[talk.philosophy.misc] Poetry and Philosophy

cher@ihlpf.UUCP (Mike Cherepov) (09/08/86)

--

> to emotion is a fallacy "in" logic, emotion as such is
> discredited. Guilt by association.

Yep, emotion is discredited, not "as such", but as basis for inquiry.
That is: whether you really would like something to be true is irrelevant.
That's what I meant, and I don't see it as either emotional of
fallacious. Come again.

I agree with all the good stuff about inquiry being an emotional
need. That should be kept in mind, I guess, but my point was just that
when evaluating factuality of some claim (e.g. I have $5), I should
not let my emotions (want to have $7) fool me. That simple, despite
the profound phrasing. I presume agreement on this point. 

> >How do we know if this idea is "beautiful" (in Jan's sense)? It is if it's 
> >true, right? Thus, the feelings of one of the 2 deepthinkers are wrong,
> 
> Or of both. Or they contain *some* truth each, but not enough
> to agree.

I see this as a glib escape, but how about this assertion: "humans have
evolved from lower animals" (no tricks with word "lower", please).
True or false? Beautiful or ugly? Can one still say "both, yes and no"?

> >So, one persons exaltation/aversion proves nothing about actual "beauty" 
> >of this idea, and the role of feeling in assessing the merits of it = 0.

> Its beauty is mmmarred by a logical jump: if A proves nothing
> about B (in the sense of an absolute, infallible proof)
> then its "role of assessing the merits of B = 0".

Ok, I suppose the last part of that sentence was loose, I strayed
away from my anti truth=beauty course.
Anyhow: either humans had primitive animals as their
ancestors or they did not. Whatever Joe Blow or the Archbishop of
Hoboken dislike of like would never change the facts of the past, no?
The idea is repugnant in 18th century, more beautiful in 20th, but
that does not mean diddley as far the truth (what actually took place) 
is concerned. In this context claiming that "truth=beauty" is absurd. 
Apparently you using some other notions. What are they?

> But all you said about (aesthetic) feeling can be said about reasoning:
> two persons can reason (on insufficient data, as usual)
> and come to the opposite conclusions. Does that prove reason
> useless? No way.

Now, this is irrelevant and is a straw man.
You made a bold assertion "beauty=truth". I attacked
that. You seem to be attacking "reason=truth" assertion which I never made.
If you moderated yours to say "beauty is instrumental in finding truth"
I would have agreed. 
		Mike Cherepov

janw@inmet.UUCP (09/17/86)

[cher@ihlpf.UUCP ]
>Yep, emotion is discredited, not "as such", but as basis for  in-
>quiry.

"Basis" is unclear. Emotion *may* sometimes hinder  inquiry.   In
other  situations, it may *help* inquiry .  Wishful thinking is a
vice; but it is not the only way thought and feeling interact.

>That is: whether you really would like something to  be  true  is
>irrelevant.

It makes that something important to you, and is a good reason  for
*testing*  it.  (The same holds if you'd hate it to be true). In this 
sense, it is relevant to inquiry.

>but my point was just that when  evaluating  factuality  of  some
>claim  (e.g.  I  have  $5), I should not let my emotions (want to
>have $7) fool me. That simple, despite the profound  phrasing.  I
>presume agreement on this point.

Agreed. One should be on one's guard against wishful thinking.
If your conclusions look too good, check again.

>... but how about this assertion: "humans have
>evolved from lower animals" (no tricks with word "lower", please).
>True or false? Beautiful or ugly? Can one still say "both, yes and no"?

True and beautiful. It harmonizes an awful lot of  seemingly
independent facts. 

>Anyhow: either humans had primitive animals as their
>ancestors or they did not. Whatever Joe Blow or the Archbishop of
>Hoboken dislike of like would never change the facts of the past, no?

Sure. 

>The idea is repugnant in 18th century, more beautiful in 20th, but
>that does not mean diddley as far the truth (what actually took place) 
>is concerned. In this context claiming that "truth=beauty" is absurd. 

No. People and centuries disagreeing about the beauty of the idea
disagree about its truth, too. So it doesn't destroy the equation.

>Apparently you using some other notions. What are they?

Those who are repelled by this  beautiful  idea,  are  wrong.
Their  aesthetic judgement errs, just as their rational judgement
does - and for the same reason:  the  idea  contradicts  some  of
their  deeply  held convictions. The combination of these convic-
tions and the new idea *is* ugly, and untrue. It is like a  Venus
head,  mounted  by some wicked prankster on a crucifix.  They are
right to reject this mixture. But they are wrong in how they han-
dle the separation. They should have modified those other assump-
tions: then the beauty of the evolutionary idea would  have  been
saved for them, and they would be closer to the truth.

>You made a bold assertion "beauty=truth". I attacked
>that. You seem to be attacking "reason=truth" assertion which I never made.

Rather, I drew an analogy between the two assertions... not to
*attack* one of them, but to defend it.

>If you moderated your[ assertion] to say "beauty is  instrumental
>in finding truth" I would have agreed.

Hot. That's one of several valid explications of Keats's formula.
Like "seeing is believing". *Is* is a paradoxical little word. It
presupposes a distinction between its  left-hand  and  right-hand
terms  which it then proceeds to abolish. It means, more or less,
"is equivalent for certain purposes".

One of possible equivalencies is "look for  the  one  and  you'll
find the other". 

Another is of the type "The morning star is the evening star":
an underlying identity of different phenomena.

As for moderating the assertion, I did so from the start. I  said
beauty was *a criterion* of truth; that on the other hand logical
coherence lent beauty to a set of ideas; and  then  proceeded  to
quote "a *similar* statement in poetical language". Like all poe-
try, it is ambiguous. I would agree with *some*  of  its  prosaic
translations...

		Jan Wasilewsky