hadeishi@husc4.harvard.edu (mitsuharu hadeishi) (10/06/86)
780c.UUCP> marty@ism780c.UUCP (Marty Smith) writes: >> "The universe is uncharacterizable in its entirety" seems to me to be >>a true statement. I can never know the state of the universe because the >>memory required to hold that state would be bigger than the universe itself. >> . . . > Ah! This is a different interpretation of Gallmeister's statement, >which is in fact true. We certainly cannot characterize the exact state >of the universe, even in theory; it simply is not possible to measure and >record the states variables of all of the different particles. > However (although I don't have the context at hand) I don't think this >is what Gallmeister meant. His meaning (I am paraphrasing a statement with >which I disagree, so be careful!) was that the exact characterization by >Man of natural law is impossible. And this is that with which I disagree. David, I get the impression from you that because this question is open, you feel free to assume (for the sake of philosophizing) that it is true (that the Universe is completely characterizable by Man.) This implications of this implicit assumption, however, are vast. What IS clear is that CURRENT physical theory does NOT completely characterize the laws of the Universe. In light of this the particular form of a physical theory that you choose to operate with becomes extremely important: Suppose you have two different forms of a physical theory which have been shown to be mathematically equivalent. In an abstract sense you can say the two forms are indistinguishable one from the other. (I am paraphrasing an argument given by Richard Feynman in _The Character of Physical Law_.) However, this is only true from the point of view of the internal qualities of the theory; i.e., if you start with one theory you can derive the equations of the other. However this theory is not complete, and you are trying to develop a better characterization of physical reality. From this point of view the form of the theory which you adopt has significant consequences. One form of the theory may suggest possible extensions or alternative theories, the other form may suggest totally different extensions. Because of the limited nature of human mindpower and the incomplete nature of physical theories, this distinction (between forms of a theory) acquires fundamental importance. I am speaking purely analogically here. You wish to leave the question (of the characterizability of the Universe) open, and would leave the job of the actual characterizing to the physicists. However, it is clear to me (from the tenor of your responses) that you have not considered the full ramifications of this view. Whether or not the Universe is completely characterizable by Man, it is very likely that the everyday world that we see is NOT characterizable in this sense. By this I mean: it turns out that the nature of physical theory precludes calculation of the properties of complex systems in an exact form. I mean that it is not even possible to compute the structure of, for example, a protein molecule. So it is not possible to derive chemistry from physics, and it does not look likely that this gap will ever be completely breached. (Also there is an increasing amount of evidence to suggest that our current physical theories will always remain an approximation: this is due to the existence of effects at higher levels of structural complexity which are not reducible to lower-level effects. If this is the case then the program of the final physical theory looks very dubious indeed. These kinds of effects are not "nice"; i.e., they don't look good for the claim of generality of physics, however they are not surprising in that all of modern physics has been derived from the study of the simplest possible idealized systems. Effects that would be measurable only at a higher level of structure would therefore not be included in current physical theory. This is not an orthodox view, but it is not possible to discount off the cuff. But this is not central to my argument.) I take the activity of philosophy to be the ultimate science; i.e., the inquiry into the nature of Reality itself. Now the claim of characterizability has an associated (not logically derivable but politically related) stance: (Loose) definition: A rational framework is a set of propositions and rational principles which can be easily articulated using language. 1. Assumption: It is possible to organize our experience into a rational framework. The problem with this is that Reality as we experience it and live it is essentially a continuous phenomenon. What we consider to be "objects" in our rational framework are never Wittgensteinian objects; i.e., objects we typically talk about (whether they be physical objects or ideas) are never "colourless." We are always leaving something out when we speak of any thing. Our language is necessarily discrete but our experience is continuous. Of course it is necessary to abstract reality into these discrete meaning-bundles we use to construct language. However it is clear that certain experiences cannot be transmitted in this fashion. As Tu Wei-Ming (a professor of Chinese History here at Harvard) put it, "A group of wine tasters may be able to discuss the fine distinctions of taste between various wines. However, no matter how hard they try, they will be unable to explain their experience to someone who is not also a wine taster." (cf. Wittgenstein's private language argument in a weaker form.) Language in itself contains no meaning; it requires at least two people with common experiences before the symbols can be said to have meaning. However, it may be that someone may experience directly something which is not easily related to ordinary language-game objects. If this experience is very far removed from these objects or frameworks then it becomes impossible to directly refer to the experience or even to relate any inferences that can be drawn directly from the experience. It may be possible to give vague hints, but it would be like trying to describe a football game in the language of someone who only sees the shadows on the wall (i.e. the inhabitants of Plato's Cave.) Whenever you work within a rational framework, or attempt to construct such a framework, you must naturally become inextricably involved in a language-game. If you are not extremely lucky, this language-game will trap you; if, in addition, you are somehow trying to contruct the perfect language-game (the "correct" language-game) then you are doomed. Because the language-game must necessarily NOT be correct, by the nature of language games. My hypothesis is that language games are not sufficiently powerful to characterize our universe, and therefore they should be viewed with extreme caution. So my stance, as it were, would be to mistrust all rational frameworks, and, in fact, to discard them when doing serious philosophy (what I am attempting to explain to you now is not what I call serious philosophy, though it is certainly more serious than most philosophy which is arrogantly proclaimed as "serious.") This stance suggests radically different approaches to confronting reality as a human being (I do not claim to be the first to suggest this, but I do seem to be one of the few to argue its rational justifiability.) The validity of this stance must be confirmed empirically. It has proven in my case to be of the utmost importance, and in fact was expounded very well (although somewhat cryptically to the modern Western reader) by Lao Tzu some 2,500 years ago. Despite its antiquity, however, I do not believe that it has really been understood and practiced by very many; however it remains a telling critique and indictment of almost all of traditional Western philosophy. (Hee hee - I love making ridiculous pronouncements like that, especially when they're true, Hee hee). -Mitsu
ladkin@kestrel.UUCP (10/08/86)
In article <337@husc6.HARVARD.EDU>, hadeishi@husc4.harvard.edu (mitsuharu hadeishi) writes: > [..] Language in itself contains no meaning; it requires > at least two people with common experiences before the symbols > can be said to have meaning. [...] Although this statement is not central to your point as I read it, I should point out that it is highly contentious. Since you mention the private language argument (if there is just one), I assume you take it to be valid. Could you show us your version of the argument in more detail, please? Peter Ladkin ladkin@kestrel.arpa
mark@umcp-cs.UUCP (Mark Weiser) (10/09/86)
In article <337@husc6.HARVARD.EDU> hadeishi@husc4.UUCP (mitsuharu hadeishi) writes: > . . . > So my stance, as it were, would be to mistrust all rational >frameworks, and, in fact, to discard them when doing serious >philosophy (what I am attempting to explain to you now is not >what I call serious philosophy, though it is certainly more serious >than most philosophy which is arrogantly proclaimed as "serious.") >This stance suggests radically different approaches to confronting >reality as a human being (I do not claim to be the first to suggest >this, but I do seem to be one of the few to argue its rational >justifiability.) > > The validity of this stance must be confirmed empirically. >It has proven in my case to be of the utmost importance, and in fact >was expounded very well (although somewhat cryptically to the modern >Western reader) by Lao Tzu some 2,500 years ago. Despite its >antiquity, however, I do not believe that it has really been understood >and practiced by very many; however it remains a telling critique >and indictment of almost all of traditional Western philosophy. >(Hee hee - I love making ridiculous pronouncements like that, >especially when they're true, Hee hee). "Almost all" saves you. Heidegger, Gadamer, and others in what is called "hermeneutic" philosophy also argue the rational justifiability of what you say, and argue it firmly within, and by detailed comparison to, Western philosophy. References: Heidegger: "What is a Thing" (actually a critique of Kant), Gadamer: "Reason in the Age of Science" -mark -- Spoken: Mark Weiser ARPA: mark@maryland Phone: +1-301-454-7817 CSNet: mark@umcp-cs UUCP: {seismo,allegra}!umcp-cs!mark USPS: Computer Science Dept., University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742
hadeishi@husc4.harvard.edu (mitsuharu hadeishi) (10/09/86)
In article <3760@umcp-cs.UUCP> mark@umcp-cs.UUCP (Mark Weiser) writes: >In article <337@husc6.HARVARD.EDU> hadeishi@husc4.UUCP (mitsuharu hadeishi) writes: >> . . . >> So my stance, as it were, would be to mistrust all rational >>frameworks, and, in fact, to discard them when doing serious >>philosophy > . . . >> by Lao Tzu some 2,500 years ago. Despite its >>antiquity, however, I do not believe that it has really been understood >>and practiced by very many; however it remains a telling critique >>and indictment of almost all of traditional Western philosophy. >>(Hee hee - I love making ridiculous pronouncements like that, >>especially when they're true, Hee hee). > >"Almost all" saves you. Heidegger, Gadamer, and others in what is >called "hermeneutic" philosophy also argue the rational justifiability >of what you say, and argue it firmly within, and by detailed comparison >to, Western philosophy. References: Heidegger: "What is a Thing" >(actually a critique of Kant), Gadamer: "Reason in the Age of Science" Thanks, Mark. I have been told that a Zen master once met Heidegger and told him "I really admire what you've written about Zen." Heidegger replied someting to the effect of "But I don't know anything about Zen." The Zen master said "You don't know that you know, but what you write about is pure Zen." However, (having read some Heidegger) I find I prefer the somewhat less wordy approach of the Zen masters. Somehow the spirit and immediate applicability to daily life of this philosophy can become obscured by lengthy explanations (such as you find in Heidegger and other existentialist writers.) But this is a matter of taste, perhaps. (I do think the Zenists are at least slightly more effective at achieving an understanding in their students; and the Zen less-wordy method has the added advantage that pretty much anyone can eventually get some profound benefit from it, without having to be an intellectual or a student of philosophy. Also Zen I think, because of the simplicity of the approach, tends to have more direct effectiveness in such things as serving tea, martial arts, writing poetry, cutting wood, walking around New York, et cetera.) -Mitsu
desj@brahms.BERKELEY.EDU (David desJardins) (10/11/86)
In article <337@husc6.HARVARD.EDU> hadeishi@husc4.UUCP (mitsuharu hadeishi) writes: > David, I get the impression from you that because this question is >open, you feel free to assume (for the sake of philosophizing) that it >is true (that the Universe is completely characterizable by Man.) This >implications of this implicit assumption, however, are vast. Suppose this assumption were to have untenable consequences. Then we could reject the assumption, and thus the question would no longer be open. So it seems that if you agree that the question is open, then you must agree that it is valid to assume either of the two possibilities. (There is nothing particularly deep here; we are simply reasoning by contradiction. Fermat's Last Theorem is open, and so we are free to assume either that it is true or that it is false. If either of these assumptions led us to a contradiction, then we would of course consider the opposite assumption to be proven.) > I am speaking purely analogically here. You wish to leave the >question (of the characterizability of the Universe) open, and would >leave the job of the actual characterizing to the physicists. However, >it is clear to me (from the tenor of your responses) that you have not >considered the full ramifications of this view. I have read your entire article many many times and I do not see a single thing in it which even attempts to explain what these supposed ramifications might be, or why they are good or bad. In lieu of such arguments, how can I respond except by saying that I have considered the logical consequences of my statements very carefully and they all seem to me perfectly desirable. > Whether or not the Universe is completely characterizable by >Man, it is very likely that the everyday world that we see is NOT >characterizable in this sense. [...] it is not possible to derive >chemistry from physics, and it does not look likely that this gap >will ever be completely breached. Even if the universe is UNcharacterizable in its entirety by Man, I expect that the derivation of chemistry from physics will be possible in a very short period of time, on the order of 100-200 years. This just seems a simple question of amassing sufficient computational power. > (Also there is an increasing amount of evidence to suggest that >our current physical theories will always remain an approximation: >this is due to the existence of effects at higher levels of structural >complexity which are not reducible to lower-level effects. Such "evidence" will always exist, until such time as a final under- standing has been reached. Thus, since it would exist whether or not a complete understanding is possible, it is not evidence in any real sense. > I take the activity of philosophy to be the ultimate >science; i.e., the inquiry into the nature of Reality itself. Now >the claim of characterizability has an associated (not logically >derivable but politically related) stance: > > (Loose) definition: A rational framework is a set of > propositions and rational principles which can be > easily articulated using language. > > 1. Assumption: It is possible to organize our experience into a > rational framework. > > The problem with this is that Reality as we experience it >and live it is essentially a continuous phenomenon. What we consider >to be "objects" in our rational framework are never Wittgensteinian >objects; i.e., objects we typically talk about (whether they be >physical objects or ideas) are never "colourless." We are always >leaving something out when we speak of any thing. Our language >is necessarily discrete but our experience is continuous. This seems false on its face. Our physical interaction with reality *is* discrete, not continuous. The fact that it takes place on a smaller scale than we can readily perceive is not particularly relevant. > Of course it is necessary to abstract reality into these >discrete meaning-bundles we use to construct language. However it is >clear that certain experiences cannot be transmitted in this fashion. ^^^^^ (A rhetorical question:) Why do you keep using words such as "clear" when making statements with which I have made it clear I disagree? >My hypothesis is that language games are not sufficiently powerful to >characterize our universe, and therefore they should be viewed with >extreme caution. And my hypothesis is that language is sufficiently powerful. Note I have made no attempt to deny your hypothesis (such hypotheses can in fact never be disproven). The only claim that I have made is that my hypothesis is equally valid. Above you said you were going to explain why this assumption is bad -- I haven't seen this yet. -- David desJardins
hadeishi@husc4.harvard.edu (mitsuharu hadeishi) (10/13/86)
In article<16099@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU> desj@brahms.UUCP (David desJardins): >> David, I get the impression from you that because this question is >>open, you feel free to assume (for the sake of philosophizing) that it >>is true (that the Universe is completely characterizable by Man.) This >>implications of this implicit assumption, however, are vast. > > Suppose this assumption were to have untenable consequences. Then we >could reject the assumption, and thus the question would no longer be open. >So it seems that if you agree that the question is open, then you must agree >that it is valid to assume either of the two possibilities. Yes, of course it is "valid" in a strictly logical sense. However, what I meant by this is that since the question is not settled, it might be desirable to consider what kinds of viewpoints of reality might be generated if we did *not* assume the universe was completely characterizable by Man. Or to put it more weakly, it might be desirable to consider what kinds of viewpoints might be generated if we simply assumed that it was not possible in practice to do so. Entertaining either possibility (the latter I'm sure would be more palatable for you) suggests a whole different class of possible stances toward reality. This is what I mean by "implications"; not logically certain consequences but consequences in terms of the types of theories about reality that you might consider. In this case both "stances" are valuable; when I am doing physics, for example, I implicity assume the plausibility of the first case, when living life, I implicity assume the second, not in a strict sense but simply as a working rule (i.e., not in terms of being able to characterize "in principle" but simply "in practice.") Again, I refer to Feynman and his wonderful discussion of the relationship between the form in which we choose to describe a theory and the extensions or new theories which this form tends to suggest (_The Character of Physical Law_ I believe is the title.) -Mitsu P.S. Since this was the main point of your posting, I thought I'd respond to only this. I do have responses to your other comments, however, which I would be happy to email to you privately.
desj@brahms (David desJardins) (10/15/86)
In article <388@husc6.HARVARD.EDU> hadeishi@husc4.UUCP (mitsuharu hadeishi) writes: > ... it might be desirable to consider what kinds of viewpoints of reality >might be generated if we did *not* assume the universe was completely char- >acterizable by Man. Or ... it might be desirable to consider what kinds >of viewpoints might be generated if we simply assumed that it was [is] not >possible in practice to do so. > ... the latter I'm sure would be more palatable for you. I have this strange feeling that you and perhaps others are continuing to ascribe to me a belief which I have not stated and do not hold. I do not claim, and have never claimed, that the universe is completely character- izable by Man. I merely object to statements made by Gallmeister and others since that the universe is not so characterizable, when they are presented with no evidence but with the implication that, "It is obvious that there must be things that Man will never know." This is *not* obvious, and no one has presented *any* evidence to support it. > ... both "stances" are valuable; when I am doing physics, for example, >I implicity assume the plausibility of the first case Exactly my point. Some degree of this assumption seems necessary to do physics. Perhaps it is enough to believe that the universe is "mostly characterizable" in some peculiar sense, but a physicist, in order to justify his work, must at least believe that there is reason to think that the laws of physics will continue to operate as they have in the past. This is char- acterizability at its most basic level. > ... when living life, I implicity assume the second, not in a strict >sense but simply as a working rule (i.e., not in terms of being able to >characterize "in principle" but simply "in practice.") My question is: In what way is it *valuable* (as you say above) to make this assumption? To me in fact it seems harmful to go through life with no belief in the continued operation of the universe in a manner that you can understand. But even if you hypothesize that the universe is uncharacter- izable only in minor ways, or ones that will not directly affect your day- to-day life, I cannot see how this could possibly be a *valuable* assumption. I guess I can see how it could be a *comfortable* assumption. Most religions are based on some sort of assumption of noncharacterizability in the form of some superhuman force or being, and certainly people have chosen to believe in such things for many millenia. But I do not consider irrational beliefs (or even rational ones) to have *value* simply because they are comfortable. Could you give a concrete example of how belief in noncharacter- izability is of value in life? -- David desJardins >P.S. Since this was the main point of your posting, I thought I'd >respond to only this. I do have responses to your other comments, >however, which I would be happy to email to you privately. Feel free. Try ...!ucbvax!brahms!desj or brahms!desj@ucbvax.berkeley.edu.
hadeishi@husc4.harvard.edu (mitsuharu hadeishi) (10/15/86)
>In article <16@cartan.Berkeley.EDU> desj@brahms (David desJardins) writes: >In article <388@husc6.HARVARD.EDU> hadeishi@husc4.UUCP (mitsuharu hadeishi) writes: >> ... it might be desirable to consider what kinds of viewpoints of reality >>might be generated if we did *not* assume the universe was completely char- >>acterizable by Man. Or ... it might be desirable to consider what kinds >>of viewpoints might be generated if we simply assumed that it was [is] not >>possible in practice to do so. > > I have this strange feeling that you and perhaps others are continuing >to ascribe to me a belief which I have not stated and do not hold. I do >not claim, and have never claimed, that the universe is completely character- >izable by Man. I merely object to statements made by Gallmeister and others >since that the universe is not so characterizable, when they are presented >with no evidence but with the implication that, "It is obvious that there >must be things that Man will never know." This is *not* obvious, and no one >has presented *any* evidence to support it. Granted. >> ... both "stances" are valuable; when I am doing physics, for example, >>I implicity assume the plausibility of the first case > > Exactly my point. Some degree of this assumption seems necessary to do >physics. Perhaps it is enough to believe that the universe is "mostly >characterizable" in some peculiar sense, but a physicist, in order to justify >his work, must at least believe that there is reason to think that the laws >of physics will continue to operate as they have in the past. This is char- >acterizability at its most basic level. Not exactly. Characterizability is not the same as stability. Of course there may well be fundamental laws of the Universe (i.e., a pattern which is unchanging in some sense) but the complete characterization of these laws may simply be beyond the capability of Wo/Man :-). Again, I am speaking here of the practical realizability of the goal. I personally feel that something like this is the case. However, when dealing with very simple systems (atoms, ideal billiard balls, etc.) it *is* possible to characterize behavior to a very high degree of accuracy; however it is well known that the laws which *we* have arrived at are not THE laws of physics but simply provisional patterns which we have managed to deduce. Even if it will be possible to arrive at a complete physical theory (that accounts for ALL experimental and experiential data) we can never be sure this theory will remain complete (Newtonian physics was once thought to be the final physics . . . if only it were, then the task of physics education would be so much simpler!) in the light of new theory. It IS clear, however, that once we begin to study more complex systems (chemistry, biology, psychology, sociology) exact predictive power (characterizability) breaks down very rapidly. It is well known that even in chemistry there are no perfect theories; although you might say that chemistry is "in principle" derivable from the relativistic version of the Schrodinger equation, even this is known to be an approximation as well. In addition, there may be important effects occuring at higher levels of complexity which will also never be possible to characterize in the same way as we can characterize, for example, the orbitals of the hydrogen atom. (This is assuming these effects are not direct consequences of the simpler theories, i.e., they are fundamental effects). Again, irregardless of what is actually the case, the fact remains the characterizability by Man is different from mere lawful behavior. The remarkable fact is that the Universe is as amazingly simple as it is, and that we have been able to make some rather impressive headway in understanding fundamental (and simple) systems. However I must emphasize the same is not the case for more complex systems, and I believe never will be the case. (I.e., to characterize these systems in terms of a simple set of well-defined "laws".) I am not sure if you read my rather long posting which goes into more detail about the value of living life without assuming it is characterizable in the sense of physical theory. If not, I will repeat the argument to you in a later posting. If so, please notify me of this fact. Suffice it to say that living life in this manner is far from "comforting"; it can be quite frightening. However, I believe it leads closer to truth than any other path of which I am aware. -Mitsu