[talk.philosophy.misc] objectivist misinterpretation of "incompleteness"

throopw@dg_rtp.UUCP (Wayne Throop) (10/08/86)

> dwyer@vixie.UUCP

> G asserts that a certain statement has no rational proof.  What
> statement?  The statement that G is making that a certain statement has
> no rational proof.  Thus, the statement that G refers to is referring to
> G referring to G referring

Not quite right.  When cast into easily-understood English, the
"statement G" is, indeed, vulnerable to something like this
counter-argument.  However, in it's mathematical formulation, G refers
unambiguously to certain facts of number theory, which in turn can be
seen to have certain implications about the statement G itself (namely,
that it can never be proven).

The statement "This statement is false." might possibly be guilty of
infinite regress.  But what about "'Forms a false statement when
preceeded by its quotation' forms a false statement when preceeded by
its quotation." ?  No infinite regress here.  The statement is talking
about a well-defined typographical construction of a statement, and
asserting that that statement will be false.  The sentence "G" is more
akin to this form of indirect self-reference, and is *not* subject
to the infinite regress quibble.

> Templeton states that if G is false, NOT-G must be true -- which then
> leads to a contradiction.

Regardless of what Templeton said, incompleteness results do *not* lead
to a contradiction.  They simply show that for any given formal system,
either the formal system is inconsistant (and one can prove both X and
NOT X for some statement X), *OR* there exist true statements that
cannot be proven in the formal system.  (That is, that is *one* of the
incompleteness results.)  Finding that formal reasoning must either be
contradictory or incomplete, most folks tend to conclude that it must be
incomplete.

> In short, an alleged statement that has no meaningful referent -- that
> is neither true nor false -- that does not serve as a cognitive
> instrument -- cannot be used to prove anything, least of all that reason
> is inefficacious.

As outlined above, "G" *does* have a meaningful referent.  Further, "G"
doesn't show reason to be "inefficacious".  It simply shows that reason
has a certain, nonintuitive (but well defined) limit.

> (Besides, the whole idea of using reason to prove reason inefficacious
> is ab- surd.  [...] After all, the whole concept of reason rests on the
> law of non-contradiction.  If contradictions are possible, then no
> rational argument can prove anything.)

Again, incompleteness yields *NO* contradiction, and does *NOT* result
in the conclusion that reason is "inefficacious".  It merely states that
"truth" cannot be totally captured by formal reasoning within any given
formal system.

--
It is better to know some of the questions than all of the answers.
                                --- James Thurber
-- 
Wayne Throop      <the-known-world>!mcnc!rti-sel!dg_rtp!throopw