >it. See predator concept above. For some environments, a factor other than response time might dominate the placement of sensors relative to the brain. For example, imagine an organism in a very treacherous and abusive environment. If the organism could regenerate parts, it could deal with repeated loss of sensors, but even with regeneration major brain damage would be majorly bad news for retaining memories needed for civilization. Therefore, it would make sense to either have the brain as far away as practical (and behind as much shielding as practical) from all of the common types of abuse, or to have a distributed redundant form of memory storage so that even a drastically mangled organism would have a good chance of containing at least one complete copy of its memories. >5th: from what we know of the processing power of our own brains, >there is a trade off of energy expended between physical >coordination or limbs and manipulation of abstract concepts. >This suggests that a creature with four arms or eight elephant >like trunks might spend all its time worrying about where the >parts of its body were and what to do with them, and less time >about its future as a life form or the meaning thereof. Our own brains should not be taken as ultimate examples -- that is, we should not assume that they represent the full range of what can be done with a nervous system. To be sure, an organism with more limbs would probably need a somewhat bigger brain to use them all as well as an organism with fewer limbs and equal intelligence and equal efficiency of utilization of brain weight and space, but this does not mean that that is impossible. Also, no reason exists why a multi-limbed organism could not evolve so as to be able to choose at will whether to distribute its motor coordination to all limbs or concentrate most of it on a few so that less brain weight would be required to control them. As a matter of fact, we can do this to some extent. >6th: the creature must have the ability to develop abstract >thinking [see #1 above on storage of information] else it will >fail to develop methods for organizing information, and thus fail >to develop technology. This suggests a protective shell of some >kind for the brain or equivalent, else the creature will never >have its mental abilities survive long enough to get the >abstractions built much less communicated. [. . .] A protective shell would certainly be useful for this, but not the only means of making memory non-perishable. Having distributed redundant memory would also work; if suitable high-data-rate communication were a biological feature of an organism, memory and even thought could be distributed over multiple physical individuals, so that logical individuals need not correspond to physical individuals (-: brains like a Sequent :-). -- | Lucius Chiaraviglio | Internet: chi9@midway.uchicago.edu
kuento@kuhub.cc.ukans.edu (10/28/90)
In article <1990Oct27.045445.28533@midway.uchicago.edu>, chi9@quads.uchicago.edu (Lucius Chiaraviglio) writes: > In article <1050400042@cdp> dyurman@cdp.UUCP writes: >>This is a reply to a posting from Daniel Mocsny on the subject >>of THEORIES NEEDED FOR LIFE. I would like to add a couple of >>points. >> As an invertebrate biologist (I specialize in bees), I would also like to add a couple of points to this discussion - considering the numerical superiority of invertebrates on our own planet, I tend to view them as more likely models of lifeforms elsewhere. I have taken some specific excerpts I'd like to address. >>2nd: the creature must be a predator, otherwise it's species will >>spend too much time avoiding being something else's supper. This >>will not leave any time for rocketry. > > Does not follow. Perhaps avoiding being someone else's supper might > be a strong selection for intelligence and the development of technology (to > be used against whomever was trying to make supper out of the technological > species). This doesn't seem to have been the primary selective force for the > development of intelligence and technology on Earth, but that doesn't mean it > couldn't be. > >> It must be at or very near >>the top of the trophic web not only for its niche, but also for >>the planet. > > Why? See above. I concur that this is an unnecessary condition. I think it could be agreed that among invertebrates, the Cephalopods (octopi, squids, and their relatives) are probably the "smartest", and yes, they are indeed predators. BUT: (a) they are also preyed upon by quite a number of other, less intelligent organisms (b) bees, which would probably come in second in the intellect ratings, feed on pollen - purely herbivorous, preyed upon by numerous organisms, and quite bright for organisms with brains the size of pinheads!(all you Zippy fans...). If these organisms can get so far without fulfilling the proposed "requirements", I don't see why they, or organisms like them, could not, under other conditions, go "all the way" to technology. Can you consider hive-or-nest-building a primitive technology? >>3rd: assuming carbon-based life, sensory organs must be seated as >>close as possible to the brain in order to provide the shortest >>possible response time between reception of input and reaction to >>it. See predator concept above. > > For some environments, a factor other than response time might > dominate the placement of sensors relative to the brain. For example, imagine > an organism in a very treacherous and abusive environment. If the organism > could regenerate parts, it could deal with repeated loss of sensors, but even > with regeneration major brain damage would be majorly bad news for retaining > memories needed for civilization. Therefore, it would make sense to either > have the brain as far away as practical (and behind as much shielding as > practical) from all of the common types of abuse, or to have a distributed > redundant form of memory storage so that even a drastically mangled organism > would have a good chance of containing at least one complete copy of its > memories. > I might add that proximity is not the only thing that increases the speed of responses - nerve impulses (in nerves as we know them) travel at a greater speed in neurons of greater diameter. A great many types of invertebrates have independently developed "escape neurons" - cells of great diameter which run directly from a sensory structure to a motor center. Examples include lobsters, squid, and cockroaches (which is why they're so tough to step on 8-). In fact (SERIOUS TRIVIA ALERT) the largest single cell on the Earth is the escape neuron ("giant axon") of the Giant Squid, _Architeuthis_, which can be around 20 feet long and an inch in diameter in the larger individuals (presumably to help them escape from Sperm Whales). Additionally, the "redundancy" idea expressed above is precisely the sort of mechanism seen in most Arthropods, in the possession of segmental ganglia which take care of most motor & reflex responses. No, not memory storage *per se*, but certain ganglia are capable of "learning", independently, and so the possibility certainly isn't too far-fetched. Just watch an insect with its head cut off some time >|-p. >>5th: from what we know of the processing power of our own brains, >>there is a trade off of energy expended between physical >>coordination or limbs and manipulation of abstract concepts. >>This suggests that a creature with four arms or eight elephant >>like trunks might spend all its time worrying about where the >>parts of its body were and what to do with them, and less time >>about its future as a life form or the meaning thereof. > > Our own brains should not be taken as ultimate examples -- that is, we > should not assume that they represent the full range of what can be done with > a nervous system. To be sure, an organism with more limbs would probably need > a somewhat bigger brain to use them all as well as an organism with fewer > limbs and equal intelligence and equal efficiency of utilization of brain > weight and space, but this does not mean that that is impossible. Also, no > reason exists why a multi-limbed organism could not evolve so as to be able to > choose at will whether to distribute its motor coordination to all limbs or > concentrate most of it on a few so that less brain weight would be required to > control them. As a matter of fact, we can do this to some extent. See my comment on ganglia above, for one, as to relegating motor activity to peripheral neural structures. Also, squid and octopi seem to do rather well, for creatures with numerous, extremely dextrous appendages, don't they? >>6th: the creature must have the ability to develop abstract >>thinking [see #1 above on storage of information] else it will >>fail to develop methods for organizing information, and thus fail >>to develop technology. This suggests a protective shell of some >>kind for the brain or equivalent, else the creature will never >>have its mental abilities survive long enough to get the >>abstractions built much less communicated. [. . .] > > A protective shell would certainly be useful for this, but not the > only means of making memory non-perishable. Having distributed redundant > memory would also work; if suitable high-data-rate communication were a > biological feature of an organism, memory and even thought could be > distributed over multiple physical individuals, so that logical individuals > need not correspond to physical individuals (-: brains like a Sequent :-). > Again, look at an octopus for a perfect example of an organism with NO hard covering for its brain, and considerable intellect. I see no reason they would need to evolve a tougher covering in order to have greater memory capacity. It does not follow. > | Lucius Chiaraviglio | Internet: chi9@midway.uchicago.edu -- ---------------------------------------------------------------- Doug Yanega (Snow Museum, Univ. of KS, Lawrence, KS 66045) My card: 0 The Fool Bitnet: Beeman@ukanvm "This is my theory, such as it is....which is mine. AAH-HEM!"
dmocsny@minerva.che.uc.edu (Daniel Mocsny) (10/29/90)
In article <26353.2729bf22@kuhub.cc.ukans.edu> kuento@kuhub.cc.ukans.edu writes: > - considering the >numerical superiority of invertebrates on our own planet, ...not to mention in my apartment... ;-) >Can you consider hive-or-nest-building a primitive technology? A "complex system" consists of a large collection of similar, relatively simple entities that interact with each other according to a relatively set of rules/equations. Despite the apparent simplicity with which we may describe the parts of the system, it may exhibit arbitrarily complex "emergent" (or "epiphenomenal") behavior. "Mind" may emerge from the interactions of a large number of relatively simple neurons. Could it emerge from other complex systems? Communication appears to be a determining factor in transforming a collection of parts from a "colony" or "mob" into an "entity" or "self". I.e., if each component part of the system has an internal communication bandwidth which greatly exceeds the inter-part bandwidth, then the capacity for the overall system to act like a unit probably suffers. This is intuitively observable in the behavior of human organizations and communities. People have a hard time holding social structures together---nations and businesses collapse, are overthrown, ethnic groups balkanize, etc. This is easy to predict from the simple fact that every particular individual enjoys a much richer communication between parts of his own brain than with other brains. The result is endless misunderstanding and conflict between humans. Conversely, the more people "talk" to each other, USENET notwithstanding ;-), the more likely they are to identify with a group than with themselves as individuals. (More than just "talk" is involved, of course, since human brains obtain information from the environment in several ways.) In practical terms, the most essential component of all successful social organizations is how well they manage information. In light of modern organizational failures, one wonders how the great empires of ancient times managed to "exist", or what this "existence" really meant in the day-to-day affairs of people living in them. Getting back to the hive-mind possibility: I suspect that any "Mind" emerging from a community of bees might not develop much of an IQ. The problems: 1. The maximum practical size of a hive is limited. The human brain has about 1e+11 components. A single bee is more complex than a single neuron, of course. However, in terms of its interaction with the hive, it is probably not vastly more complex. For the small system of a few thousands of bees to become "Mind", each bee would have to embed a comsiderable degree of intelligence. This brings us to the next problem. 2. Intra-bee communication is by neural pathways. This is several orders of magnitude faster than inter-bee communication, which is by tactile, visual, and chemical pathways. Unless bees can come up with a way to "talk" faster, the overall performance of the hive-mind will be very slow. If it is too slow, it will only be able to respond to environmental phenomena that operate with slow characteristic times. For example, the hive-mind can track changes in the location of the best pollen fields. The slow inter-bee communication also probably limits the extent to which the hive subsumes each individual bee. For example, each bee is capable of existing in the real world (to some extent) independently from the hive. This is not possible at all for a neuron in the brain. The hive-mind simply isn't fast and powerful enough to safeguard the momentary existence of each bee. Thus each bee must be a self-contained survival machine. This gives each bee a self-interest and identity apart from the hive. To the extent that each bee can stand on its own six feet, the hive-mind must be limited. -- Dan Mocsny Snail: Internet: dmocsny@minerva.che.uc.edu Dept. of Chemical Engng. M.L. 171 dmocsny@uceng.uc.edu University of Cincinnati 513/751-6824 (home) 513/556-2007 (lab) Cincinnati, Ohio 45221-0171