david@star2.cm.utexas.edu (David Sigeti) (12/18/90)
Note: This is part of a discussion currently going on in
talk.religion.misc. At Bill Mayne's suggestion, I have posted
it to soc.religion.eastern as well. In the future, I would
suggest that any replies include both these groups in the
"Newsgroups:" header line.
In article <4542@idunno.Princeton.EDU>
elturner@phoenix.Princeton.EDU (Edwin L Turner) writes:
[An extension of our discussion of the relationship of Buddhism to
violence.]
It seems to me that there is really too much going on in this
discussion for a single thread so I am going to break up my response
into several new threads. Here, I will try to deal with the question
of the role of ethics in Buddhism. I will be writing about the
teachings of Buddhism both on an historical/objective level and as a
(fairly heretical) Buddhist trying to make sense out of the teachings.
The question of the actual behavior of Buddhist groups and individuals
I will leave for other postings.
Ed writes:
[Quoting me]
Ed completely ignores, for example, the basic moral precepts
that are laid out in the Pali suttas and that have been accepted
by virtually all Buddhists, ancient and modern. For a good
introduction to basic Buddhist ethics, I suggest "What the
Buddha Taught" by Walpola Rahula. The author is a Theravadin
monk who is non-sectarian in his attitude to other forms of
Buddhism and whose approach is congenial to modern, secular
minds.
[And responding]
Buddhist behavioral principles are frequently termed "ethics"
rather than "morals" for just the reason that they are not absolute
standards of behavior but rather practical guides to reaching a
specific goal, enlightenment. The Pali canons are generally
considered to lay out a specific "recipe" for enlightenment, namely
the one actually employed and described by the historical Buddha
himself. As you say, none dispute that it is a path, but despite
the fact that Theravadic Buddhists have "made a religion" (if
you'll excuse the pun) of following it exactingly, few Buddhists
would claim that it is the only possible path or that it has any
innate virtue of its own beyond where it leads. To elevate the
non-violence (or other ethical principles) set forth in the Pali
canons beyond this is to make the classic Buddhist error of
"mistaking the finger for the moon".
First of all, Ed's concern with pointing out that the Buddhist
precepts (for lay people) are not "absolute standards of behavior" is
a red herring. The precepts are laid out mostly as general ethical
principles, not as a set of specific rules. This is generally how
they are interpreted in all the major schools of Buddhism, including
Theravada. Ed seems to be creating a false dichotomy between
promulgating a rigid set of rules for personal behavior on the one
hand and having no concern for ethics at all on the other. I think
that the historical record is pretty clear; Buddhism is quite
concerned with ethics but it does not in general lay down rigid rules
for the behavior of lay people.
I think that this is true in particular of the precepts discouraging
violence. For example, there is not, to the best of my knowledge, any
clearly worked out position on the question of self-defense (for lay
people) in the Pali suttas. The exhortation to avoid violence and the
taking of life is presented as a general moral principle incumbant on
all followers of the Buddha (and really on all human beings), not as
some set of arbitrary rules that can be discarded if one adopts a
different "recipe" for attaining enlightenment.
Secondly, Ed's notion that the precepts are specific to Theravadin
Buddhism is simply wrong. As I wrote above, the basic ethical
precepts that are laid out in the Pali suttas have been accepted by
virtually all Buddhists, ancient and modern. This includes Mahayana
in general and Rinzai Zen in particular. Obviously, some of the sects
must have had some pretty peculiar interpretations of some of the
precepts in order to justify things like monks training warriors,
monks actually fighting, and violent suppression of other Buddhist
sects. Nevertheless, virtually all the sects give at least lip
service to the original precepts (Mahayana adds some additional ones).
Within this shared tradition of moral principles, the exhortation to
avoid violence and killing clearly holds a very prominent place.
Whatever the actual practice of Buddhist groups and individuals and
whatever tortured or self-serving interpretations of the sutras they
may use to justify their practice of violence, Buddhists who practice
aggressive violence are clearly forced into the position of being
hypocrites. There is simply nothing in the shared Buddhist tradition
corresponding to the genocidal holy war endorsed in the Hebrew
scriptures, Jesus' driving the money lenders out of the temple,
Muhammad's practice of jihad, or even Jesus' verbally violent tirades
against those that he took to be hypocrites. All these examples have
provided straightforward justification for religious violence in the
western religions. There is simply no corresponding ammunition in the
shared Buddhist tradition.
[I don't mean to imply that followers of western religions are
necessarily violent. Many followers of western religions interpret
these examples in metaphorical ways that deny that they provide
justification for religious violence. I have no fundamental quarrel
with these believers. My point is just that the ammunition is there.]
Returning to Ed's posting, I want to discuss Ed's contention that the
ethical principles laid out in the early Buddhist scriptures are
simply part of a "recipe" leading to "enlightment". I'll begin by
pointing out that it is clear on an objective level that this is not
how the ethical teachings were originally intended.
The rules that the Buddha lays out specifically for monks and nuns
(that is, those rules that are not also incumbant on lay people)
obviously have as their specific purpose the attaining of
"enlightenment". But the Buddha is generally quite clear when he lays
out principles of right behavior for lay people that the goal of these
principles is the attainment of "wordly" happiness. This is clear not
only from the whole tone of the Buddha's discussions but also from the
fact that, at the end of his discussions, the Buddha often contrasts
"wordly" happiness with the happiness that a monk attains by
"renouncing the world" and states that the latter is far superior.
In any case, the principles that the Buddha laid out for the behavior
of rulers certainly cannot be said to have as their goal the attaining
of "enlightenment". Their purpose is the promotion of peace, justice,
and prosperity in society at large.
Arguing on a doctrinal level, I would say that the reason that this
concern for ethical behavior on the part of lay people is not a
"purely practical matter" is that the compassion for the suffering of
others that led the Buddha to discourse on these matters has always
been regarded by Buddhists as an essential sign of his buddhahood. In
the Theravadin tradition, it is precisely this compassion that is
supposed to distinguish a full buddha from a pratyeka (private or
non-teaching) buddha. Of course, in the Mahayana tradition of which
Zen is a part, the Buddha's compassion is elevated to the status of
his highest virtue.
What is held to be true for Shakyamuni is also held to be true for
anyone who seeks to follow him. Compassion for others, as made
manifest in ethical behavior toward them, is taken to be a necessary
but not sufficient condition for spiritual progress in almost all
schools of Buddhism (Amidism excepted). This includes Rinzai Zen.
Again, some of the Rinzai interpretations of what it means to be
ethical and compassionate may be fairly peculiar but I doubt that even
the most idiosyncratic Rinzai master would deny that compassion and
ethical behavior are necessary parts of the Buddhist path.
If the reader is in any doubt about this, I suggest reading the dharma
talk and letters by the medieval Rinzai master Bassui that are
translated in "The Three Pillars of Zen", by Phillip Kapleau. Bassui
was certainly a traditional Rinzai master who spent almost all his
time (or at least his words) exhorting his students to attain
awakening as directly as possible. Nevertheless, he also made it
clear that neither awakening nor the effort to attain it negates the
need for ethical behavior.
My final point is that Ed's whole line of argument here seems to
indicate that he views the "essence" of Buddhism as something utterly
transcendental and fundamentally unconnected to mundane concerns like
ethical behavior or even compassion. I hope that I am not seriously
misrepresenting what Ed is trying to say but it seems to me that
something like this is behind not only his statements on the role of
ethics in Buddhism but also his comments later in the same posting on
the Buddhist attitude toward the question of the reality of the
phenomenal world. I will try to deal with this in a posting on the
Buddhist attitude toward the question of the reality of suffering and
of the phenomenal world in general. Hopefully, I will get that
posting out within a few days of this one.
--
David Sigeti david@star2.cm.utexas.edu cmhl265@hermes.chpc.utexas.edu