[talk.philosophy.misc] Realism, nominalism, positivism

garys@bunker.UUCP (Gary M. Samuelson) (09/30/86)

In article <2382@utai.UUCP> cbo@utai.UUCP (Calvin Bruce Ostrum) writes:
>How about some real philosophy discussion? Like, for example:
>Is realism correct? (vs. nominalism/idealism (old style) or 
>positivism/constructivism (new style)).

For the uninitiated (like me), how about a brief definition of the above terms?
Off hand, the statement "Realism is correct" sounds like a tautology.

Perhaps we can start with what my dictionary has to say (I will quote only
those definitions which relate to philosophy):

Realism: "2a: a doctrine that universals exist outside the mind; specifically:
	the conception that an abstract term names an independent and unitary
	reality.  2b: the conception that objects of sense perception or
	cognition exist independently of the mind."

By the above definition, I am a realist.  In fact, I submit that
everyone, in practice, is a realist, contrary claims notwithstanding.
Does anyone reading this really think, "there seem to be words in front
of what I think are my eyes, and even though I can't know that they are
really there, I will imagine that I am reading them, and maybe imagine
that I am going to write a response..." ?

Nominalism: "1: a theory that there are no universal essences in reality
	and that the mind can frame no single concept or image corresponding
	to any universal or general term.  2: the theory that only individuals
	and no abstract entities (as essences, classes, or propositions)
	exist."

This definition cuts the foundation out from under itself.  "Nominalism
is a theory..." is a proposition about the class of theories.  To make
a proposition that says there are no propositions is nonsense, and in
fact is saying that what is being said is nonsense (which is hard to
dispute!).

Idealism: "1a(1): a theory that ultimate reality lies in a realm
	transcending phenomena (2): a theory that the essential nature
	of reality lies in consciousness or reason; b(1): a theory that
	only the perceptible is real (2): a theory that only mental
	states or entities are knowable."

Frankly, I don't understand definition 1a(1). Definition 1a(2) seems
to say that consciousness or reason exists apart from someone to be
conscious or to do the reasoning.  (Hmm, could this be supernaturalism
in disguise?)  Definition 1b(1) implies that what we are accustomed to
calling discoveries are really inventions.  I.e., before Leeuwenhoek
"invented" germs, diseases really were caused by evil spirits -- and
in some places in the world, still are.  Definition 1b(2) has the same
problem that 1a(2) has -- it suggests the question, the mental state
of *what*?

Positivism: "1a: a theory that theology and metaphysics are earlier
	imperfect modes of knowledge and that positive knowledge is
	based on natural phenomena and their properties and relations
	as verified by the empirical sciences. b: Logical positivism."

Logical positivism: "a 20th century philosophical movement that holds
	characteristically that all meaningful statements are either
	analytic or conclusively verifiable or at least confirmable by
	observation and experiment and that metaphysical theories are
	therefore strictly meaningless -- also called logical empiricism."

(I wonder why only the last is dated?  It couldn't be that someone is
trying to make it sound better because it's more "modern," could it?)

First, it is apparent to me that you have to be a realist before you
can be a positivist.  I submit that "realism" is a metaphysical theory;
you have to believe that natural phenomena exist and behave according
to real laws.  These laws may or may not have been discovered yet --
and they are to be discovered, not invented (cf. comments on idealism,
above).

Furthermore, positivism itself is a metaphysical theory, and is not
subject to verification by its own criteria.  The statement "positive
knowledge is based on..." is a metaphysical statement.  Furthermore,
it is not empirically verifiable.  It is therefore (according to
positivism) meaningless, and therefore positivism, like nominalism,
asserts itself to be meaningless (again, hard to dispute).

Constructivism, in my dictionary, is not given a definition relating
to philosophy (one has to do with art, and the other with stage setting),
so I won't attempt a discussion.  I've probably set myself up for enough
flaming as it is :-).

No doubt someone will say that some of the above definitions are
inadequate.  I will not quarrel with that, but those are what I
had to start with.  If anyone has better definitions, by all means
post them.

Gary Samuelson

wex@milano.UUCP (10/02/86)

In article <1211@bunker.UUCP>, garys@bunker.UUCP (Gary M.  Samuelson) gives
dictionary defintions of a number of philosophical concepts, most of which
seem pretty good.  Rather than discuss them, I will try to answer a question
he raised:
> Idealism: "1a(1): a theory that ultimate reality lies in a realm
> 	transcending phenomena (2): a theory that the essential nature
> 	of reality lies in consciousness or reason; b(1): a theory that
> 	only the perceptible is real (2): a theory that only mental
> 	states or entities are knowable."
> 
> Frankly, I don't understand definition 1a(1).

This definition is derived from the works of Plato who was the first (known)
idealist.  What happened was basically this:  Plato looked around him and
saw a group of things that were called "men" and another group that were
called "chairs" and another group...

He also noted that people had some sense that one member of these groups was
better than another.  Even though people couldn't always formalize their
criteria for ranking or agree on which thing was better, still everyone
seemed to do *some* kind of ranking.

He then hypothesized that for each group (and indeed, for all groups not yet
discovered) there was a "perfect" object that totally exemplified that
group.  These perfect objects existed in "Plato's heaven" (that is distinct
from the Judeo-Christian heaven or the Greek Olympus - it was a theoretical,
unreachable place).  Plato's heaven contained all and only these objects;
this also included objects like numbers - there was an ideal "number 2" of
which all others were imperfect copies!

This explanation had certain benefits - it explained all the phenomena Plato
had observed and it helped explain some of the ways we treat things like
numbers (for example, I am not inclined to say "My number 2 is even, how
about yours?").

The objects in Plato's heaven were "ideal" objects and thus this sort of
belief became known as "idealism".  Other, later, philosophies also laid
claim to that name, a fact reflected by the four-part dictionary definition.


-- 
Alan Wexelblat
ARPA: WEX@MCC.ARPA or WEX@MCC.COM
UUCP: {seismo, harvard, gatech, pyramid, &c.}!ut-sally!im4u!milano!wex

"True victory is victory over oneself."