tedrick@ernie.Berkeley.EDU (Tom Tedrick) (08/25/87)
Here are some extracts from "Surprise", by the German General W. Erfurth. The book was first published just prior to WW2, I believe, and discusses the role of surprise in war. Some of you might find it interesting. I would be interested in corrections to his statements. Thanks, -Tom tedrick@ernie.berkeley.edu ******************************************************** page 73: "Complete and detailed information about the enemy is, however, never available in war, unless the enemy himself takes the trouble to furnish it, as the Russians did during the battle of Tannenburg and during the campaign of Lodz by broadcasting it by radio." page 86: " ... the Germans and Austrians were equally well informed of the Russian moves [this is during Fall 1914]. In that territory, secret agents played an important role for both parties. Besides, the Russians still stuck to their habit of not enciphering important radio messages, a habit which already during the battle of Tannenburg proved to be very helpful to the Germans." page 91: " [this is a translator's note] There is no reason to assume that the Germans in August, 1914, were confused by mere accident. On the contrary, the British had put an elaborate scheme for misleading their enemy into operation. They were successful because they had discovered the German espionage system in England [shades of WW2!!] and used, or rather abused, it without knowledge on the part of the Germans. During the first days of the war they transmitted to Germany the information that the British army would not leave Great Britain. Later they spread false information on the size of the British Expeditionary Force and the points of disembarkation. During the critical phase of the operations in August, 1914, they made the Germans fear a British attack from Ostende, that is to say, against the rear and flank of the German First Army. Moreover, they spread the rumor that strong Russian forces, recently landed in England, would attack the Germans in the same region." page 93: " [back to Tannenburg] ... the staff of the German Eight Army read all the important Russian radio messages and thereby had exact and complete knowledge of the enemy's intentions. There is hardly a historical precedent for this. The commanders of the two Russian armies on August 25 informed each other by radio of the dispositions of their forces and the objectives of their movements. The Germans intercepted these radiograms and thus were able to base their own decisions upon invaluable complete information. Hence a surprise move could be attempted under exceptionally favorable conditions. The 'Cannae of Eastern Prussia' was the result of a combination of merit, luck and surprise methods on the one side and of mistakes, omissions and ill luck on the other." page 108: "Before and during the battle of the Masurian Lakes both sides had incomplete knowledge of the impending movements of the enemy. The Germans were no longer assisted by Russian radio messages in plain language." [I had thought that the Germans were still reading Russian radio messages at this time, by breaking their codes. Anyone know the answer?] page 109: "It was particularly important to prevent a Russian attack on the German left flank. [Therefore] The German radio on September 7 transmitted a message en clair suggesting the arrival of two corps from the western front behind the German left wing." page 111: " On September 7 ... he [Russian General Rennenkampf] gave orders to attack strongly on a broad front the open flank of the wheeling Germans. On the same day, however, the Russians received the German radio-message about the alleged arrival of two German corps behind the northern flank. Rennenkampf became irresolute and could not make up his mind whether he should accept battle or withdraw ... " page 145: "The Germans started their offensive [Lodz] under particularly favorable circumstances. The German commander knew all the details of the Russian strength, disposition and organization. In the last minute, he learned beyond any doubt that the Russians had ceased to advance further to the south. Hence he was able to take strong forces away from the southern front and to organize an offensive center of gravity in the area of Thorn. The reports of German air reconnaissance and of the German land forces were confirmed by lengthy Russian radio messages which the Germans decrypted without difficulty. Thus, the enemy facilitated the German preparations for a battle of annihilation." page 147: "The Russians unwittingly and carelessly continued to inform the Germans about their dispositions by transmitting inter-army orders and intelligence in clear by radio. Like General Gallieni before the battle of the Marne, General von Mackensen prior to the offensive of Lodz knew everything about the Russian situation." page 198: "Recent wars showed that radio sometimes may be the means of betraying important secrets. During WW1, when radio was used for the first time, all belligerents used to broadcast falsified orders in order to deceive the enemy. Before the offensive on the Isonzo a whole net of radio stations was built in Tyrol to detract the attention of the Italians from the Isonzo to the Tyrol front. On the eastern front, as we have already related, the German army profited from the amateurish way in which the Russians used their radio. The French were also clever at deciphering German orders and actually detected German movements before the battle of the Marne by radio listening. According to the French Minister of War, Messimy, the chief of the French radio and cipher bureau was a kind of sorcerer who, within the shortest time, discovered some of the deepest German secrets. He was helped in his task by the Germans themselves. Once two German codes fell into the hands of the French, while at another time some German staffs simultaneously broadcast the same text en clair and enciphered. Messimy asserts that the services rendered by the French cipher bureau were 'eclantant'." page 199: "Also the British excelled in the art of deciphering. A professor from Edinburgh, A. Ewing, was in charge of this important work [sic] for the British Admiralty and became famous in his country. By the end of 1914, Russian divers removed the German naval code from the stranded and abandoned cruiser Magdeburg. The code was quickly dispatched to the British Admiralty which profited greatly from it." "In the Russo-Polish War radio listening played an important role and often revealed the intentions of the enemy to the last details. The Poles deciphered the Russian orders for the Russian counter-offensive in the Ukraine in May, 1920. In Abyssinia only the Italians profited from the radio messages of their opponent. Marshall Badoglio revealed that the few Abyssinian transmitters were actually more helpful to the Italians than to the Abyssinians. It goes without saying that precautions must be taken against such occurences. [Sarcastic remark goes here. Remember this is a German general on the eve of WW2.] The Army whose radio-messages are read by the opponent renounces all chances of surprise, while it offers vast strategic possibilities to the enemy. [Doubly sarcastic remark goes here.]
henry@utzoo.UUCP (Henry Spencer) (08/26/87)
> ... It goes without saying that precautions must be taken against > such occurences. [Sarcastic remark goes here. Remember > this is a German general on the eve of WW2.] The Army > whose radio-messages are read by the opponent renounces > all chances of surprise, while it offers vast strategic > possibilities to the enemy. [Doubly sarcastic remark goes here.] Don't get too sarcastic. Remember that the Allies botched this very detail in Africa -- Rommel's field cryptanalysts were reading a great deal of the traffic from Egypt, including the US ambassador's detailed reports on British status and movements. As I recall, two fairly significant dates in the war in Africa were the day the US ambassador was replaced (by a less mouthy one) and the day Rommel's field cryptanalysis unit was decimated during a confused skirmish. -- "There's a lot more to do in space | Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology than sending people to Mars." --Bova | {allegra,ihnp4,decvax,utai}!utzoo!henry
hofbauer@utcsri.UUCP (08/27/87)
> Don't get too sarcastic. Remember that the Allies botched this very detail > in Africa -- Rommel's field cryptanalysts were reading a great deal of the > traffic from Egypt, including the US ambassador's detailed reports on > British status and movements. As I recall, two fairly significant dates > in the war in Africa were the day the US ambassador was replaced (by a less > mouthy one) and the day Rommel's field cryptanalysis unit was decimated > during a confused skirmish. > -- I read a biography of Rommel not that long ago and was also amazed by the role cryptography seemed to play in his campaign. BTW, the U.S. Ambassador's name was Feller and Rommel referred to the intercepts as "his little Feller's". Exactly how significant the cryptography was is hard to judge. Rommel was a brilliant field commander and he was beset by supply problems and a high command that eventually thought him and his campaign as irrelevant.
tedrick@ernie.Berkeley.EDU.UUCP (08/27/87)
>> ... It goes without saying that precautions must be taken against >> such occurences. [Sarcastic remark goes here. Remember >> this is a German general on the eve of WW2.] The Army >> whose radio-messages are read by the opponent renounces >> all chances of surprise, while it offers vast strategic >> possibilities to the enemy. [Doubly sarcastic remark goes here.] >Don't get too sarcastic. Remember that the Allies botched this very detail >in Africa ... That's true. The reason for the sarcasm is that the Germans botched this very detail ...