david@star2.cm.utexas.edu (David Sigeti) (12/18/90)
In article <4542@idunno.Princeton.EDU> elturner@phoenix.Princeton.EDU (Edwin L Turner) writes: [An extension of our discussion of the relationship between Buddhism and violence.] It seems to me that there is really too much going on in this discussion for a single thread so I am going to break up my response into several new threads. Here, I will discuss the attitude of Buddhism toward the question of the reality of the phenomenal world. In a later posting, I will talk about the specific question of the reality of suffering. Finally, I hope to produce a posting on the question of whether or not Buddhism has an "essence" that can be seen as purely transcendental. The exchange began when Ed wrote: >> 1) Buddhism does not consider violence (or anything else) wrong >> or bad in principle ("mindless killing" takes on a new >> meaning within a zen vocabulary). I replied: >This is simply not true. Buddhism considers anything that >increases the suffering of sentient beings evil and has always >opposed violence as a primary source of suffering, both for the >victims and the perpetrators (assuming the action of the law of >karma). Ed replied My understanding is that "the suffering of sentient beings" is not evil; rather it is illusion, a dream, yet another aspect of the clouds of Maya. The goal of Buddhism is to escape the illusion by awakening; to get caught up in trying to control/modify/judge the dream is just the desire/attachment which chains us to it. This is the most standard and basic Buddhist philosophy and is essentially what is expressed in my .sig below, a quote often said to capture the essence of the Buddha's teachings. . . . . . . . . Ed Turner "Suffering alone exists, none who suffer; phoenix!elturner The deed there is, but no doer thereof; Nirvana is, but no one seeking it; The Path there is, but none who travel it." or elturner@phoenix.Princeton.EDU - The Visuddhimagga (16) The notion that Buddhism teaches that suffering, or other aspects of observable reality, are "illusions" is a very serious (but very common) misreading of Buddhist teaching. It seems to arise in part from a confusion of Buddhism with certain forms of Brahminism. For example, I have never seen any reference to the "veil of Maya" in any Buddhist sutra, although many people seem to think that the concept is a part of Buddhism. Ironically, the quote in Ed's signature directly contradicts his conclusion. It says quite clearly that suffering -- along with actions, nirvana, and the path -- exists. The quote is really just a restatement of the fundamental Buddhist doctrine of anatta -- the teaching that there is nothing in a human being (or anything else) that corresponds to a "self" or "essence". What Buddhism *does* teach is that our picture of the phenomenal world is fundamentally distorted by our ingrained habit of grasping. This grasping is not just the kind of gross behavior visible as, for example, greed. Rather, it is a property of our most basic mental processes. It is traditionally held to come in to play around or just after the point where we first become aware of something. In other words, it follows right on the heels of each momentary perception that we have. Thus, things are not as we think they are not because our senses are deceiving us but because our habit of grasping distorts the picture that we have of the world and what it contains. One particular distortion caused by this habit of grasping is that we tend to see things as being more substantial, solid, and permanent then they really are -- the better to grasp and hold them. In other words, we fail to see the impermanence of the phenomenal world. Another way that our view of the world is distorted by our habit of grasping is that we tend to think that if we can just get hold of the thing that we are trying to grasp *right now*, then we will be happy. Of course, once we get the thing that we are trying to grasp *right now*, we will start hankering after something else. We fail to see the inherently limited ability of the things that we grasp to make us happy. A somewhat less obvious (but really more important) consequence of our habit of grasping is that we tend to see things as having an "essence", a "heart", that can be grasped. In particular, we come to believe that *we* have an essence, a "self", some part of us that is our true heart, our true being. Now, in the course of ordinary life, it is necessary to "grasp" many things, both physically and mentally. In this context, it is often convenient or even necessary to regard some property of an object or situation as "essential". Indeed, this is the most common colloquial use of the English word that I just quoted. Clearly, such "essences" have no absolute or ultimate reality. In particular, they have a tendency to change when we need to approach the object or situation in a different way. In other words, even though we think that what we are taking as "essential" is an absolute or inherent property of the object, in reality it is a contigent property of our current (basically practical) relationship to the object. In psychological terms, we might say that what is wrong with our approach to the world has two aspects: an affective aspect, grasping; and a cognitive aspect, principally a belief in "essences". Although refuting the cognitive error is clearly not going to solve the problem on its own, doing this can be a valuable *aid* to curing our habitually misdirected approach to the world. This is precisely the purpose of the many statements in the Buddhist literature that are sometimes misinterpreted to be saying that the phenomenal world is somehow illusory or nonexistent. When the sutras say that "the sentient beings are not really sentient beings," they are not saying that the sentient beings are not there at all. Rather, they are saying that the sentient beings are not what we take them to be. In particular, *we* are not what we take *ourselves* to be. This is worth repeating: WE ARE NOT WHAT WE THINK WE ARE. I can't think of a more important insight in the whole of Buddhism. I found this conclusion increasingly evident and inescapable pretty early in my practice of zazen: "Good Heavens, I really am *not* what I thought I was." When the emperor asked Bodhidharma, "Who are you?" Bodhidharma replied, "I don't know." Do *you* know who *you* are? Lin-chi (Rinzai) said, "No man, but causation." There is no human being, only a chain of causation. The old man (who was really a fox) said to Pai-chang (Hakujo), "I am not a human being." Indeed, are any of us "human beings"? As for me, I think that this is "unreality" enough to last me for a lifetime. NOTES 1. In Buddhist literature, one often finds references or allusions to the "three signs (or marks) of being". These are: 1. "dukkha", usually translated "suffering" but more properly "unsatisfactoriness" or even "stress"; 2. "anicca", meaning "impermanence", and; 3. "anatta", translated "no-self" or "not-self". The first two are taken to be characteristic of all "samkhara" (conditioned things) while the third is characteristic of all "dhamma", that is, of all things whatsoever. This includes, in addition to conditioned things, the "unconditioned", that is, nirvana. 2. As Ed seems to be saying, somewhat indirectly, the teaching of anatta ("no-self" or "not-self") is frequently presented as the "core" or "heart" of Buddhism. I am not sure that I would go this far. It should be clear from the discussion above that I am likely to be suspicious of a claim to present the "essence" of Buddhism (or of anything else). Nevertheless the teaching of anatta is clearly central to Buddhism and is certainly its most distinctive feature. Theravadin Buddhism emphasizes anatta as its most important teaching. The concept is even more important (if that is possible) in Mahayana in the form of the doctrine of "shunyata" (emptiness). That shunyata is essentially (:-)) the same as anatta is stated explicitly by Nagarjuna, who first promulgated the doctrine of shunyata about 2000 years ago (I am not sure about the reference). That this is a fundamental point of agreement between Theravada and Mahayana is pointed out by the Theravadin monk Walpola Rahula in "What the Buddha Taught" in the chapter on anatta. 3. I have included the quotations from Zen sources partly to show how Zen takes basic Buddhist teachings and presents them in its own distinctive and very effective style. It has been my experience that, most of the time, what the Zen masters are saying is just basic Buddhism. Generally, I think that if one wants to understand what the Zen masters are saying, one needs to approach them through Buddhism. Trying to go the other way -- trying to understand Buddhism through Zen -- seems to result mostly in missing the point. Bodhidharma's "I don't know," is a very famous Zen story that is probably well known to almost every student of Zen. I think that the meaning, on this level, is fairly clear. The quote from Lin-chi is less well known. I don't know a reference off-hand but it should be findable in any good book about Lin-chi's teachings. Its meaning is, I think, even clearer than Bodhidharma's "I don't know," especially when one realizes that Lin-chi is alluding to the "chain of conditioned origination" of Buddhist psychology (Abhidharma). "I am not a human being," is from "Hyakujo's fox", the second koan in the Wu-men kuan (Mumonkan). I certainly don't want to claim to understand this koan on even the most superficial level. It is unusually long and eerily evocative and is reputed to be very difficult and "advanced". It has also served, I have been told, as a nearly bottomless source for commentaries. That said, I have it on good authority that the phrase that I have quoted is the "key" or "gateway" to the koan and this much seems clear to me. Certainly, if the old man is not a human being it is hard to see what he is doing listening to a Zen master's talks and asking him questions. Conversely, if he *is* a human being then it is hard to see what his problem is. Thus, we are naturally led to the question, "What is a human being?", and then to this question in its most intimate form, "What is *this* human being (right here)?". I don't mean to imply that this is *the* point of the koan -- only that the koan is clearly raising this question. -- David Sigeti david@star2.cm.utexas.edu cmhl265@hermes.chpc.utexas.edu
tp0x+@CS.CMU.EDU (Thomas Price) (12/20/90)
In article <1990Dec18.004932.9293@nas.nasa.gov> david@star2.cm.utexas.edu (David Sigeti) writes: > >In article <4542@idunno.Princeton.EDU> >elturner@phoenix.Princeton.EDU (Edwin L Turner) writes: > > [An extension of our discussion of the relationship between > Buddhism and violence.] > >The exchange began when Ed wrote: > > >> 1) Buddhism does not consider violence (or anything else) wrong > >> or bad in principle ("mindless killing" takes on a new > >> meaning within a zen vocabulary). > >I replied: > > >This is simply not true. Buddhism considers anything that > >increases the suffering of sentient beings evil and has always > >opposed violence as a primary source of suffering, both for the > >victims and the perpetrators (assuming the action of the law of > >karma). > >David Sigeti david@star2.cm.utexas.edu cmhl265@hermes.chpc.utexas.edu I have a question which I would like someone to answer for me. I am a Christian who admires Zen. I believe that a large part of the history of Zen in Japan is its reception by the Samurai class? How does one explain the influence of Zen on the samurai, if suffering is evil? How can one be a Buddhist and a warrior? I suspect that one may make a parallel with "Christian Knights and Crusaders". I would respond that Knights and Crusaders were deluded blasphemers and not worthy of the name of Christian, and you may say something similar. But what of the element of military discipline in some practice of Zen, i.e. "Zen and the art of Archery"? Please give me a historical understanding of the relationship between Zen and the warrior class in historical Japan, rather than telling me what is "truly Buddhism" (although I would appreciate such subjective comments at the end of any article). Thank you, Tom Price tp0x@cs.cmu.edu Disclaimer: (You've got to be careful what I mean vs. what I say. -- Bill McCracken)
david@star2.cm.utexas.edu (David Sigeti) (12/20/90)
In article <1990Dec18.184453.16768@noose.ecn.purdue.edu> muttiah@maize.ecn.purdue.edu (Ranjan S Muttiah) writes: In article <1990Dec18.004932.9293@nas.nasa.gov> david@star2.cm.utexas.edu (David Sigeti) writes: [I have added two paragraphs of context. Ranjan quoted just the sentence with the capitalized phrase. DES] In psychological terms, we might say that what is wrong with our approach to the world has two aspects: an affective aspect, grasping; and a cognitive aspect, principally a belief in "essences". Although refuting the cognitive error is clearly not going to solve the problem on its own, doing this can be a valuable *aid* to curing our habitually misdirected approach to the world. This is precisely the purpose of the many statements in the Buddhist literature that are sometimes misinterpreted to be saying that the phenomenal world is somehow illusory or nonexistent. When the sutras say that "the sentient beings are not really sentient beings," they are not saying that the sentient beings are not there at all. Rather, they are saying that the sentient beings are not what we take them to be. In particular, *we* are not what we take *ourselves* to be. This is worth repeating: WE ARE NOT WHAT WE THINK WE ARE [*]. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ I can't think of a more important insight in the whole of Buddhism. I found this conclusion increasingly evident and inescapable pretty early in my practice of zazen: "Good Heavens, I really am *not* what I thought I was." When the emperor asked Bodhidharma, "Who are you?" Bodhidharma replied, "I don't know." Do *you* know who *you* are? Lin-chi (Rinzai) said, "No man, but causation." There is no human being, only a chain of causation. The old man (who was really a fox) said to Pai-chang (Hakujo), "I am not a human being." Indeed, are any of us "human beings"? So say we reach some stage of attainment (whatever that is) say this follows from [*]. Then we discover that the method of that attainment itself was flawed by [*]. Thus [*] is self contradictory. Is this QEA or QED ? This is a very perceptive observation and it goes right to the heart of what I was trying to say in the capitalized phrase. Each of us continually takes herself to be *something*. Sometimes it is a location in space, sometimes a part of the body (often a spot between and just behind the eyes). Sometimes we ruminate and take ourselves to be our stream of thoughts. We may meditate and take ourselves to be a point of (supposedly) pure awareness. But always *something*. Of course, the problem is that this *something* is constantly shifting. Not only is the thing that we take ourselves to be itself changing constantly, but we ourselves are constantly shifting our point of view, constantly changing what it is that we think we are. The sensible conclusion is, of course, that we really aren't anything at all. It is characteristic of the Pali suttas that they simply state this conclusion baldly -- "All things are without self (anatta)". This method has many virtues, especially if one is attempting to *found* a new religion/philosophy. The problem comes when one attempts to *practice* the philosophy. Then the abstract nature of doctrine becomes a major problem. To say abstractly that "there is no self," already presupposes (or creates) a distance from the immediate experience that the statement seeks to affirm. The Mahayana sutras attempt to deal with this problem by enumerating endlessly the things that we aren't, thus bringing the reader closer to seeing that she is not anything at all. The Zen masters were even more direct, pointing directly to this very experience of "not being anything". The old man (who is really a fox) has gotten far enough to see clearly that he is not a "human being". Bodhidharma really *doesn't* know who he (or anyone else) is. -- David Sigeti david@star2.cm.utexas.edu cmhl265@hermes.chpc.utexas.edu
muttiah@stable.ecn.purdue.edu (Ranjan S Muttiah) (12/31/90)
In article <DAVID.90Dec22185322@star2.cm.utexas.edu> david@star2.cm.utexas.edu (David Sigeti) writes: >In article <1990Dec22.061258.3644@noose.ecn.purdue.edu> >muttiah@stable.ecn.purdue.edu (Ranjan S Muttiah) writes: > Another question that just croped is (and this is what I was trying > to hit at) how one "knows" that one has reached nirvana or > buddhahood or whatever ? Is it by general agreement and consent by > other fellow meditators ? >Traditionally, one presents one's realization to a recognized >Buddhist teacher, someone who has received "dharma transmission" >in some line of teachers that is believed to go back to the >Buddha, and accepts her judgement. Sometimes, a teacher may >withhold judgement because she feels that she needs to get a >better idea of the student's level of realization. Or she may be >concerned that, even though the student has had a genuine and >deep realization, he may be in danger of getting some inflated >sense of his own importance and abilities. This really does >happen and a lot of the stories of Zen masters treating their >students to all sorts of abuse involve exactly this problem (on >the students' part). I have some difficulties with this, since in my opinion everyone experieces the universe and life in his or her own unique way. And it seems to me that in this tradition of consent that you intimate about one is merely giving into consent as agreed upon by others. It's much like people accepting some of the fundamental axioms of mathematics: it's a maneuver for consensus formation i.e., everyone tries to play by the same rules. >I suspect that people who decide entirely on their own that they >are "enlightened" are in severe danger of falling into this >problem in some of its most hideous forms. I think that this is >probably particularly likely to be true when the person has very >little zazen behind them. The discipline of meditation really >can help one to see into the traps of egotism. Again, if every person experiences the universe uniquely, I don't see why this egotism scenario should show up at all. >Three or four years ago, I might simply have answered, "No. The >method is not faulty; it is just that, by careful observation, >one has seen that a certain impression that one had had was >mistaken." I still think that this is true on a certain ordinary >level. In one sense, one has just made a simple observation >about the operation of one's own mind. As I said earlier, >David Hume became one of the most important figures in >Enlightenment (European, not Buddhist) philosophy on the basis of >this simple observation. I also should say that this simple The interesting thing that Hume observed was that we don't have impressions of _causality_ as we do say events. Is this supposed to be a limitation on our perceptions ? May be so, but that is why we have inferencing capabilities (via our intelligence). >my practice -- I think that the effort that I had to make in >meditation was critical to the fact that the observation was >actually helpful to me. Nevertheless, this kind of observation >seems to sum up a lot of what I got out of Zen meditation in the >earlier years of my practice. I still don't quite get it David. You say you realized that you weren't what you once were. Let's probe a little further and find out what there is in "realization" vs saying something. For instance, I can just say verbally, "I realize that I'm not Ranjan." How does one know what *exactly* is meant by this. So far all I can see is merely denial. I don't see any sort of conclusion that can be drawn from all of this. I'm more familiar with the denial tactics used for reducio ad absurdum. But you seemed to imply in one the posts that this wasn't what you were after. >mind being observed is precisely the mind doing the observing. >This, of course, is a problem of self-reference (as you have >intuited) but on the level of direct observation, rather than on >the level of intellection or conceptualization (as in >mathematics). See, I'm confused already! >-- the mind observing the mind observing the mind observing the >mind(...). The image that comes to me when I think of this >process is of a pair of nearly parallel mirrors (as you often >find in dressing rooms in clothing stores) and the series of >images of oneself and the room that seems to stretch off into >infinity. May be so. But one has to be clear about one is trying to prove or disprove. >This strikes me as an excellent basis for approaching life, or >for starting Zen practice. Certainly, Zen should never be a drug >that we use to avoid seeing the pain and suffering of life. The >only admonition that I would add is that, just as the pain and >suffering is not yours alone, even so your "taking charge of >whatever it is that you decide to do," and your "making things as >self evident to yourself as possible," should not be for yourself >alone. If one experiences the universe and life uniquely then I don't understand why one would want to consult anyone other than for consensus formation. I try to akin this to driving a vehicle. Only you alone at the wheel control which way the car turns. Of course, there are these various "rules" (i.e., laws of nature) that one has to follow in driving around. The car in my opinion has only a single seat for the driver. >Several times each day, Zen monks take the "Four >Bodhisattvas' Vows". The first one is > > "Although the beings are numberless, I vow to save them all." What are the other three ?