[sci.crypt] "Secure" encryption

kruger@whyvax.dec.com (Hart for CCCP chief in '88) (01/14/88)

Maybe someone can answer a question that's been bothering me for a while now. Ifyou need an absolutely (provably) secure code, the key must be as long as the
message. Even if it is not, a very short (and fairly random) datum will be hard to decode. So why not embed the real key in the message? ie, the external "key"
is designed only to decrypt the randomly selected internal key, which is the
one that decodes the real message. One of the modes of DES does this, but each
successive key is no longer than the previous one. I am proposing a key of
perhaps 128 bytes. It is extremely random (this is a technical point on which
I have no expertise -- I will assume a REALLY random technique, ie not a pseudo-random sequence whose mechanics we know, but some physical process we don't,
like radiation counts or something. Now, your 16 byte key need only decrypt a
patternless "plaintext" key. And the longer key can be used to make a much
nastier encryption. Why isn't this done?

dov

"Disclaimers are bullshit"

leonard@bucket.UUCP (01/16/88)

In article <8801132010.AA15994@decwrl.dec.com> kruger@whyvax.dec.com (Hart for CCCP chief in '88) writes:
<Maybe someone can answer a question that's been bothering me for a while now.
<If you need an absolutely (provably) secure code, the key must be as long as
<the message. Even if it is not, a very short (and fairly random) datum will
<be hard to decode. So why not embed the real key in the message? ie, the
<external "key" is designed only to decrypt the randomly selected internal
<key, which is the one that decodes the real message. ....
<I am proposing a key of perhaps 128 bytes. ... Now, your 16
<byte key need only decrypt a patternless "plaintext" key. And the longer key
<can be used to make a much nastier encryption. Why isn't this done?

They problem is that a "secure" cipher according to current definitions,
requires that the message still be secure even if the encryption method is 
known! Under your technique, if I known the method all I have to do to crack
the message is start my computer rolling thru all possible 16 byte keys.
(hmm 256**16 = 3.4e38.... this may take a while!)

Your are also confusing the "rules" for substitution and transposition
ciphers with the more modern techniques. For the "old" ciphers, a key length
needs to be at least as long as the message (or the messages must be short).
You also need to change the key frequently. 

What matters with modern "bit-wise" encryption is not the key _length_ so
much as the size of the "key space". Your 16 byte key (did you _really_
mean byte? DES only uses _7_!!!) generates an ENORMOUS key space.

-- 
Leonard Erickson		...!tektronix!reed!percival!bucket!leonard
CIS: [70465,203]
"I used to be a hacker. Now I'm a 'microcomputer specialist'.
You know... I'd rather be a hacker."

markh@csd4.milw.wisc.edu (Mark William Hopkins) (01/16/88)

In article <8801132010.AA15994@decwrl.dec.com> kruger@whyvax.dec.com (Hart for CCCP chief in '88) writes:
>Maybe someone can answer a question that's been bothering me for a while now. Ifyou need an absolutely (provably) secure code, the key must be as long as the
>message. Even if it is not, a very short (and fairly random) datum will be hard to decode. So why not embed the real key in the message? ie, the external "key"
>is designed only to decrypt the randomly selected internal key, which is the
>one that decodes the real message. One of the modes of DES does this, but each
>successive key is no longer than the previous one. I am proposing a key of
>perhaps 128 bytes. It is extremely random (this is a technical point on which
>I have no expertise -- I will assume a REALLY random technique, ie not a pseudo-random sequence whose mechanics we know, but some physical process we don't,
>like radiation counts or something. Now, your 16 byte key need only decrypt a
>patternless "plaintext" key. And the longer key can be used to make a much
>nastier encryption. Why isn't this done?
>
>dov
>
>"Disclaimers are bullshit"

This problem may briing a quick resolution to one of the issues brought up.

This is a message in a code based on the Post Correspondence Problem.  Its
characteristic is that neither the message nor the key is necessary!

There is an obvious problem in receiving an encrypted message based on the
Post Correspondence Problem.  How does one parse it?  The answer, incredibly
enough, is to send the message in unencrypted form!  But, you might wonder,
doesn't that defeat the purpose of using encryption?  No, as you will see.

Problem:  Find the actual message encrypted below.

Hint: THIS IS NOT THE ACTUAL MESSAGE (which, of course, is why it does not
need to be transmitted.)

MESSAGE:

51405020503150820087603150820087641209075140587651405020512
208762515216508051405049925152130587685051122008200251525431220  

A solution will be given at this time in the year 2001.  If this problem 
proves to be too difficult (or impossible) then I will also give out the key.
Having the key, though, will not help in the least bit, as it is totally
useless. Using computers will not help either, since this code is based on the 
unsolveable Post Correspondence Problem (or is it?).