desj@brahms (David desJardins) (11/19/86)
In article <344@cartan.Berkeley.EDU> weemba@brahms.BERKELEY.EDU (Matthew P Wiener) writes: >In article <2274@mtgzz.UUCP> leeper@mtgzz.UUCP writes: >> Cryptography did not >>turn the tide in WWII, > >Nonsense. Cryptography *was* the tide, major battle after battle, from >Britain to El Alemain to Ardennes II to Stalingrad to Kursk to Midway to >Leyte Gulf. Read Hinsley et al for starts before spouting off like the >above. I agree cryptography and intelligence are of great importance, but I think it is ridiculous to claim that the Axis would have won the war if they had had better mathematicians (or had better used the ones they had). The odds were too heavily against them. Nobody is denying that crypto- graphy was of value, but can you seriously claim that it turned the tide of the war? The tide turned in June 1941 when Germany invaded Russia (if not sooner); from that point on they didn't have a chance. I don't see how you can attribute the Allied victory to cryptography rather than to our overwhelming advantage in manpower and production. Just as I don't see how you can attribute the early Axis victories, and German survival until 1945, to anything other than overwhelmingly superior tactics and leadership. In the Pacific cryptography played a greater role, but it still is unimaginable that we could lose that war. And don't try to accuse me of not having read on the subject. -- David desJardins P.S. Very sorry to post this to sci.math, but where does it go? Sci.crypt would be better I suppose, but we really need a sci.history group. Sigh. Anyway, please try to followup only to appropriate groups.
herman@marlin.UUCP (John W. Herman) (11/20/86)
>In article <344@cartan.Berkeley.EDU> weemba@brahms.BERKELEY.EDU (Matthew P Wiener) writes: >>In article <2274@mtgzz.UUCP> leeper@mtgzz.UUCP writes: >>> Cryptography did not >>>turn the tide in WWII, >> >>Nonsense. Cryptography *was* the tide, major battle after battle, from >>Britain to El Alemain to Ardennes II to Stalingrad to Kursk to Midway to >>Leyte Gulf. Read Hinsley et al for starts before spouting off like the >>above. > I agree cryptography and intelligence are of great importance, but I >think it is ridiculous to claim that the Axis would have won the war if >they had had better mathematicians (or had better used the ones they had). > > -- David desJardins Two comments come to mind, namely: 1. What does "winning the war" mean? Both Germany and Japan had the capability to continue to wage war. They became convinced that the war was not winnable. It is not always easy to determine the point at which a country is defeated. 2. The outcome of the war was in doubt until the submarine battle in the Atlantic was won. Intelligence and cryptography had a great deal to do with that turning point. Matters such as this are subject to a great deal of discussion because there is only one reality which we can examine. 'What happens if' is a subject which has appeared in many (mostly poorly done) Science Fiction novels.
clewis@spectrix.UUCP (Chris Lewis) (11/20/86)
In article <354@cartan.Berkeley.EDU> desj@brahms (David desJardins) writes: >In article <344@cartan.Berkeley.EDU> weemba@brahms.BERKELEY.EDU (Matthew P Wiener) writes: >>In article <2274@mtgzz.UUCP> leeper@mtgzz.UUCP writes: >>> Cryptography did not >>>turn the tide in WWII, >> >>Nonsense. Cryptography *was* the tide, major battle after battle, from >>Britain to El Alemain to Ardennes II to Stalingrad to Kursk to Midway to >>Leyte Gulf. Read Hinsley et al for starts before spouting off like the >>above. > > I agree cryptography and intelligence are of great importance, but I >think it is ridiculous to claim that the Axis would have won the war if >they had had better mathematicians (or had better used the ones they had). >The odds were too heavily against them. Nobody is denying that crypto- >graphy was of value, but can you seriously claim that it turned the >tide of the war? The tide turned in June 1941 when Germany invaded >Russia (if not sooner); from that point on they didn't have a chance. If there's anything I've learned from reading about the war, it's that you cannot base any claims for who won/lost the war for any one reason. If Stalin had believed the ULTRA decodings provided to them by Britain, Russia wouldn't have been caught by surprise and the war would have ended sooner. If the US hadn't sold (under the table) a few old decrepid destroyers and some old airplanes in '40 and '41, Britain may not have survived the battle of the Atlantic. If ULTRA hadn't worked as well as it did, the Battle of Britain would have been lost. Or, there would have been more Coventrys. Or, without the unbelieveable courage of the RAF pilots... Or, if Germany hadn't declared war on the US in late December of 1941, the US would probably have been fighting only in the Pacific, and the European war would have lasted longer. Or, if Hitler had started operation "Sea Lion" he might have won. Or not (I've seen in depth analysis done by various strategic planners - from both AXIS and ALLIED commands - done in the 50's I think, that said that it wouldn't have worked after all). And so on, and so on. "ULTRA Goes to War" is an extremely interesting read for those interested in ENIGMA (ULTRA was the code name for the information retrieved from the ENIGMA intercepts) and the role it played in the war. By Lewin I think. Thank gawd the Poles managed to smuggle one to the English... -- Chris Lewis Spectrix Microsystems Inc, UUCP: {utzoo|utcs|yetti|genat|seismo}!mnetor!spectrix!clewis ARPA: mnetor!spectrix!clewis@seismo.css.gov Phone: (416)-474-1955
huds@ur-tut.UUCP (Andrew Hudson) (11/20/86)
> 'What happens if' is >a subject which has appeared in many (mostly poorly done) Science Fiction >novels. For an excellent treatment read Cyril Kornbluth's Two Dooms. Spoiler in one sentence follows: U.S. does not drop the bombs, attrition in Japan saps America, the Axis powers revitalize and do achieve a horrible world supremecy. A. Hudson
clewis@spectrix.UUCP (Chris Lewis) (11/20/86)
In article <844@marlin.UUCP> herman@marlin.UUCP (John W. Herman) writes: I agree completely - only a few minor points... >1. What does "winning the war" mean? Both Germany and Japan had the >capability to continue to wage war. They became convinced that the >war was not winnable. It is not always easy to determine the point >at which a country is defeated. Japan could have fought on (considering how more atomic bombs the US had after Nagasaki - namely zero) for a while (a year or two). Germany? Hardly. When hostilities ended the AXIS controlled area consisted of Berlin (and a few inconsequential pockets)... And Berlin was having the shit pounded out of it - 20,000 Russian artillery pieces firing continuously for weeks... And, it also depends on *who* thinks the war was unwinnable. Senior German staff officers (Eg: Rommel) believed that the war was unwinnable since around 1942. Unfortunately, Hitler didn't - and Rommel died under suspicious circumstances... >2. The outcome of the war was in doubt until the submarine battle in >the Atlantic was won. That all depends on what you mean by "won". Late 1942 when the ship losses started to go down drastically? Or 1944 when the allies were able to almost completely destroy the submarine fleet? Coming from a different point of view, consider this: the outcome of the invasion of France was in no doubt whatsoever - the Germans would have lost, ... except, Guderian disobeyed *direct* orders from Hitler (by feigning radio problems) to stop his tanks just inside the border and wait for the infantry. If he had followed orders, the war would have run quite differently. Too bad ULTRA missed that one. >Intelligence and cryptography had a great deal to do with that turning point. ---- I agree, as long as you change that to "all turning points". Dere's tousands of 'em! :-) >Matters such as this are subject to a great deal of discussion because >there is only one reality which we can examine. 'What happens if' is >a subject which has appeared in many (mostly poorly done) Science Fiction >novels. Absolutely true! -- Chris Lewis Spectrix Microsystems Inc, UUCP: {utzoo|utcs|yetti|genat|seismo}!mnetor!spectrix!clewis ARPA: mnetor!spectrix!clewis@seismo.css.gov Phone: (416)-474-1955
clewis@spectrix.UUCP (Chris Lewis) (11/21/86)
In article <866@ur-tut.UUCP> huds@ur-tut.UUCP (Andrew Hudson) writes: > >For an excellent treatment read Cyril Kornbluth's Two Dooms.... I believe I've read it, and several like it, and enjoyed them a lot. But it would have been an interesting trick - by the time the bombs were dropped (or not), there wasn't enough left of the AXIS to revitalize. Germany had been flat on its back for a couple of months. Then compare the navies, air forces and building capacity of Britain, the US, Canada and Australia (along with probably the Soviet Union and Free French running "prize" German ships. Eg: there was only one German aircraft carrier - the USSR got it at the end of the war along with a couple of complete mine-sweeper fleets. The Americans blew up most of their "prizes" in their later A- and H-bomb tests in the Pacific. In contrast, Canada didn't even keep the ships we built ourselves - most of them ended up in the Brooklyn Navy yards as scrap iron) to a blockaded Japan (as it effectively was by the time the bombs were dropped). The US wasn't the only nation fighting Japan in the Pacific - especially after Europe wasn't occupying all of the rest of the allies' attention... The Pacific was a foregone conclusion from the moment Japan attacked Pearl Harbour - as a Japanese admiral put it "I fear ... the wake of the sleeping giant" regardless of US losses at Pearl or the use of A-bombs. In all likelyhood, if Japan hadn't attacked Pearl, most of the Pacific would still be under Japanese control. In fact, if the US intelligence service had managed to tell Washington of the imminent attack on Pearl found from their breaking of the Japanese codes, or the Japanese embassy had decoded their messages faster there may not have been a war... nothing gets Americans more riled up than attacks without warning (and the lack of warning was un-intentional). The US could have lost *all* of their ships at Pearl and still won - only a little later. Japan could never have invaded the mainland - would have made the Eastern Front look like a cakewalk (for the Germans). -- Chris Lewis Spectrix Microsystems Inc, UUCP: {utzoo|utcs|yetti|genat|seismo}!mnetor!spectrix!clewis ARPA: mnetor!spectrix!clewis@seismo.css.gov Phone: (416)-474-1955
scw@locus.ucla.edu (Stephen C Woods) (12/02/86)
<leeper>==<2274@mtgzz.UUCP> leeper@mtgzz.UUCP (Evelyn Leeper?)
<weemba>==<344@cartan.Berkeley.EDU> weemba@brahms.BERKELEY.EDU(Matthew P Wiener)
<desj>== <354@cartan.Berkeley.EDU> desj@brahms (David desJardins)
<clewis>==<191@spectrix.UUCP> clewis@spectrix.UUCP (Chris Lewis)
<leeper> ...Cryptography did NOT turn the tide in WWII...
<weemba>Nonsense. Cryptography *was* the tide, major battle after battle, from
<weemba>Britain to El Alemain to Ardennes II to Stalingrad to Kursk to Midway to
<weemba>Leyte Gulf. Read Hinsley et al for starts before spouting off like the
<weemba>above.
<desj> I agree cryptography and intelligence are of great importance, but I
<desj>think it is ridiculous to claim that the Axis would have won the war if
<desj>they had [...] in June 1941 when Germany invaded
<desj>Russia (if not sooner); from that point on they didn't have a chance.
<clewis>... you cannot base any claims for who won/lost the war for any one
<clewis>reason. If Stalin [...] Atlantic. If ULTRA hadn't worked
<clewis>as well as it did, the Battle of Britain would have been lost. Or,
<clewis>there would have been more Coventrys. Or, without the unbelieveable
<clewis>courage of the RAF pilots... Or, [...] would have lasted longer.
<clewis>Or, if Hitler had started operation "Sea Lion" he might have won. Or
<clewis>not (I've seen in depth analysis done by various strategic planners -
<clewis>from both AXIS and ALLIED commands - done in the 50's I think, that
<clewis>said that it wouldn't have worked after all). And so on, and so on....
For a comprehensive analysis of the Battle of Britian (and a fairly close look
at "Sea Lion") I highly recomend Len Deighton's 'Fighter' (ISBN 0-586-04611-9).
In essense he says that The German Navy was NOT prepaired to support ANY
landings unless they would be unopposed, and that the plans issues were more
staff studies than real invasion plans (typical invasion plans are about
the size of an encyclopedia).
On a different subject, according to Deighton (and contrary to popular belief):
' It was an act of faith to send the jamming signals into the ether,
not knowing how effective where these countermeasures. And yet on the
night of 14-15 November there came a horrifying indication of what was
being achieved; it was one that the experts would readily have forgone.
An error in the adjustment of the modulation made it relatively easy to
distinguish the sound of the signal from the sound of the jamming(1).
KGr 100 put over 1,000 incendiaries precisely onto Coventry to lead
three separate streams of bombers there with high explosive.'
and this footnote.
'(1)In spite of recient nonsense written about Churchill and the Enigma
machine, this technical error was the sole reason that the German
attack was so successful.'
Having read several (!) books about the state of the RAF nightfighter
force in WWII, I can see no way that they could have interferred
effectivly (if at all) with a raid of this size at that time, even if
they had had extremly precise information as to the exact routing and
timeing of the attacking force they probably could not have attacked
more than 5% of the involved aircraft.
<scw>
Stephen C. Woods; UCLA SEASNET; 2567 BH;LA CA 90024; (213)-825-8614
UUCP: ...!{inhp4,ucbvax,{hao!cepu}}!ucla-cs!scw ARPA:scw@locus.UCLA.EDU