dwyer@vixie.UUCP (Bill Dwyer) (09/22/86)
A Response to Brad Templeton's Criticisms of Objectivism
by William Dwyer
(part 1 of 9)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
This article is a response to Brad Templeton's article 624@looking.UUCP,
posted a few months ago. My response is very long, and so will be posted
over a period of about a week. Copies of any portion of the response, or
of the original article, are available upon request.
Editorial assistance was provided by paul@vixie.UUCP (Paul A. Vixie)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Brad Templeton presents nine (though he says eight) problems which, he claims,
he has yet to see an Objectivist answer.
To begin with, Templeton lists the following principles which he alleges to be
"fundamental axioms" of Objectivism:
1) Existence exists.
2) Consciousness exists and is an irreducible primary.
3) Man's consciousness has reliable senses for input.
4) The senses perceive an objective reality.
5) Reason is the only means to gain knowledge, and acts through integrat-
ing the input of the senses.
6) Man has free will, at least regarding the decision to apply rational
thought.
7) A is A, which means "things are what they are," which means that all
things have a *specific* nature. It also means that you can't have A
and NOT A.
However, I do not believe that all of the principles listed here would be re-
garded by Objectivism as "fundamental axioms". (Templeton may wish to debate
this point, although I do not regard it as essential to his discussion.) The
only truly fundamental axioms that I am aware of in Objectivism are the ep-
istemological axioms of "existence", "consciousness" and "identity."
At any rate, Templeton then argues that Objectivism's basis for its axioms (a
basis which he claims to be "self-introspection") is inadequate for the follow-
ing reason: Other people have self-introspected and not agreed with these ax-
ioms; they have come up with different ones.
"Now", he states, "you can't call these people who conceive of other ax-
ioms irrational because they conceive of the others. That's circular --
you have defined rationality in terms of following your school of ra-
tionality.
"You must concede that other systems can also be derived from self-
introspection by rational people, and since self-introspection was the
basis of your own certainty in your axioms, you must question this."
Hence, "PROBLEM 1: Does your self-introspection guarantee a correct appraisal
of the outside world? (Objective reality)
ANSWER: Only insofar as introspection presupposes extrospection -- only in-
sofar as consciousness presupposes existence. If one wants to know what is
outside, one must look outside.
However,
there is a way to ascertain whether a given concept is axiomatic or not:
one ascertains it by observing the fact that an axiomatic concept cannot
be escaped, that it is implicit in all knowledge, that it has to be ac-
cepted and used even in the process of any attempt to deny it.
For instance, when modern philosophers declare that axioms are a matter of
arbitrary choice, and proceed to choose complex, derivative concepts as
the alleged axioms of their alleged reasoning, one can observe that their
statements imply and depend on "existence," "consciousness," "identity,"
which they profess to negate, but which are smuggled into their arguments
in the form of unacknowledged, "stolen" concepts. [Ayn Rand, "Axiomatic
Concepts," INTRODUCTION TO OBJECTIVIST EPISTEMOLOGY (Paper), p. 79]
Templeton states:
"(It's too complex to go into here, but if you really want some consistent
metaphysical systems where A is not A or consciousness does not exist, I
and others on the net can provide them. This article is long enough al-
ready.)"
Since it is the law of identity that defines consistency, a consistent metaphy-
sical system in which A is not A is worse than a contradiction in terms. It is
a contradiction in terms that explicitly forbid contradictions! If you can
have a consistent metaphysical system in which A is not A, then what would an
INCONSISTENT metaphysical system be? One in which A is A? What consistency
means is a context in which you do not have both A and not A (at the same time
and in the same respect).
As for consistent metaphysical systems in which consciousness does not exist,
it may indeed be possible to imagine them, but that does not refute the idea
that consciousness is an EPISTEMOLOGICAL axiom. Whereas existence does not
depend on consciousness; knowledge or proof definitely does. The ACTUAL ex-
istence of consciousness cannot be denied without self-contradiction, for what
is one denying it with? UNCONSCIOUSNESS?!wex@milano.UUCP (09/23/86)
In the past, I have avoided the Objectivist items because they seemed to be mostly flames. However, Bill Dwyer has started what looks like a reasoned discussion, so I will join in. In article <150@vixie.UUCP>, dwyer@vixie.UUCP (Bill Dwyer) writes: > Since it is the law of identity that defines consistency, a consistent > metaphysical system in which A is not A is worse than a contradiction in > terms. If you can have a consistent metaphysical system in which A is > not A, then what would an INCONSISTENT metaphysical system be? One in > which A is A? What consistency means is a context in which you do not > have both A and not A (at the same time and in the same respect). I have two problems with this. First, it doesn't seem (intuitively) right. I don't think I need identity to have a consistent system. Perhaps one might invoke such a law in testing or disproving consistency? The second problem has to do with your assumption that P and not(P) are all that can be talked of. There is something called the law of the excluded middle which is used in some forms of logic and not used in others. In logics which use the excluded middle, the formula (P or not(P)) is always true. However, there are other logics in which this is not the case. In these logics, asserting not(not(P)) is not the same as asserting P. This sort of thinking is used in "intuitionist" logics, something of which I am woefully ignorant (mail.phil.tech readers: HELP!) More interestingly, it corresponds to some situations I encounter in the "real world." For example, say I edit a 300-page book. I am a very good proofreader and expect to catch all the spelling errors as I edit. Now, if you were to present me with the 300 pages, one at a time, and say "Is there a spelling error on this page?" I would say "No" 300 times. However, if you asked "Is there a spelling error somewhere in these 300 pages?" I would say "Yes". Contradiction? Depends on how you look at it. > As for consistent metaphysical systems in which consciousness does not > exist, it may indeed be possible to imagine them, but that does not refute > the idea that consciousness is an EPISTEMOLOGICAL axiom. Whereas existence > does not depend on consciousness; knowledge or proof definitely does. The > ACTUAL existence of consciousness cannot be denied without self- > contradiction, for what is one denying it with? UNCONSCIOUSNESS?! When I studied philosophy formally I had a professor who was a specialist in the works of Descartes. He claimed that this is what Descartes meant when he said "I think, therefore I am." That is, to say "I think, therefore I do not exist" seems somehow foolish. However, there is a deeper, more subtle problem with this. Why do we allow Descartes the "I"? That is, we can allow that there is thinking and/or consciousness, but why must we allow that this thing belongs to a unique individual self, distinct in some way from other (similar) selves? The possibilities of solipsism and of unitary consciousness still exist. This is why Objectivists are often reduced to saying "Existence exists" or "Something exists." (Although this point is minor here, it becomes more important later on.) -- Alan Wexelblat ARPA: WEX@MCC.ARPA or WEX@MCC.COM UUCP: {seismo, harvard, gatech, pyramid, &c.}!ut-sally!im4u!milano!wex "True victory is victory over oneself."
dwyer@vixie.UUCP (09/27/86)
A Response to Brad Templeton's Criticisms of Objectivism
by William Dwyer
(parts 2 and 3 of 9)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
This article is a response to Brad Templeton's article 624@looking.UUCP,
posted a few months ago. My response is very long, and so will be posted
over a period of about a week. Copies of any portion of the response, or
of the original article, are available upon request.
Editorial assistance was provided by paul@vixie.UUCP (Paul A. Vixie)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
"PROBLEM 2: Consciousness is an irreducible primary." Templeton disagrees:
Well plain and simple, it isn't. Time is a more fundamental concept,
since you can't be conscious or reason without time. Thought requires
transition from state A to state B, and transition is a function of time.
This criticism arises from a failure to focus on what Objectivism means by
stating that consciousness is an "irreducible primary", a statement which does
not mean that there are no preconditions for consciousness. Consciousness re-
quires a brain and sense organs. It also requires something (an external
world) to be conscious of. Objectivism certainly does not endorse what it
terms "the primacy of consciousness" -- which is the view that consciousness is
metaphysically the ruler and controller of existence -- but rather the "primacy
of existence" which is the view that consciousness is metaphysically dependent
on, and its content determined by, existence. In other words, according to Ob-
jectivism, existence can get along without consciousness, but consciousness
cannot get along without existence. In this sense, existence not consciousness
is metaphysically primary.
What Objectivists mean by saying that consciousness is an "irreducible primary"
is that one cannot analyze or "prove" consciousness as such. Any attempt to
"prove" it is self-contradictory: it is an attempt to prove consciousness by
means of unconsciousness -- since "proof", strictly speaking, is a process of
derivation from other evidence. This does not mean, of course, that conscious-
ness cannot be "validated". One validates its existence by showing that cons-
ciousness is epistemologically inescapable -- that one must use consciousness
even in the process of any attempt to deny it.
"PROBLEM 3: Time violates the law of identity." Templeton states:
"That all things have a specific nature seems to imply to Objectivists
that all things are finite. For to be infinite is non-specific."
He then states:
"But if time is finite then there is a boundary to existence [which] boils
down to existence did not always exist. ... I'm not sure why but Objec-
tivists seem to get real upset with that statement. They conclude that
time must be infinite, and then decide that time does not exist in the
same way that other things do, and thus needn't have a specific nature."
To begin with, Objectivism does not maintain that time is infinite. Nor does
it hold that time has no specific nature. It's position, along with
Aristotle's, is that time is the measurement of motion. For example, if we say
a job took eight hours, we mean that the process of the job was eight twenty-
fourths the rotation of the earth. In other words, time is a certain relation-
ship which the motion of one thing bears to the motion of another. As such,
time is a function of existence, and therefore presupposes an already existing
universe.
Of course, the universe (meaning existence) has not existed for a finite period
of time, because existence had no beginning. To have a beginning, it would
have had to come into existence out of nothing, and from nothing comes nothing.
In that sense, the universe always existed -- meaning that it existed (in some
form) for all of time -- because time itself depends on the universe. That
does not mean, however, that the universe existed for an infinite period of
time, because if we say that something exists "for a period of time", we mean,
once again, that its motion bears a certain relationship to the motion of
another object. That relationship must be finite, otherwise the relationship
would make no sense: it would have no identity. Besides, since the universe
is literally everything, it can have no relationship to anything else -- nei-
ther a temporal one nor a spatial one. Things in the universe can have tem-
poral and spatial relationships, but the universe as a whole cannot. The
universe as a whole cannot be said to have existed for any period of time. It
is literally timeless, in other words, "eternal" (which does not mean "infinite
in time" but "out of time").dwyer@vixie.UUCP (Bill Dwyer) (09/30/86)
A Response to Brad Templeton's Criticisms of Objectivism
by William Dwyer
(part 4 of 9)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
This article is a response to Brad Templeton's article 624@looking.UUCP,
posted a few months ago. My response is very long, and so will be posted
over a period of about a week. Copies of any portion of the response, or
of the original article, are available upon request.
Editorial assistance was provided by paul@vixie.UUCP (Paul A. Vixie)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
"PROBLEM 4: Is the law of identity being proved meaningless?"
Templeton cites recent experiments that violate "Bell's famous inequality", a
violation which allegedly implies one of the following possibilities:
A) Faster than light communication.
- Holy causality Batman! Without causality, Objectivism goes out
with the bathwater.
In order for faster than light communication to be possible, it must be con-
sistent with the law of causality. Whether it is possible or not is, of
course, a scientific question. And no valid scientific inferences are possible
that repudiate the law of universal causation -- a principle on which all
scientific induction depends.
B) The Copenhagen Interpretation.
- things DON'T have a specific nature. It is meaningless to propose
that they do.
"A is approximately A" - will this be the new slogan? How about,
"A has a high probability of being A."
If things don't have a specific nature, then it is not possible to draw any
conclusions about them, including the conclusion that they don't have a specif-
ic nature. To say that "A is approximately A" would be meaningless itself, if
A were not A. For if A were not A, if it had no identity, how could one iden-
tify it as being approximately anything? If a thing is not itself but only ap-
proximately itself, then if it is "approximately A", does that mean then that
it is approximately "approximately A"? And if so, does that in turn mean that
it is approximately "approximately 'approximately A'"? Evidently. We are thus
led to an infinite regress, in other words, to a contradiction.
The statement "A has a high probability of being A" is no better. Is it TRUE
that "A has a high probability of being A" or is it merely highly probable?
And if it is merely highly probable, is that true, or merely highly probable?
Etc. Furthermore, if A is not A, then how can one say that it -- A -- has a
high probability of being A. Yes, A has a high probability of being A (accord-
ing to this view). But A may not be A; it may only have a high probability of
being A, in which case, one cannot say that IT has a high probability of being
A; one can only say it if it is A, and according to this theory, it may not be
A.
C) The Many-Worlds Theory
Things may have a specific nature, but the nature of Man is that it
is is impossible for him to perceive the totality of it.
I don't follow this. Of course, it is impossible for man to perceive the to-
tality of existence. So what? Objectivists, in fact, stress this point as a
justification for the importance of concept formation. With concepts, one can
bring the not directly perceivable within man's grasp. For example, one can
perceive five (|||||) but not five thousand. One grasps five thousand concep-
tually. Thus, although one cannot grasp the totality of existence perceptual-
ly, one can nevertheless grasp it conceptually.
D) No local variables
All particles that were ever related are forever related. By the Big
Bang theory, that's the whole universe. No entity has an independent
existence. A is A now only applies to the whole universe, and as
such it's not very meaningful. "The universe is the universe." -
That I'll agree with.
I don't follow this either. To say that things are related is not to say that
they do not have separate identities. A man may be related in some way to an
asteroid, but that does not mean that a man is not a man, as distinct from an
asteroid. Besides, if things do not have separate identities, how is it that
we can say they are related? A relationship only applies between things that
are in some sense separate and distinct. Otherwise, what is it that we have a
relationship between? In order to have a relationship between A and B, A must
be A, and B, B. A thing is "related to" something other than itself. It is
only because different things have similarities that the concept of "relation-
ship" is possible or meaningful.
Templeton states:
If this was all too much Physics for you, I advise you to read up soon. I
find it hard to imagine you can talk about Metaphysics (the nature of
reality) without some grounding in physics (the study of reality).
But physics is not the study of reality (as such); it is the study of a partic-
ular aspect of reality: the laws of matter and energy. In the sense of study-
ing a particular aspect of reality, there are many subjects besides physics
that "study reality". Medicine is the "study of reality". So is plumbing; so
is automotive mechanics. It must be equally hard, then, for Templeton to ima-
gine that one can talk about metaphysics (the nature of reality) without some
grounding in medicine, plumbing and automotive mechanics, since these discip-
lines also involve the study of reality.
Furthermore, to say that physics is the study of reality (as such) is just to
say that it is the study of the nature of reality. But as Templeton observes,
it is metaphysics (not physics) that studies the nature of reality. In fact,
without a proper metaphysics (without a correct understanding of the law of
identity and its corollary, the law of causality), the conclusions of physics
are themselves unreliable. It is metaphysics that is required for a proper in-
terpretation of the evidence provided by the science of physics, not the other
way around.wex@milano.UUCP (09/30/86)
In article <151@vixie.UUCP>, dwyer@vixie.UUCP writes: > > A Response to Brad Templeton's Criticisms of Objectivism > > This criticism arises from a failure to focus on what Objectivism means by > stating that consciousness is an "irreducible primary", a statement which > does not mean that there are no preconditions for consciousness. This is one of the problems that people often have with objectivism: it seems that words tend to have different meanings to objectivists than to their critics. Fortunately, William defines what the words mean (below). First some asides: > Consciousness requires a brain and sense organs. It also requires something > (an external world) to be conscious of. I disagree with both these points. Although we have not seen any examples of consciousness absent from brains, there does not seem to be a logical necessity. I can make this argument in a separate article, if necessary. The second sentence is also problematic. Surely we can conceive of a self-aware consciousness? Why is an outside world required? > ... the "primacy of existence" ... is the view that consciousness is > metaphysically dependent on, and its content determined by, existence. In > other words, according to Objectivism, existence can get along without > consciousness, but consciousness cannot get along without existence. In > this sense, existence not consciousness is metaphysically primary. (Note: how is "metaphysically primary" different from "primary"?) Again, two points. I have in my consciousness an image of a chimera. How is that bit of content "determined by existence"? Second, "get along with" is a very loose phrase. It seems certain that in some ways the very presence of consciousness affects existence (I am thinking here of quantum-mechanical effects). Could you please nail down this definition a little more firmly? > What Objectivists mean by saying that consciousness is an "irreducible > primary" is that one cannot analyze or "prove" consciousness as such. Any > attempt to "prove" it is self-contradictory: it is an attempt to prove > consciousness by means of unconsciousness -- since "proof", strictly > speaking, is a process of derivation from other evidence. This does not > mean, of course, that consciousness cannot be "validated". One validates > its existence by showing that consciousness is epistemologically > inescapable -- that one must use consciousness even in the process of any > attempt to deny it. I'm sorry to quote so much, but this really confuses me. What does it mean to "prove consciousness"? Do you mean "prove that consciousness exists"? Do you mean "prove that I have consciousness"? Or "prove that you and I both have consciousness and that they are not connected or identical"? Did you see my previous note about Descartes? > [Objectivism]'s position, ... is that time is the measurement of motion. This, I'm afraid, shows a lack of understanding of relativity. If I take a trip at some significant fraction of the speed of light (say >75%), then even an instrument as coarse as a wall-clock will show the differences. You here on earth will think that my trip took significantly longer than I thought it did. If we want to use quite precise instruments (say, atomic clocks) we can show that "eight hours" does not have the exact same meaning on the ground as it does at the top of the World Trade Center. What motion is involved here? On another front, behaviorists have shown that there is a definite correlation between intelligence and "time sense." Animals which we agree (do we?) are conscious, such as dogs, do not have such a sense. For example, you can train a dog to do something when he hears a bell. You cannot train him to wait 2 seconds and then do something. > Of course, the universe (meaning existence) has not existed for a finite > period of time, because existence had no beginning. To have a beginning, > it would have had to come into existence out of nothing, and from nothing > comes nothing. I wonder how you know this. Were you there? What is it about the universe that makes you say it has always existed? And what do you mean by "from nothing comes nothing"? > ... since the universe is literally everything, it can have no relationship > to anything else -- neither a temporal one nor a spatial one. Once again, you are using a word differently. I have heard astronomers and astrophysicists use the term "other universe" (when talking about black holes). What do you mean by "universe" such that there can be nothing else? Do you include these other universes? Possible universes? Awaiting answers eagerly... -- Alan Wexelblat ARPA: WEX@MCC.ARPA or WEX@MCC.COM UUCP: {seismo, harvard, gatech, pyramid, &c.}!ut-sally!im4u!milano!wex "True victory is victory over oneself."
gsmith@brahms.UUCP (10/02/86)
In article <152@vixie.UUCP> dwyer@vixie.UUCP (Bill Dwyer) writes: > A Response to Brad Templeton's Criticisms of Objectivism >"PROBLEM 4: Is the law of identity being proved meaningless?" >In order for faster than light communication to be possible, it must be con- >sistent with the law of causality. Whether it is possible or not is, of >course, a scientific question. And no valid scientific inferences are possible >that repudiate the law of universal causation -- a principle on which all >scientific induction depends. What in the name of Ayn Rand is "the universal law of causality"? Would you care to define what it is, and show why it is *presupposed* by induction? >Furthermore, to say that physics is the study of reality (as such) is just to >say that it is the study of the nature of reality. But as Templeton observes, >it is metaphysics (not physics) that studies the nature of reality. In fact, >without a proper metaphysics (without a correct understanding of the law of >identity and its corollary, the law of causality), the conclusions of physics >are themselves unreliable. It is metaphysics that is required for a proper in- >terpretation of the evidence provided by the science of physics, not the other >way around. Both metaphysics and physics are attempts to understand reality. Without wishing to assert physics is in some unique way the science of reality, I would like to claim that anyone who today wishes to do serious metaphysics ought to understand some physics, notably relativity and quantum mechanics. I am aware that some philosophers get upset by this prescription, but they are fooling themselves. I see you are now claiming that the "law of causality" follows from the "law of identity", and that physics depends on both. Care to explain your meaning? ucbvax!brahms!gsmith Gene Ward Smith/UCB Math Dept/Berkeley CA 94720 ucbvax!weyl!gsmith Institute of Pi Research
wex@milano.UUCP (10/02/86)
In article <152@vixie.UUCP>, dwyer@vixie.UUCP (Bill Dwyer) writes: > > A Response to Brad Templeton's Criticisms of Objectivism > > by William Dwyer > > (part 4 of 9) > > "PROBLEM 4: Is the law of identity being proved meaningless?" > > Templeton cites recent experiments that violate "Bell's famous inequality", > a violation which allegedly implies one of the following possibilities: > > A) Faster than light communication. > > In order for faster than light communication to be possible, it must be con- > sistent with the law of causality... And no valid scientific inferences > are possible that repudiate the law of universal causation -- a principle > on which all scientific induction depends. Two points: I think Bill Dwyer doesn't quite understand what FTL communication may mean. FTL travel (whether of information or whatever) implies time-travel. Thus we could have effects occurring *before* their "causes"! I also don't understand what he means by "the law of universal causation" and what it has to do with the Objectivist identity axiom. > B) The Copenhagen Interpretation. > - things DON'T have a specific nature. It is meaningless to > propose that they do. > "A is approximately A" - will this be the new slogan? How about > "A has a high probability of being A"? > > ...To say that "A is approximately A" would be meaningless itself, if A were > not A. For if A were not A, if it had no identity, how could one identify > it as being approximately anything? Dwyer's problem here is that he doesn't understand what Templeton means by "approximately". Templeton means "to the first approximation"; that is, what we call A may not actually turn out to be the case if we look too closely at it. Thus, the statement "that is A" is *not* a statement about how things really are, but rather is a statement of human convenience. > If a thing is not itself but only approximately itself, then if it is > "approximately A", does that mean then that it is approximately > "approximately A"? And if so, does that in turn mean that it is > approximately "approximately 'approximately A'"? Evidently. We are thus > led to an infinite regress, in other words, to a contradiction. No. Look at again from the viewpoint I presented above. To say that "A is approximately A" *does not* say that it is approximately "approximately A". No regress (which, by the way, is not the same as a contradiction!). > The statement "A has a high probability of being A" is no better. Is it > TRUE that "A has a high probability of being A" or is it merely highly > probable? Once again, you're not seeing Brad's viewpoint. To say "A has a high probability of being A" is to say that making identifications in the real world is not a certain business. It says nothing about English sentences, which have no trouble remaining true or false. Thus the sentence I quoted is true if the Copenhagen interpretation is correct, false otherwise. No probability is involved. > D) No local variables > All particles that were ever related are forever related. By the > Big Bang theory, that's the whole universe. No entity has an > independent existence. A is A now only applies to the whole > universe, and as such it's not very meaningful. "The universe is > the universe." - That I'll agree with. > > I don't follow this either. To say that things are related is not to say > that they do not have separate identities. A man may be related in some way > to an asteroid, but that does not mean that a man is not a man, as distinct > from an asteroid. Besides, if things do not have separate identities, how > is it that we can say they are related? A relationship only applies between > things that are in some sense separate and distinct. Otherwise, what is it > that we have a relationship between? It is only because different things > have similarities that the concept of "relationship" is possible or > meaningful. This is a little harder to "get". What Brad is saying is this: By some theory we are all part of the same "stuff". If you look at things from a certain viewpoint, all that we call "things" are part of one thing. This is another way of making the same point that was first made: what we call "A" has less to do with reality than it does with human convenience. The same thing can be said of relationships - they are just human notational conveniences, not reflections of "what's really out there." This is important because Objectivism claims to be making metaphysical statements (ie statements about the way things really are). Gary is showing how that might be a false claim. -- Alan Wexelblat ARPA: WEX@MCC.ARPA or WEX@MCC.COM UUCP: {seismo, harvard, gatech, pyramid, &c.}!ut-sally!im4u!milano!wex "True victory is victory over oneself."
dwyer@vixie.UUCP (Bill Dwyer) (10/03/86)
A Response to Brad Templeton's Criticisms of Objectivism
by William Dwyer
(part 5 of 9)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
This article is a response to Brad Templeton's article 624@looking.UUCP,
posted a few months ago. My response is very long, and so will be posted
over a period of about a week. Copies of any portion of the response, or
of the original article, are available upon request.
Editorial assistance was provided by paul@vixie.UUCP (Paul A. Vixie)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
"PROBLEM 5: The efficacy of human reason and the incompleteness theorem."
Templeton cites the so-called incompleteness theorem (See GODEL, ESCHER, BACH
by Hofstadter) as proof that there are such things as the unprovable by reason.
He presents the argument for this theorem as follows:
Consider the statement G:
G: The statement G has no rational proof - it is beyond reason.
Now consider the converse:
NOT G: The statement G has a rational proof - it can be derived with
reason.
If G is false, NOT G must be true, but if NOT G is true, then G has a
rational proof and must be true. Thus we have G & NOT G (egads!!!!).
Thus G must be true - there is at least one thing beyond reason.
Templeton then states:
Now most Objectivists, when shown our "G" up there say that G is a non-
sense statement because it is self-referential. They forget that self-
reference is the essence of consciousness, perhaps even the definition of
it. A consciousness must be aware of itself (self-aware) and be able to
reason about itself. You can't have epistemology without the ability to
reason about reason.
While it is true that a (fully developed) human consciousness is self-
referential -- is aware of itself -- it is so only because it is first aware of
something other than itself. Which is precisely the point that Objectivism
makes with respect to the incompleteness theorem.
Contrary to Templeton, Objectivism does not say that G is nonsensical because
it is self-referential. What Objectivism does say is that before G can be
meaningfully self-referential -- before it can meaningfully refer to its own
act of referral -- it must refer to something other than its own act of refer-
ral, which it does not do. Just as there must be an awareness OF SOMETHING be-
fore there can be an awareness to be aware of, so there must be a referral TO
SOMETHING before there can be a referral to refer to.
Thus, the nature of consciousness does not refute, but supports, Objectivism's
answer to the incompleteness theorem. Just as consciousness requires an in-
dependent object to be conscious of before it can be conscious of its act of
being conscious, so a statement requires an independent object to refer to be-
fore it can refer to its process of referral. Since G does not fulfill that
requirement, it cannot meaningfully refer to itself, i.e., to its own process
of referral.
G asserts that a certain statement has no rational proof. What statement? The
statement that G is making that a certain statement has no rational proof.
Thus, the statement that G refers to is referring to G referring to G referring
Templeton states that if G is false, NOT-G must be true -- which then leads to
a contradiction. But if G has no meaningful referent, G can be neither true
nor false. And if it can be neither true nor false, it does not, properly
speaking, qualify as a statement. "[S]tatements are COGNITIVE instruments. A
statement, or proposition, is not just any seemingly grammatical collection of
words; it is an integration of concepts used to make a meaningful assertion."
[Binswanger, THE OBJECTIVIST FORUM, February 1984, p. 14]
In short, an alleged statement that has no meaningful referent -- that is nei-
ther true nor false -- that does not serve as a cognitive instrument -- cannot
be used to prove anything, least of all that reason is inefficacious.
This is the Objectivist position on the "incompleteness theorem". As one can
see, it is scarcely the view that there can be no valid self-referential state-
ments -- a view more appropriate to Bertrand Russell and is infamous theory of
types.
(Besides, the whole idea of using reason to prove reason inefficacious is ab-
surd. If reason truly is inefficacious a la the incompleteness theorem, then
what justifies the incompleteness theorem? Unreason? A point to bear in mind
here is that if one's reason leads to a contradiction, it does not mean that a
contradiction exists; it means that there is something wrong with the reasoning
that led to it. After all, the whole concept of reason rests on the law of
non-contradiction. If contradictions are possible, then no rational argument
can prove anything.)dwyer@vixie.UUCP (Bill Dwyer) (10/04/86)
A Response to Brad Templeton's Criticisms of Objectivism
by William Dwyer
(parts 6, 7 and 8 of 9)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
This article is a response to Brad Templeton's article 624@looking.UUCP,
posted a few months ago. My response is very long, and so will be posted
over a period of about a week. Copies of any portion of the response, or
of the original article, are available upon request.
Editorial assistance was provided by paul@vixie.UUCP (Paul A. Vixie)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
"PROBLEM 6: The great circle of Metaphysics and Epistemology." Templeton
states:
Objectivists feel that metaphysics is the most fundamental of philoso-
phies. But since metaphysicians . . . are all human, it's actually a body
of knowledge -- the study of the nature of reality. But how a body of
knowledge is built is the domain of epistemology. To gain a picture of
the nature of reality, you need an epistemology.
But to gain an epistemology, you need a brain. And a brain is part of
reality, and its existence must follow the rules of metaphysics. So both
disciplines require the other, and as such, neither can contain irreduci-
ble primaries, just circular ones.
To begin with, metaphysics is not a philosophy but a branch of philosophy.
Secondly, there is no contradiction between metaphysics being the most funda-
mental branch of philosophy (if indeed it is) and a body of knowledge as well.
A branch of philosophy IS a body of knowledge. However, contrary to Templeton,
Objectivism does not consider metaphysics to be more fundamental than ep-
istemology. Templeton is confusing metaphysics, which is the study of the na-
ture of existence, with existence itself. Although Objectivism considers ex-
istence to be more fundamental than consciousness, it does not consider meta-
physics to be more fundamental than epistemology.
It is true that a rational epistemology must conform to the laws of reality, if
only because the law of identity is ontological, meaning that the law describes
reality, not just thought. It is irrational to hold contradictions in one's
mind, because they do not exist in reality. However, since metaphysics and ep-
istemology are fundamental branches of philosophy, neither can have primacy
over the other. In a sense, both are primary, in that neither can be reduced
to a branch of philosophy that is more fundamental than the other.
Templeton says that "to gain an epistemology, you need a brain. And a brain is
part of reality, and its existence must follow the rules of metaphysics. So
both disciplines require the other..."
Each discipline does require the other, but not in the way that he suggests.
You don't arrive at rational principles of epistemology by studying the neuro-
logical structure of the human brain, for the knowledge you would gain from
that study would be inferential, and the process of inference would itself need
to be based on a rational epistemology. Metaphysics is the study of the nature
of existence -- of existence as such -- and epistemology, the study of the na-
ture of knowledge -- of knowledge as such. These disciplines are necessarily
broader and more fundamental than a particular science such as neurology. They
therefore cannot be predicated on such a science.
"PROBLEM 7: Free will, mysticism and materialism." Templeton argues:
To me, saying that all things have a specific nature, and that there is no
such thing as the supernatural adds up to materialism.
Doesn't materialism imply determinism in the traditional sense?
Materialism, in philosophy, is the view that everything is matter in motion,
and that there is no mind. Such a view does not follow simply from the fact
that all things have a specific nature and are part of the natural world.
Consciousness or mind is itself part of the natural world. It is true, accord-
ing to Objectivism, that materialism implies determinism, since for Objectiv-
ism, free will is an aspect of human consciousness, but it remains for Temple-
ton to show how identity combined with naturalism implies materialism. Leonard
Peikoff has argued that free will is not inconsistent with man having a specif-
ic nature, since (according to Objectivism) free will is part of the nature of
man. Nor is it inconsistent with causal necessity, since (according to Objec-
tivism) man MUST exercise choice -- he cannot escape the necessity of doing so.
"PROBLEM 8: Artificial intelligence." Templeton argues that artificial intel-
ligence is possible. He then asks: "What does AI tell us about reason?" He
answers:
For one, consciousness is not an irreducible primary, for we have reduced
it. We may not understand how we did it, but when we do it, we will know
we have reduced it.
This problem of consciousness not being an irreducible primary has already been
dealt with in my answer to PROBLEM 2 concerning what Objectivism means by "ir-
reducible primary". As I indicated there, when Objectivism says that cons-
ciousness is an irreducible primary, it does not mean that there are no precon-
ditions of consciousness, such as a brain and sense organs. It means that one
cannot analyze or "prove" consciousness as such. An attempt to prove it is
self-contradictory; it is an attempt to prove consciousness by means of uncons-
ciousness.
Templeton continues:
What's worse, we will certainly know the source of whatever "free will"
this consciousness has. It may be a cosmic ray detector or any number of
things, but what implications will this have on ethical questions?
None as far as I can tell. What implications does Templeton have in mind? And
why does he believe they would be disturbing to Objectivists?dwyer@vixie.UUCP (Bill Dwyer) (10/08/86)
A Response to Brad Templeton's Criticisms of Objectivism
by William Dwyer
(part 9 of 9)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
This article is a response to Brad Templeton's article 624@looking.UUCP,
posted a few months ago. My response is very long, and so will be posted
over a period of about a week. Copies of any portion of the response, or
of the original article, are available upon request.
Editorial assistance was provided by paul@vixie.UUCP (Paul A. Vixie)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
"PROBLEM 9: All the old standards." Templeton states:
I'll complete this posting by citing some of the more common questions you
will probably have heard:
You know your senses and your brain edit incoming information. How can
you retain certainty with this knowledge?
But if I can't retain any certainty, then how can I know that my senses and
brain edit incoming information? He asks, "How can you retain certainty with
this knowledge?" My question is: How can I have knowledge without any cer-
tainty? And if I lack knowledge, then I also lack the knowledge required for
doubting my knowledge, in which case, I have no basis for doubting it. His ar-
gument is self-refuting, because it turns on the knowledge that one's senses
and brain edit incoming information -- knowledge which the argument itself
simultaneously repudiates.
In fact, the senses provide information; they don't distort information. It is
true that they provide a limited amount of information, but that does not mean
that one cannot be certain of the information that is provided. Certainty does
not require omniscience. For example, my education is limited, because my
teachers edited their instruction. In teaching me arithmetic, they omitted
geometry; in teaching me geometry, they omitted calculus. Does that mean that
I cannot add and subtract or calculate the area of a triangle? I think not.
Furthermore, if the senses prevent us from knowing anything, than they prevent
us from being conscious of anything. What then are we conscious of? Non-
existence? But non-existence does not exist; it is nothing. And a conscious-
ness conscious of nothing is a contradiction in terms. If it is conscious of
nothing, then it is not conscious; and if it is not conscious, then it is not a
consciousness. Are we conscious only of our consciousness? "A consciousness
conscious of nothing but itself is a contradiction in terms. Before it could
identity itself as consciousness, it had to be conscious of something [other
than itself]." Consciousness presupposes consciousness of existence; it
presupposes knowledge of reality. To be sure, we can err in our judgments
about what reality is. However, such error is not the fault of our sensory ap-
paratus, but derives from a failure properly to organize our sensory material.
Besides, the concept of error itself presupposes knowledge of reality; it
presupposes knowledge of something to be in error about.
Templeton quotes Rand:
"A consciousness conscious of nothing but itself is a contradiction in
terms. Before it could identity itself as consciousness, it had to be
conscious of something. If that which you claim to perceive does not ex-
ist, what you possess is not consciousness."
He answers:
What if the so-called "external" reality perceived is inexorably linked to
consciousness?
If the external reality perceived were inexorably linked to consciousness, then
that reality would be a part of consciousness, in which case, consciousness
would be conscious of nothing but itself -- which is impossible for the very
reasons that Rands gives in the passage Templeton quotes. What Rand means in
that passage is that if one were conscious of nothing but one's own act of
consciousness, one wouldn't be conscious to begin with, because an act of cons-
ciousness is always OF SOMETHING. Thus, in order to be conscious of one's act
of being conscious, one would have to be conscious of one's act of being cons-
cious OF SOMETHING, and that something would then be something other than the
act of consciousness itself.
Templeton quotes Rand:
"Honesty is the recognition of the fact that the unreal is unreal and can
have no value."
He answers:
"You mean works of fiction like `Atlas Drugged?'" [sic]
One must be capable of appreciating the context in which a statement is made if
one wishes to criticize it. Works of fiction are certainly real as works of
fiction, and do have value. Obviously, the characters are not real people, but
then they do not have value as real people either. (That is not to say, of
course, that if Rand's heroes existed, they would not be valuable human be-
ings.)
What Rand means by her statement is that honesty is the recognition of the fact
that there can be no value in faking reality in order to evade it's conse-
quences, since the consequences will obtain irrespective of whether or not one
chooses to acknowledge them. For example, a drug addict may evade acknowledg-
ing the consequences of his actions, but he cannot escape the consequences
themselves. Here again, the primacy of existence is of paramount importance.
Templeton quotes Rand:
"Errors of knowledge are not breaches of morality."
He answers:
What about errors of knowledge concerning breaches of morality? What is
morality but knowledge of a moral code. Is a person who commits immoral
acts because he hasn't fubelmonte@svax.cs.cornell.edu (Matthew Belmonte) (10/11/86)
In article <152@vixie.UUCP>, dwyer@vixie.UUCP (Bill Dwyer) writes: > B) The Copenhagen Interpretation. > - things DON'T have a specific nature. It is meaningless to propose > that they do. > "A is approximately A" - will this be the new slogan? How about, > "A has a high probability of being A." > > If things don't have a specific nature, then it is not possible to draw any > conclusions about them, including the conclusion that they don't have a specif > ic nature. To say that "A is approximately A" would be meaningless itself, if > A were not A. For if A were not A, if it had no identity, how could one iden- > tify it as being approximately anything? If a thing is not itself but only ap > proximately itself, then if it is "approximately A", does that mean then that > it is approximately "approximately A"? And if so, does that in turn mean that > it is approximately "approximately 'approximately A'"? Evidently. We are thu > led to an infinite regress, in other words, to a contradiction. I'm not clear on how you arrive at the conclusion that this is contradictory. "Approximately" means within some bounds. (You're welcome to dispute this definition; I haven't my dictionary in hand right now.) Therefore, "Approximately approximately" means within some bounds that are within some bounds. If something is within some bounds that are within some bounds, then it certainly is within some bounds. Therefore, "Approximately approximately," and generally any series "approximately"**n, where n is in [1,infinity), is equivalent in meaning to "approximately." By "bounds," I mean physical, relational, or semantic (Is there any other general category I've left out?) constraints. > The statement "A has a high probability of being A" is no better. Is it TRUE > that "A has a high probability of being A" or is it merely highly probable? > And if it is merely highly probable, is that true, or merely highly probable? It is certainly true that if _A_ has a high probability of being _A_, then it is true that _A_ has a high probability of being _A_. This is tautological. If it is true that _A_ has a high probability of being _A_, then there is a high probability (namely, 100%) that there is a high probability of _A_ being _A_. But there is not _merely_ a high probability that there is a high probability of _A_ being _A_. > Etc. Furthermore, if A is not A, then how can one say that it -- A -- has a > high probability of being A. Yes, A has a high probability of being A (accord > ing to this view). But A may not be A; it may only have a high probability of > being A, in which case, one cannot say that IT has a high probability of being > A; one can only say it if it is A, and according to this theory, it may not be > A. According to this theory, _A_ may not be _A_. But we don't know that, and we have some evidence which supports _A_'s being _A_. So, WITHIN THE CURRENT CONTEXT, we say that _A_ has a high probability of being _A_. We admit that our knowledge (or belief) is fuzzy. If later on we find more evidence supporting _A_'s not being _A_ (although I can't imagine how this would happen -- I think there is opposition, but not contradiction, in the universe as a whole.), then the context has changed, and so has our belief about _A_. "Logic dictated that logic did not apply." -- Spock, "The Galileo Seven" -- Matthew Belmonte ARPA: <belmonte@rocky.cs.cornell.edu> <belmonte@svax.cs.cornell.edu> BITNET: <d25y@cornella> <d25y@crnlvax5> UUCP: ..!decvax!duke!duknbsr!mkb