[talk.philosophy.misc] Turing Tests and Chinese Rooms

rathmann@cartan.UUCP (11/27/86)

> Ray Trent

>  1) I've always been somewhat suspicious about the Turing Test. (1/2 :-)
>
>     a) does anyone out there have any good references regarding
>        its shortcomings. :-|

    John Searle's notorious "Chinese Room" argument has probably
    drawn out more discussion on this topic in recent times than
    anything else I can think of. As far as I can tell, there seems
    to be no consensus of opinion on this issue, only a broad spectrum
    of philosophical stances, some of them apparently quite angry
    (Hofstadter, for example). The most complete presentation I have yet
    encountered is in the journal for the Behavioral and Brain Sciences
    1980, with a complete statement of Searle's original argument,
    responses by folks like Fodor, Rorty, McCarthy, Dennett, Hofstadter,
    Eccles, etc, and Searle's counterresponse. 

    People frequently have misconceptions of just what Searle is arguing,
    the most common of these being:

        Machines cannot have minds.

    What Searle really argues is that:

        The relation (mind:brain :: software:hardware) is fallacious.

        Computers cannot have minds solely by virtue of their running the
        correct program.

    His position seems to derive from his thoughts in the philosophy of
    language, and in particular his notion of Intentionality.
    Familiarity with the work of Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, Quine,
    Austin, Putnam, and Kripke would really be helpful if you are
    interested in the motivation behind this concept, but Searle
    maintains that his Chinese room argument makes sense without any of
    that background.

-michael