[sci.space] Replacement and Insurance Costs

serre@boulder.Colorado.EDU (SERRE GLENN) (11/05/90)

In article <1494.27343C70@ofa123.fidonet.org> Wales.Larrison@ofa123.fidonet.org (Wales Larrison) writes:
>issue with HLVs.  Let us assume a HLV with a reliability of 95%  - a 
>bit higher than the current Titan fleet with about 80 launches, and 
Nits and trivia:
Actually, the Titan fleet's reliability is a bit more that 95%.  The
advertised rate is 96.something%.  Also, depending on which Titan III versions
you count, the total number of launches could be said to be over 100.  (I'd 
guess that you're counting only the versions with SRMs attached).  I'd also
like to point out that the Titan IV is 2 for 2, making for a 100% success 
rate :-). 

Question:  
Do Shuttle payloads require insurance?

Points:
Note that the payload costs given for classified satellites imply that the 
Air Force is probably not really that interested in cheap boosters.  

Also, note that there's no reason to think that reusable boosters are any more
reliable than expendables, notwithstanding Mr. Larrison's preference for 
reusables.  


--Glenn Serre
serre@tramp.colorado.edu

dmocsny@minerva.che.uc.edu (Daniel Mocsny) (11/06/90)

In article <1494.27343C70@ofa123.fidonet.org> Wales.Larrison@ofa123.fidonet.org (Wales Larrison) writes:
>  So what was the real replacement cost of a lost shuttle mission?  
>Replacement costs are orbiter (assume $1.5 billion), lost ET, lost 
>SRBs, lost SSMEs.  ET costs are in the vicinity of $25 M.  SRB cases 
>(not the propellent) are about $25 M per shipset (two complete sets 
>of segments and components). SSMEs are more expensive - a shipset of 
>SSMEs costs about $150 M.   Total of about  $1.7 B.  Which is about 
>1/2 of the "3,000,000,000.00" being bandied around.  


I have a question (not an assertion):

When the next shuttle accident occurs, what will be the likelihood
that the disaster will result from another generic flaw that grounds
the program for an extended period?

The MTTR (mean time to repair) is probably an important (hypothetical)
statistic to consider with shuttle accidents. The money spent to sustain 
an idle program during the repair interim might be considered a
legitimate part of "replacement cost". Also, the time value of idle
assets should be taken into account (i.e., all the expensive hardware
that takes a two-year vacation). 

If NASA can recover from the next shuttle disaster within a few months,
and keep up with its launch commitments, then the cost for the lost 
shuttle is roughly its purchase price. But if the program goes down 
for 2 years, the overall loss is probably far in excess of the purchase 
price of the shuttle.


--
Dan Mocsny				Snail:
Internet: dmocsny@minerva.che.uc.edu	Dept. of Chemical Engng. M.L. 171
	  dmocsny@uceng.uc.edu		University of Cincinnati
513/751-6824 (home) 513/556-2007 (lab)	Cincinnati, Ohio 45221-0171

n8035388@unicorn.wwu.edu (Worth Henry A) (11/06/90)

>In article <1494.27343C70@ofa123.fidonet.org> Wales.Larrison@ofa123.fidonet.org (Wales Larrison) writes:
>
>I have a question (not an assertion):
>
>When the next shuttle accident occurs, what will be the likelihood
>that the disaster will result from another generic flaw that grounds
>the program for an extended period?
>
    Even if the accident is unrelated to any generic flaw, expect the
fleet to be grounded for at least six months while various review boards
and Congress (opps, nearly forgot the press) determine the probable 
cause; depends a lot on how long it takes everyone to reach a concensous.

    Additionally, even if it is determined that the accident was unrelated 
to any generic flaw, the review process would likely result in "safety
upgrades" that would result in further delays. There is also a very real 
possibility that the resulting political firestorm would result in the 
permanent grounding of the fleet. :-( 

    Our pioneer ancestors must think us such ungrateful wimps, to simply
survive, yet alone carve out a nation, they faced more risk on a regular
basis than we are prepared to allow a few informed volunteers to face 
today -- despite the potential gain, despite the infrequency, despite
mankind's instinctive need to explore and pioneer.