carnes@gargoyle.UChicago.EDU (Richard Carnes) (06/23/87)
nelson_p@apollo.uucp: >This shows, as I noted a month ago here, that most of the disputes in >this group are essentially epistemological in nature. In my original >posting [I] defined 'knowledge' as being of the scientific definition >i.e., generally agreed-upon, testable, predictive, repeatable results >etc. You may, of course, adopt a definition that includes things >like personal experience if you wish but I find such a definition is >too broad, i.e., almost anything qualifies as knowledge that way, >even a great many things that directly contradict each other. There is no such animal as `the scientific definition of knowledge' or `the scientific epistemology'. Your view of knowledge is, in broad terms, an empiricist one, which is orthodoxy in the hard sciences because it explains them well. But the philosophical question you and others are begging is whether an empiricist epistemology is adequate for the kind of understanding we can have of the specifically human world studied by the social sciences. The following quote from Charles Taylor's essay on `Interpretation and the Sciences of Man' [*The Review of Metaphysics* 25 (1971), pp. 3-51] will give one a taste of an different conception of knowledge: "The progress of natural science has lent great credibility to this epistemology, since it can be plausibly reconstructed on this model, as for instance has been done by the logical empiricists. And, of course, the temptation has been overwhelming to reconstruct the sciences of man on the same model; or rather to launch them in lines of enquiry that fit this paradigm, since they are constantly said to be in their `infancy'. Psychology, where an earlier vogue of behaviourism is being replaced by a boom of computer-based models, is far from the only case. "The form this epistemological bias -- one might say obsession -- takes is different for different sciences.... But in general, the empiricist orientation must be hostile to a conduct of enquiry which is based on interpretation, and which encounters the hermeneutical circle as this was characterized above. This cannot meet the requirements of intersubjective, non-arbitrary verification which it considers essential to science. And along with the epistemological stance goes the ontological belief that reality must be susceptible to understanding and explanation by science so understood. From this follows a certain set of notions of what the sciences of man must be. "On the other hand, many, including myself, would like to argue that these notions about the sciences of man are sterile, that we cannot come to understand important dimensions of human life within the bounds set by this epistemological orientation.... "Common meanings, as well as inter-subjective ones, fall through the net of mainstream social science. They can find no place in its categories. For they are not simply a converging set of subjective reactions, but part of the common world. What the ontology of mainstream social science lacks is the notion of meaning as not simply for an individual subject; of a subject who can be a `we' as well as an `I'. The exclusion of this possibility, of the communal, comes once again from the baleful influence of the epistemological tradition for which all knowledge has to be reconstructed from the impressions imprinted on the individual subject. But if we free ourselves from the hold of these prejudices, this seems a wildly implausible view about the development of human consciousness; we are aware of the world through a `we' before we are through an `I'. Hence we need the distinction between what is just shared in the sense that each of us has it in our individual worlds, and that which is in the common world. But the very idea of something which is in the common world in contradistinction to what is in all the individual worlds is totally opaque to empiricist epistemology. Hence it finds no place in mainstream social science...." Richard Carnes
franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) (06/26/87)
In article <680@gargoyle.UChicago.EDU> carnes@gargoyle.uchicago.edu.UUCP (Richard Carnes) writes: >The following quote from Charles Taylor's essay on `Interpretation and the >Sciences of Man' [*The Review of Metaphysics* 25 (1971), pp. 3-51] >... > we are aware of the world through a `we' before we are through an `I'. This seems more than a little dubious to me. In fact, it seems blatantly false. I would be interested in an attempt to justify it. -- Frank Adams ihnp4!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka Ashton-Tate 52 Oakland Ave North E. Hartford, CT 06108
eric@snark.UUCP (06/29/87)
Richard Carnes writes: > There is no such animal as `the scientific definition of knowledge' > or `the scientific epistemology'. I think it's quite fair to speak of `the scientific epistemology', since in order to believe that science is anything but futile you must at some level be an empiricist and/or operationalist. Yes, there are scientists who profess to have other philosophies in connection with their religious beliefs or whatever -- but *in the lab* they must function as operationalists or give up. > Your view of knowledge is, in > broad terms, an empiricist one, which is orthodoxy in the hard > sciences because it explains them well. But the philosophical > question you and others are begging is whether an empiricist > epistemology is adequate for the kind of understanding we can have of > the specifically human world studied by the social sciences. Knowledge is instrumental. Humans gather knowledge in order to *predict* things and *do* things. Humans form beliefs (including philosophical beliefs) in order to organize knowledge so they can *do* things and *predict* things. Therefore, the choice between empiricism and anything else as a philosophical stance is *not* ultimately a 'philosophical question' (i.e. one addressable via a debate on the high-order abstractions we study in philosophy) it is an *instrumental* question: what works? What maximizes our ability to predict and do? The philosophical revolution that came with experimental science gave us the Universe's answer. Empiricism, verificationism, and operationalism *work*. Repeatably. Consistently. Powerfully. After 300 years of this, the arrogance displayed by the likes of Charles Taylor and implicitly defended by Mr. Carnes would be laughable if such people didn't retain a disproportionate amount of influence on the culture. I therefore invite Mr. Carnes (and through him, Charles Taylor and anti-empiricists in general) to put up or shut up. Show us how a non-empiricist epistemology can yield a model with *instrumental* success exceeding that of empiricism. If you think instrumental success is somehow the wrong criterion, pick another criterion and defend it. Mr Carnes quotes Charles Taylor: > "On the other hand, many, including myself, would like to argue that > these notions about the sciences of man are sterile, that we cannot > come to understand important dimensions of human life within the > bounds set by this epistemological orientation.... I'm sure Mr. Taylor would *like* to argue that. Sadly for him, there's no respectable evidence that it's true and excellent reasons of principle to believe it false. If it's impossible to 'understand' human life within empiricist/operationalist terms, it's hard to see how we can have any kind of understanding-with-instrumental-consequences about it at all -- in which case Mr. Taylor and friends are proposing an utterly pointless enterprise. > What the ontology of > mainstream social science lacks is the notion of meaning as not > simply for an individual subject; of a subject who can be a `we' as > well as an `I'. This is nonsense. There is nothing in general empiricism or the empiricist program for the social sciences that excludes discussion of intersubjectivity. Linguists, for example, deal with intersubjectivity all the time. What is the 'meaning' of a word but an intersubjective reality? Yet linguists haven't discovered any pressing need to abandon predictive goals -- because there isn't one. > The exclusion of this possibility, of the communal, > comes once again from the baleful influence of the epistemological > tradition for which all knowledge has to be reconstructed from the > impressions imprinted on the individual subject. Mr. Taylor is not only historically wrong but actually incoherent here. The ontological status of individual impressions versus intersubjective reality has nothing to do with the empiricist versus anti-empiricist distinction. An empiricist need not care whether a percept is an 'individual impression' or an intersubjective reality; the question is: what can be *predicted* with it? what can be *done* with it? > But if we free > ourselves from the hold of these prejudices, this seems a wildly > implausible view about the development of human consciousness; we are > aware of the world through a `we' before we are through an `I'. Implausible on what data? Everything we know about the infantile development of consciousness suggests that the infant passes through four stages: 1) I am everything 2) There are others that are not me 3) The others are different from each other 4) The others are like me. Taylor's notion can only derive from a misreading of infantle solipsism as identification with others into a 'we'. It can be no such thing if there is no concept of 'other'! > Hence we need the distinction between what is just shared in the > sense that each of us has it in our individual worlds, and that which > is in the common world. But the very idea of something which is in > the common world in contradistinction to what is in all the > individual worlds is totally opaque to empiricist epistemology. > Hence it finds no place in mainstream social science...." A restatement of an earlier claim, equally nonsense. Empiricism simply says 'Fine, these people are reacting to some immaterial common reality? It's expressed as information in their minds, we can deal with it'. If Taylor's claim were true, empiricists would be compelled to deny the existence of any symbolic activity at all. He seems to think we're all behaviorists... > Richard Carnes I am afraid Charles Taylor impresses me not a bit more than the gentlemen you quoted earlier. I see a lot of polished, seductive rhetoric hiding a position that is founded on philosophical errors, defended with factual and historical errors, and evidently designed to appeal to academics who have lost the intellectual and moral courage needed to pursue a difficult branch of science towards its proper and wortwhile goals. -- Eric S. Raymond UUCP: {{seismo,ihnp4,rutgers}!cbmvax,sdcrdcf!burdvax}!snark!eric Post: 22 South Warren Avenue, Malvern, PA 19355 Phone: (215)-296-5718