simsong@mit-amt.MEDIA.MIT.EDU (Simson L. Garfinkel) (12/05/86)
Well, it's kind of neat. You pay a real M/A-COM box, you send them $30/month, and your box "magically" lets you decode. The feeling of the students in my class on Telecommunications Technology and Policy is that the satelite broadcasts a message to your box saying "Ok, let your user see the scrambled stuff now." Apparently, there are even provisions to purchase, say, $100 worth of broadcasting. Then when you turn on your box it gets taken out of your running account. This number is maintained in your box, not in the satelite. Now, you're right -- this means that you could build your own box. But it is a whole lot cheaper simply to use the M/A-COM box than to try to build you own. At least, that's what M/A-COM is counting on. The real thing about the this block-box thing might be for people outside the US who would like to pick up the broadcasts. (Remember, you can't export the M/A-COM because of export control.) Almost certainly, the black-box simply pertends that it's always allowed to play. It's not breaking DES. It's probably not even "breaking" the keys, since they are almost certainly not transmitted with a public key encryption system. (Why bother?) Some hackers get into theft-of-service, even if it costs them ten times more than the service does. I don't. ================================================================ The reason that treason is defined so explicity in the Constitution is that there was a lot of fear, in the early days of the republic, that a lot of people might be liable for aiding the Brittish, or that the charge of treason would be levied against people for "personal" reasons. So it's really hard to do. It's done, but it's really hard. Usually much easier to get people for mail fraud, but that's something else again. ================================================================ Simson L. Garfinkel MIT Media Lab This posting completely reflects my views. Isn't that neat? -- Bomb, terrorist, cryptography, DES, assasinate, secret, decode, NSA, CIA, NRO. The above is food for the NSA line eater. Add it to your .signature and you too can help overflow the NSA's ability to scan all traffic going in or out of the USA looking for "significant" words. (This is not a joke, sadly.)
ems@prls.UUCP (Gordon Vickers) (12/08/86)
In article <543@mit-amt.MEDIA.MIT.EDU> simsong@mit-amt.MEDIA.MIT.EDU (Simson L. Garfinkel) writes ( in his .signature file) : > >================================================================ > Simson L. Garfinkel > MIT Media Lab > >This posting completely reflects my views. Isn't that neat? >-- > [ line containing words NSA suppossedly scans for; deleted -gpv ] > The above is food for the NSA line eater. Add it to your .signature and > you too can help overflow the NSA's ability to scan all traffic going in or > out of the USA looking for "significant" words. (This is not a joke, sadly.) I may not condone the NSA's practice of searching exported data for 'significant words' but as long as the practice is legal, and while my tax dollars are helping to support their efforts , I'd like to see the NSA operate as effeciantly as possiable . If you don't like what they do, there are more constructive ways to protest . Your .signature file is not going to make them stop or even to consider stopping their suppossed actions. You accomplish nothing, they continue as always. At most you've wasted a couple of seconds of some poor clods day and burned up few nano-seconds of Cray cpu time. So what. Sounds real adolescent to me. ------------- fold, spindle, mutilate at will ------(it's your CRT) ---- Gordon P. Vickers Signetics Corp., PO Box 409, M/S 69, Sunnyvale, Ca 94086 {allegra,decvax,ihnp4}!philabs!prls!ems or {ucbvax,decwrl,ihnp4,allegra}!amdcad!amdimage!prls!ems Kick the habit: ask the American Lung Association about their "Freedom From Smoking" class. It worked for me, the wife, and 75% of the class. What a differance! Its GREAT! [ In this correspondance, I am representing myself and no others. I am not part of the PRLS group, but they are nice enough to allow me to TIP(1) to an account on their machine so I can send/receive email.]
eric@sdcrdcf.UUCP (Eric Lund) (12/09/86)
> Your .signature file is not going to make them stop or even to >consider stopping their suppossed actions. You accomplish nothing, they >continue as always. At most you've wasted a couple of seconds of some poor >clods day and burned up few nano-seconds of Cray cpu time. So what. Sounds >real adolescent to me. Speaking as a System Administrator who has been both perpetrator and victim of both friendly and hostile attacks, I say PLEASE KEEP ATTACKING!!!!! A security system that is installed and never tested never shows its flaws until too late. I, personally, would rather be under friendly attack that shows me how to shield myself rather than become victim (again!) of a hostile attack. If these simple attacks show up a flaw in this supposed keyword seaching of exported data, then this will force our security agencies to come up with better measures, which, in turn, enhances our own security. To bring this back to sci.crypt, would you buy a cryptographic system from some guy that tells you "This system is so hard to break, we don't even bother testing it!"? These are my opinions, not necessarily those of my employer, my friends, my enemies, or any of my other personalities. My new flameproof armor needs a field test; do you need to test your new flamethrower? Eric the DBA
ccplumb@watnot.UUCP (12/09/86)
In article <2485@prls.UUCP> ems@prls.UUCP (Gordon Vickers) writes: > > I may not condone the NSA's practice of searching exported data for >'significant words' but as long as the practice is legal, and while my >tax dollars are helping to support their efforts , I'd like to see the >NSA operate as effeciantly as possiable . > If you don't like what they do, there are more constructive ways to >protest . Your .signature file is not going to make them stop or even to >consider stopping their suppossed actions. You accomplish nothing, they >continue as always. At most you've wasted a couple of seconds of some poor >clods day and burned up few nano-seconds of Cray cpu time. So what. Sounds >real adolescent to me. > Hm... As a Canadian, I'm not too up-to-date on U.S. counterintelligence, but I don't think tapping every single phone line that goes across the U.S. border is fully legal. It's just that the NSA has been doing it for so long, and can stonewall so well ("We can't tell you for security reasons") that nobody's ever made an issue of it. But still, we don't need to make things *too* easy for them. I'd say one article could take a reasonable fraction of a minute to prosess, considering it probably crosses the border several times. -Colin Plumb (ccplumb@watnot.UUCP) Zippy says: I just heard the SEVENTIES were over!! And I was just getting in touch with my LEISURE SUIT!!
rhorn@infinet.UUCP (12/10/86)
In article <2485@prls.UUCP> ems@prls.UUCP (Gordon Vickers) writes:
[complaint about the NSA food fad being in-appropriate]
All of the posters have overlooked the far more extensive GRU and KGB
monitoring of both international and domestic US telecommunications.
We may be wasting a few cycles on an NSA machine, but we are also
wasting many more cycles on KGB machines. They get all the interior
US traffic to browse also. I don't mind wasting their time at all.
Lets keep up the KGB food, keep those Moscow computers busy.
--
Rob Horn
UUCP: ...{decvax, seismo!harvard}!wanginst!infinet!rhorn
Snail: Infinet, 40 High St., North Andover, MA