[sci.crypt] The Real Regs about crypto exporting

gnu@hoptoad.uucp (John Gilmore) (10/29/86)

There has been way too much bullshit flying on this issue, so I decided
to waste half an hour and type in the real regulations, which I xeroXed
down at the Commerce Dept.  These come out of the Commodity Control
List, part of the book of export control regulations which lists
specific types of equipment and how exporting them is to be handled.
Here we go...

-----

ECCN 1527A.  Cryptographic equipment and specially designed components
therefor, designed to ensure secrecy of communications (such as
telegraphy, telephony, facsimile, video and data communications) or of
stored information; and "software" controlling or computers performing
the functions of such cryptographic equipment.

CONTROLS FOR ECCN 1527A

Unit: Report in "$ value."
Validated License Required: Country Groups QSTVWYZ.
GLV $ Value Limit: $0 for all destinations.
Processing Code: MT.
Reason for Control: National security.
Special Licenses Available:  See Part 373.

LIST OF EQUIPMENT CONTROLLED BY ECCN 1527A

Cryptographic equipment and ancillary equipment (such as teleprinters,
perforators, vocoders, visual display units) designed to ensure secrecy
of communications (such as telegraphy, telephony, facsimile, video,
data) or of stored information, their specialized components, and
software controlling of performing the function of such cryptographic
equipment; also video systems which, for secrecy purposes, use digital
techniques (conversion of an analog, i.e., video or facsimile, signal
into a digital signal).  (ECCN 1527A also covers digital computers and
differential analyzers (incremental computers) designed or modified for,
or combined with, any cipher machines, cryptographic equipment, devices
or techniques including software, microprogram control (firmware) and/or
specialized logic control (hardware), associated equipment therefor, and
equipment or systems incorporating such computers or analyzers), except
simple cryptographic devices or equipment only ensuring the privacy of
communications, of the following decription:

  (a) Equipment for voice transmission making use of fixed frequency
inversions and/or fixed band scrambling techniques in which the
transposition changes occur not more frequently than once every 10
seconds;

  (b) Standard civil facsimile and video equipment designed to ensure
the privacy of communications by an analog transmission using
nonstandard practices for intended receivers only (video system equipment
effecting the transposition of analog data);

  (c) Video systems for pay television and similar restricted audience
television, including industrial and commercial television equipment
using other than standard commercial sweep systems.

TECHNICAL NOTE:  No technical data or software controlled under this
ECCN may be exported or reexported under General License GTDR.

NOTE -- Exporters requiesting a validated license from the Department of
Commerce must provide a statement from the Department of State, Office
of Munitions Control, verifying that the equipment intended for export
is under the licensing jurisdiction of the Department of Commerce.

NOTE: 1.  This ECCN also covers video systems that, for secrecy
purposes, use digital techniques (conversion of an analog, i.e., video
or facsimile, signal into a digital signal).

2.  This ECCN does not cover simple cryptographic devices or equipment
only ensuring the privacy of communicaitions, as follows:

  (a) Equipment for voice transmission making use of fixed frequency
inversions or fixed band scrambling techniques in which the
transportation changes occur not more frequently than once every 10
seconds;

  (b) Standard civil facsimile and video equipment designed to ensure
the privacy of communications by an analog transmission using
non-standard practices for intended receivers only (video system equipment
effecting the transposition of analog data);

  (c) Video systems for pay television and similar restricted audience
television, including industrial and commercial television equipment
using other than standard commercial sweep systems.

3.  "Digital computers" and digital differential analyzers (incremental
computers) designed or modified for, or combined with, any cipher
machines, cryptographic equipment, devices or techniques including
"software", "microprogram" control ("firmware") or specialized logic
control (hardware), associated equipment therefor, and equipment or
systems incorporating such computers or analyzers are covered by this
ECCN or by Supp. No 2. to part 370 of the Export Administration
Regulations.

-----

That's it, including the typos ("transportation" for "transposition") and
duplications.  Straight out of the Commodity Control List.  If you want
further explanation of what this all means, don't flap your fingers on the
net!  Go down to your nearest Federal Building and talk to the folks
there.
-- 
John Gilmore  {sun,ptsfa,lll-crg,ihnp4}!hoptoad!gnu   jgilmore@lll-crg.arpa
  Overheard at a funeral: "I know this may be an awkward time, but do
  you recall him ever mentioning source code?"		-- Charles Addams

andersa@kuling.UUCP (Anders Andersson) (11/08/86)

No doubt the law (maybe with good explanation) makes clear what's legal to
export and what's not. What's NOT clear to me is how and when this relates
to electronic mail/conferencing (perhaps I should ask the US Embassy about
that, but I think it might as well be disputed here).

I recall this debate started with somebody posting an article containing
encryption software to the world-wide network. Now, WHO was (legally)
exporting the stuff? The original poster, or the SA of every relay host
actually transmitting it over the border (I don't know the topology of
the North American USENET, but I suspect there are several machines in
the USA with foreign connections, besides seismo's link to Europe), or
perhaps both?

What if such a message had originated in Europe and found its way to
Canada, *via* the USA? Would that procedure be called "exporting" by
the US Dept. of Commerce?

Yes, I might as well write a letter to the embassy and ask about this, but
as some people has shown their disappointment with certain companies being
careful enough to bring the crypt(X) issue to court, I think I'd better
ask the net for advice/permission before giving any authority an incentive
to start meddling in this unclear field of communication... Well?

Besides, it seems that this recently adopted export control law of ours
is working. According to the news today, Russian cargo trailers loaded
with electronics are piling up, stucked at the customs! :-)
-- 
Anders Andersson, Dept. of Computer Systems, Uppsala University, Sweden
Phone: +46 18 183170
UUCP: andersa@kuling.UUCP (...!{seismo,mcvax}!enea!kuling!andersa)