marty1@houem.UUCP (M.BRILLIANT) (10/06/86)
In article <631@houem.UUCP> I wrote: * There is a "vast" difference between a fetus and a two-year-old.... * ... The state, in the exercise of its police powers, can * protect a two-year-old without imposing on the pursuit of happiness * of any other person. For example, a two-year-old can become a foster * child. It can not so protect a fetus. It can not remove a fetus from * the body of its natural mother and place it in the body of a foster * mother.... In <1609@cbdkc1.UUCP>, pmd@cbdkc1.UUCP (Paul M. Dubuc) wrote >In article <636@houem.UUCP> marty1@houem.UUCP (M.BRILLIANT) writes: >>In <1597@cbdkc1.UUCP>, pmd@cbdkc1.UUCP (Paul M. Dubuc) purports to answer >>my response to an article of his. He has so misrepresented my position >>that I cannot answer his article. He says > >... or maybe you didn't represent your own position adaquately enough? >I won't press this point. Let any who have read this discussion decide >for themselves. I will try again. In the middle of <1597@cbdkc1.UUCP>, he wrote: >You seem to imply that portability makes one a person because the >state *may* protect one in that case... Portability is a very important part of the definition of a person. Being confined to an iron lung does not make one a non-person, but being confined inside the body of another person, at the very least, puts grave doubts on the matter. Let me say that "separability from other persons is essential to being a person because the state *can* protect one in that case." Paul also said >... it is still not a reason why it *should*... and in <1609@cbdkc1.UUCP> he said > One logical relationship you failed to state is the one you apparently > assume between "CAN protect" and "should protect" on the part of the state. I'm confused. I said the state *can* protect a two-year-old as an individual. I assumed we agree that the state *should* protect a two-year-old. I said also that the state *can* protect a fetus at the price of the "pursuit of happiness" of a pregnant woman, but said it *shouldn't*. I don't think I logically equated *can* and *should*. In <1597@cbdkc1.UUCP> he said: >It depends on how you define "pursuit of happiness" doesn't it? and in <1609@cbdkc1.UUCP> he said >You apparently use the term in an unqualified manner where its perception >by the pregnant woman and the implications of it for the life or death >of the fetus is concerned. I want to be precise about what I mean by "pursuit of happiness." I don't think paying you to care for a child is an infringement on your "pursuit of happiness" if you are free to refuse. The state can and does offer a variety of inducements to a variety of people to induce them to care for a child whose parents do not want it. But if the state demands that you care for a child, or a fetus, I think that is an infringement on your "pursuit of happiness" no matter what compensation is offered. I suppose an essential element of "pursuit of happiness" is "freedom," and I guess that concept is crucial to my conclusion that there is a clear difference between a fetus and a child. M. B. Brilliant Marty AT&T-BL HO 3D-520 (201)-949-1858 Holmdel, NJ 07733 ihnp4!houem!marty1