henry@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer) (12/11/90)
OSC and Hercules get the 1990 National Air and Space Museum Trophy for Pegasus. House+Senate endorse USAF/NASA proposal for a joint buy of four IUSes, for a small cost saving. Society of Japanese Aerospace Companies studies a recoverable spacecraft to carry a 300kg payload into orbit for two weeks, using existing boosters. Orbital Sciences posts its first after-tax profit, with five Pegasus launches sold to date (all to DARPA). First Inmarsat 2 launched, by Delta from the Cape, Oct 30. This was the 200th Delta. House/Senate appropriations funding for Milstar, which directed a major re-orientation to tactical needs, also criticized the Pentagon for the lack of a comprehensive DoD comsat plan and asked that one be produced as part of next year's budget. Details of the five categories into which SDI funding is now split. Of particular note is that the "Phase 1" category is required to cover all Brilliant Pebbles work. [Evidently Congress is not buying SDIO's claim that Brilliant Pebbles is the answer to everything, including defense against limited attacks.] The Pentagon cannot move more than 10% of a category's funding around without Congressional approval. Hatch-repair spacewalk on Mir fails. This is considered annoying but not disastrous. Story on SDIO's single-stage-to-orbit project. The basic objective of the project is to demonstrate an SSTO vehicle, in a suborbital flight, in 1994. The assumption is that current technology (including materials developed for the X-30) is sufficient to make a non-airbreathing SSTO spacecraft practical. In August, small study contracts (circa $3M each) went to Boeing, General Dynamics, McDonnell Douglas, and Rockwell, for reports on basic designs and critical technologies by mid-Dec. After six months of "risk reduction", investigating said technologies, two companies will be picked to build prototypes for 1994 flight. An operational vehicle could fly 2-3 years after that. The SSTO companies have been asked to look at all three combinations of takeoff and landing: vertical/vertical, vertical/horizontal, and horizontal/horizontal. Some takeoff assistance, e.g. trolleys or catapults, is allowed if needed. Delivery of Brilliant Pebbles interceptors was suggested as a model mission, but the contractors have wide latitude to define payload, performance, fleet size, launch rate, and ground facilities. Other hypothetical missions include space-station resupply and maintaining two astronauts in orbit for a four-day mission. Man-rating is required, preferably with a 14.7psi cabin atmosphere and flight-crew escape systems. Another major objective is survival of a single engine failure at any time. The key objective is "aircraft operations", with a turnaround time of 7-10 days with at most 350 man-days of effort. "If you can't reduce turnaround, you might as well buy more [expendable launch vehicles]." SDIO and industry insist that this is not another "paper program", like the SSTO studies to date. The objective is a vehicle, not a report. It is a bit unclear, however, why SDIO is doing this, given that it seems only marginally related to missile defense. The popular theory is that if the early work looks good and money is available, the project will probably be transferred to another organization for implementation, with SDIO involved in getting things going because it is the one major organization with no vested interest in existing launchers. Atlantis launch "postponed indefinitely" due to secret problems with its military payload. The delay looks to be a week or so; apparently the problems were not actually serious, but the bird had to be pulled out of the payload bay for fixes. The nature of the delay in the Titan IV launch, now set to go shortly after Atlantis, has been revealed: lining in a duct providing payload cooling air flaked off and was blown into the payload fairing, which had to be removed for cleaning. The spacecraft itself was not affected. First international conference on waverider aircraft, which fly on a hypersonic shockwave. There is great interest in using such designs for more sophisticated versions of aerobraking, such as using the atmosphere of Mars or Venus to make drastic changes in probe trajectory, more than could be achieved by orthodox gravity assists. [You can use aerodynamic lift to hold the spacecraft *down*, rather than having to rely on the relatively feeble gravitational field of Mars or Venus, making a much tighter turn around the planet possible.] There is beginning to be real progress again, after very little effort in the 70s and early 80s. The major problem areas are basic aerodynamics -- no waverider has actually flown, at least not that has been admitted -- and heat-transfer technology. Various research projects are now being proposed, including launching a test vehicle from a reentering shuttle orbiter. -- "The average pointer, statistically, |Henry Spencer at U of Toronto Zoology points somewhere in X." -Hugh Redelmeier| henry@zoo.toronto.edu utzoo!henry
szabo@crg5.UUCP (Nick Szabo) (12/12/90)
In article <1990Dec11.055832.24321@zoo.toronto.edu> henry@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer) writes: >OSC and Hercules get the 1990 National Air and Space Museum Trophy for >Pegasus. Congratulations! Pegasus is indeed the most important space development of 1990, IMHO. >... >Orbital Sciences posts its first after-tax profit, with five Pegasus launches >sold to date (all to DARPA). The Pegasus program is still operating at a loss, since it is in the R&D phase. Most of the profits come from the Space Data Division, which operates satellite tracking systems for NASA, DoD, and other organizations. When doing cutting-edge R&D in the real world (as opposed to begging before Congress) it helps to have a diversified product line and customer base. A major weakness of SSI, Amroc, and other stalling private space companies is * they are 1-product companies * their designs are not compatable with current satellites, but they do not have the resources to develop their own satellites * they have not put priority on strategic partners (OSC works with Martin Marietta and Hercules on their two largest projects). IMHO, Amroc can still succeed if they do the following: * Build a rocket with a payload fairing exactly the size of Ariane or Delta (so that currently building satellites can be launched) * Find a strategic partner to do integration and launch (they are doing this now) * Develop and market a second, related product (for example, a small military missile using their patented fuels). OSC tows the fine line between government contracts (most of its revenue still comes from NASA and DoD) and cutting-edge projects with potentially large public and private markets. Unlike the larger aerospace companies, they are not afraid to trade short-term profits on government contracts for longer-term market potential. -- Nick Szabo szabo@sequent.com "We live and we learn, or we don't live long" -- Robert A. Heinlein The above opinions are my own and not related to those of any organization I may be affiliated with.
henry@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer) (12/13/90)
In article <20699@crg5.UUCP> szabo@crg5.UUCP (Nick Szabo) writes: >A major weakness of SSI, Amroc, and other stalling private space companies >is >* they are 1-product companies >* their designs are not compatable with current satellites, but they > do not have the resources to develop their own satellites > ... Actually, I would say the fundamental problem is that a concentration on small launchers -- in my opinion a wise decision -- implies that you must build a market, rather than expecting customers to beat a path to your door immediately. The survivors will be those who have the backing to be patient and help the customers figure out what they want. Actually, much the same comments apply to any attempt to take the large- launcher market by storm. The existing market is small -- if anything there is overcapacity on the horizon -- and is much more sensitive to established reliability than to cost. A new low-cost launcher would, again, have to *build* a market rather than relying on capturing much of the existing one. (The reason I think it wise to stick to small launchers is that all the problems get bigger with the launcher, including the size of the financial resources needed for market building.) >* Build a rocket with a payload fairing exactly the size of Ariane > or Delta (so that currently building satellites can be launched) Ha ha ha. Nick, are you under the impression that the interfaces to current launchers are standardized? Not so. The size of the payload fairing is the least of the problems. -- "The average pointer, statistically, |Henry Spencer at U of Toronto Zoology points somewhere in X." -Hugh Redelmeier| henry@zoo.toronto.edu utzoo!henry
mvk@pawl.rpi.edu (Michael V. Kent) (12/13/90)
In article <20699@crg5.UUCP> szabo@crg5.UUCP (Nick Szabo) writes: >large public and private markets. Unlike the larger aerospace companies, >they are not afraid to trade short-term profits on government contracts >for longer-term market potential. Do you have a particular gripe in mind, or is this just another pot shot at the large aerospace firms? Michael Kent mvk@pawl.rpi.edu
szabo@crg5.UUCP (Nick Szabo) (12/13/90)
In article <FGF^?1|@rpi.edu> mvk@pawl.rpi.edu (Michael V. Kent) writes: > >In article <20699@crg5.UUCP> szabo@crg5.UUCP (Nick Szabo) writes: >>large public and private markets. Unlike the larger aerospace companies, >>they are not afraid to trade short-term profits on government contracts >>for longer-term market potential. > >Do you have a particular gripe in mind, or is this just another pot shot at >the large aerospace firms? > OSC and Hercules are the only U.S. aerospace companies since the Shuttle to development a totally new, successful orbital launcher. They did it for 1/50th (2%) of what it cost to develop the first Shuttle. Unlike the major Shuttle contractors, they have carried a loss on the project (in other words risked their own money) eying future commercial markets. These are encouraging facts not gripes. Sorry I sounded like such a sourpuss over such a happy event. :-) -- Nick Szabo szabo@sequent.com "For historical reasons, this feature is unintelligible" The above opinions are my own and not related to those of any organization I may be affiliated with.
mvk@pawl.rpi.edu (Michael V. Kent) (12/14/90)
>OSC and Hercules are the only U.S. aerospace companies since the >Shuttle to development a totally new, successful orbital launcher. >They did it for 1/50th (2%) of what it cost to develop the first Shuttle. >Unlike the major Shuttle contractors, they have carried a loss on the >project (in other words risked their own money) eying future commercial >markets. These are encouraging facts not gripes. Sorry I sounded like >such a sourpuss over such a happy event. :-) > >Nick Szabo szabo@sequent.com As I am not yet knowledgeable enough about other companies' R & D, I will primarily discuss the one corporation I do know something about, McDonnell Douglas. While I truly admire the efforts of OSC and Hercules, they are by no means the only companies doing risky R & D. The 5 NASP contractors are each supporting about 10% of the development cost, with NASA and the DoD splitting the remaining 50%. This too is an orbiting vehicle, and it has no guarrantee of actually flying, even if it is technically up to par. The contractors are risking their own money to develop the technology to enable them (and the United States) to remain world aerospace leaders. MDC has also spent about $3 billion on the development of the MD-11. True, it is not an orbital launcher, but it is a major aerospace project that caused the company to forego considerable profit (and raises :) ) in the hope of future commercial success. Other programs (government and commercial) that require significant up-front money are the MD-12X, NOTAR, YF-23 (by design) and the A-12 (not by design). I'm sure most of the other large aerospace firms are also performing "risky" R&D. My point here is to say that there are some major advances occurring right now in aerospace, and many of them are due to the risk taken by the large aerospace firms. I do not mean to diminish the accomplishments of OSC and Hercules, but they are not alone. Although they may become "the competition", I wish them great success. Michael Kent mvk@pawl.rpi.edu
dlbres10@pc.usl.edu (Fraering Philip) (12/16/90)
In article <20714@crg5.UUCP> szabo@crg5.UUCP (Nick Szabo) writes: >OSC and Hercules are the only U.S. aerospace companies since the >Shuttle to development a totally new, successful orbital launcher. >They did it for 1/50th (2%) of what it cost to develop the first Shuttle. >Unlike the major Shuttle contractors, they have carried a loss on the >project (in other words risked their own money) eying future commercial >markets. These are encouraging facts not gripes. Sorry I sounded like >such a sourpuss over such a happy event. :-) Didn't they start out with a guaranteed sale from DAPRA before the thing was actually built? And they also had use of the B-52 from DAPRA, didn't they? Phil
crad@polari.UUCP (Charles Radley) (12/16/90)
+but now it is out in the open. The long truss is probably not long +for this world, in particular: a Goddard project to attach science +payloads to it has been cancelled, and the request for bids for the +assembly training facility in Houston has been withdrawn. The +leading idea right now is simply to retain the central cluster of +modules, but kill the truss. Among other advantages, the resulting +station should have gravity-gradient stability, eliminating +attitude-control thruster firings that eat fuel and bother the +microgravity people. - This is nonsense. The current Freedom is already gravity gradient stabilized, and The Truss is the very feature which makes gravity gradient stabilization possible, since it gives the solar arrays sufficient degrees of freedom to continuously track the Sun independent of the attitude of the main part of the station, which is pointing at the earth. Deleting the truss means the station will no longer be gravity gradient stabilized because the solar arrays will have only one degree of freedom. This means that the entire station will have to be kept more or less sun pointing, and gravity gradient pointing will no longer be possible. Instead of reducing thruster firings and fuel consumption, deleting the truss will substantially increase both. :wq
gary@ke4zv.UUCP (Gary Coffman) (12/20/90)
In article <20714@crg5.UUCP> szabo@crg5.UUCP (Nick Szabo) writes: > >OSC and Hercules are the only U.S. aerospace companies since the >Shuttle to development a totally new, successful orbital launcher. >They did it for 1/50th (2%) of what it cost to develop the first Shuttle. >Unlike the major Shuttle contractors, they have carried a loss on the >project (in other words risked their own money) eying future commercial >markets. These are encouraging facts not gripes. Sorry I sounded like >such a sourpuss over such a happy event. :-) The fact that a little 400 kilo payload launcher cost 2% of what the vastly bigger and more complex shuttle cost is, in itself, shocking. What are the hard numbers on development costs? Gary