sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) (03/15/88)
>In article <2885@sfsup.UUCP>, glg@sfsup.UUCP (G.Gleason) writes: > > So, I ask you, what is reality, and who defines it? Reality is the totality of what exists. For an individual person, reality is the totality of what exists for him. Thus different people have different realities, though realities may intersect to form consensual or interpersonal realities. Whether there is an "objective reality" that exists outside of the reality of individuals is an unprovable question and should therefore be ignored. -- "Absolute knowledge means never having to change your mind." Sarge Gerbode Institute for Research in Metapsychology 950 Guinda St. Palo Alto, CA 94301 UUCP: pyramid!thirdi!sarge
jsb@actnyc.UUCP (The Invisible Man) (03/16/88)
In article <343@thirdi.UUCP> sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes: >>In article <2885@sfsup.UUCP>, glg@sfsup.UUCP (G.Gleason) writes: >> >> So, I ask you, what is reality, and who defines it? > >Reality is the totality of what exists. >For an individual person, reality is the totality of what exists for him. Thus >different people have different realities, though realities may intersect >to form consensual or interpersonal realities. Does this mean that someone who thinks he's Napoleon has as 'valid' a reality as I (or you?) or are we assuming some sort of "majority rules" principal? Then again, I'd hate to think that my reality achieves ligitimacy by the same process that selected Reagan for president. But what I think you're really saying is that the validity of everyone else's reality depends on whether it corresponds to yours; i.e the answer to G. Gleason's question is that *you* define reality (though you might qualify that as *your* reality). Or maybe you're saying whatever a person believes is what she believes, which is a tautology which makes it both unfalsifyable and contentless. And, therefore, as you put it below, should be ignored. But the interesting question is why do these realities, which *may* intersect, seem to have so much in common? Or is this merely a feature of *my* reality? >Whether there is an "objective reality" that exists outside of the reality of >individuals is an unprovable question and should therefore be ignored. This is the same kind of "unprovable" as the heavily debated question of what is conciousness as distinguished from its behavioral manifestations. Turing's point was that the question of machine intelegence is only a meaningful question on the behavioral level. >-- >"Absolute knowledge means never having to change your mind." > >Sarge Gerbode -- Absloute knowledge means never having to change your .signature jim (uunet!actnyc!jsb)
gcf@actnyc.UUCP (Gordon Fitch) (03/17/88)
For some of us, reality is paraphrasing Wittgenstein. "Reality -- what a concept!" -- Mork.
sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) (03/20/88)
In article <732@actnyc.UUCP> jsb@actnyc.UUCP (The Invisible Man) writes: >In article <343@thirdi.UUCP> sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes: >>Reality is the totality of what exists. >>For an individual person, reality is the totality of what exists for him. Thus >>different people have different realities, though realities may intersect >>to form consensual or interpersonal realities. >Does this mean that someone who thinks he's Napoleon has as 'valid' a reality >as I (or you?) or are we assuming some sort of "majority rules" principal? I wasn't talking about "validity". I was only pointing out that reality is what exists for a person. I think what we normally think of as "validity" is really "credibility", and it refers to the possibility of getting others to agree, not to a standard of correspondence with some absolute standard. A person with a very credible reality would have an easier time getting agreement from others than one with a less credible reality. A major aspect of credibility is conformity to what others already believe. Another is logical consistency. Another is aesthetics. But I think it is relatively meaningless to speak of the "validity" of a reality. >But what I think you're >really saying is that the validity of everyone else's reality depends on whether >it corresponds to yours; i.e the answer to G. Gleason's question is that *you* >define reality (though you might qualify that as *your* reality). I think people naturally tend to apply, as a first shot, the criterion of whether a presented reality corresponds to theirs, and they tend to reject those that don't. But the saving grace is that if a credible reality is well presented, people can change their minds and have a different reality. But the viewpoint that *my* reality is in some sense an *absolute* reality is a form of ideological imperialism. I think anyone who asserts an absolute reality is being such an imperialist. It is really only *his* reality, but in asserting it as absolute, he is trying to enforce it on others. >Or maybe you're saying whatever a person believes is what she believes, which >is a tautology which makes it both unfalsifyable and contentless. Definitions are always unfalsifiable and contentless (I think). I was just giving a definition of the term, "reality". Naturally, by making the appropriate substitution, you can turn any definition into a tautology. >But the interesting question is why do these realities, which *may* intersect, >seem to have so much in common? Or is this merely a feature of *my* reality? I think it is because *people* have so much in common. There are certain rules that most people follow in organizing their worlds -- such as that of logical consistency, the pleasure principle, trying to create a simplicity and an ease of operation, much as one would try to do in designing the front end of a computer program. So they will tend to agree of things that promote these characteristics in their worlds. Nelson Goodman goes into this notion in his excellent book, "Ways of World-Making". >>Whether there is an "objective reality" that exists outside of the reality of >>individuals is an unprovable question and should therefore be ignored. >This is the same kind of "unprovable" as the heavily debated question of what >is conciousness as distinguished from its behavioral manifestations. Consciousness in oneself does not require proof, since it can be *experienced* and, in fact, is a necessary condition for having any experience at all. Consciousness in others, similar to what we experience, cannot be directly experienced (absent telepathy) and therefore must be proved -- e.,g., by behavioral means. >Turing's point was that the question of machine intelligence is only a >meaningful question on the behavioral level. Certain logical positivists notwithstanding, something can be *meaningful* without being *provable*. I can get an idea of what it would mean for a machine to be intelligent without being able to prove it. -- "Absolute knowledge means never having to change your mind." Sarge Gerbode Institute for Research in Metapsychology 950 Guinda St. Palo Alto, CA 94301 UUCP: pyramid!thirdi!sarge
crown@dukempd.UUCP (Rick Crownover) (03/20/88)
"Reality is what doesn't go away when you stop believing in it." -- Philip K. Dick -- -- Rick Crownover 1-919-684-8279 Duke University Dept. of Physics crown@dukempd.uucp Durham, N.C. 27706 mcnc!duke!dukempd!crown
jsb@actnyc.UUCP (The Invisible Man) (03/21/88)
In article <356@thirdi.UUCP> sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes: ]In article <732@actnyc.UUCP> jsb@actnyc.UUCP (The Invisible Man) writes: ] ]>In article <343@thirdi.UUCP> sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes: ] ]>>Reality is the totality of what exists. ] ]>>For an individual person, reality is the totality of what exists for him. Thus ]>>different people have different realities, though realities may intersect ]>>to form consensual or interpersonal realities. ] ]>Does this mean that someone who thinks he's Napoleon has as 'valid' a reality ]>as I (or you?) or are we assuming some sort of "majority rules" principal? ] ]I wasn't talking about "validity". I was only pointing out that reality is ]what exists for a person. I think what we normally think of as "validity" is ]really "credibility", and it refers to the possibility of getting others to ]agree, not to a standard of correspondence with some absolute standard. A ]person with a very credible reality would have an easier time getting ]agreement from others than one with a less credible reality. A major aspect ]of credibility is conformity to what others already believe. Another is ]logical consistency. Another is aesthetics. But I think it is relatively ]meaningless to speak of the "validity" of a reality. At the risk of sounding like the 'ordinary language' folks, I have to say that this is not the way we use the word "reality". We can talk about someone being out of touch with reality. We don't mean merely that we don't agree with her reality. I can even entertain the idea that I am out of touch with reality. This does not mean that I believe that the "totality of what exists for me" doesn't exist for me. Regardless of what I may like to philosophise about, I believe in my ordinary life (and I suspect so do you) that reality is "out there" and that my senses give me a workable picture of it, sufficient, at least, to cross the street without getting run over. I further believe that others have access to that same "out there" reality. In other words, reality is (at least partially) independant of what "exists for me" and if (ignoring life after death issues) I were to cease to exist, there would still be a "you" (gentle reader) out there in reality. (Not very 'New Age' of me, I know) ] ]I think people naturally tend to apply, as a first shot, the criterion of ]whether a presented reality corresponds to theirs, and they tend to reject ]those that don't. But the saving grace is that if a credible reality is well ]presented, people can change their minds and have a different reality. But the ]viewpoint that *my* reality is in some sense an *absolute* reality is a form of ]ideological imperialism. I think anyone who asserts an absolute reality is ]being such an imperialist. It is really only *his* reality, but in asserting ]it as absolute, he is trying to enforce it on others. Are you asserting this view as "absolutely" true? Does that make you a meta-imperialist? ] ]>Or maybe you're saying whatever a person believes is what she believes, which ]>is a tautology which makes it both unfalsifyable and contentless. ] ]Definitions are always unfalsifiable and contentless (I think). I was just ]giving a definition of the term, "reality". Naturally, by making the ]appropriate substitution, you can turn any definition into a tautology. But your definition does not correspond to the way the word is normally used. ]>But the interesting question is why do these realities, which *may* intersect, ]>seem to have so much in common? Or is this merely a feature of *my* reality? ] ]I think it is because *people* have so much in common. There are certain rules ]that most people follow in organizing their worlds -- such as that of logical ]consistency, the pleasure principle, trying to create a simplicity and an ease ]of operation, much as one would try to do in designing the front end of a ]computer program. So they will tend to agree of things that promote these ]characteristics in their worlds. Nelson Goodman goes into this notion in his ]excellent book, "Ways of World-Making". This begs the question. Why do most people follow the same rules in organizing their world? Do they accidently choose the same rules? Or are these "rules" part of a "reality" they have in common? ] ]>>Whether there is an "objective reality" that exists outside of the reality of ]>>individuals is an unprovable question and should therefore be ignored. ] ]>This is the same kind of "unprovable" as the heavily debated question of what ]>is conciousness as distinguished from its behavioral manifestations. ] ]Consciousness in oneself does not require proof, since it can be *experienced* ]and, in fact, is a necessary condition for having any experience at all. ]Consciousness in others, similar to what we experience, cannot be directly ]experienced (absent telepathy) and therefore must be proved -- e.,g., by ]behavioral means. How would you go about "proving" somebody (or some machine) is concious? ] ]>Turing's point was that the question of machine intelligence is only a ]>meaningful question on the behavioral level. ] ]Certain logical positivists notwithstanding, something can be *meaningful* ]without being *provable*. I can get an idea of what it would mean for a ]machine to be intelligent without being able to prove it. Is this 'idea' verbalizable? Is it a judgement made on the basis of observable evidence? Or is it a feeling, such as we have watching the image of an actor on the screen that this image is concious? ]-- ]"Absolute knowledge means never having to change your mind." ] ]Sarge Gerbode ]Institute for Research in Metapsychology ]950 Guinda St. ]Palo Alto, CA 94301 ]UUCP: pyramid!thirdi!sarge "Absolute knowledge means never having to change your .signature" -- The check is in the e-mail jim (uunet!actnyc!jsb)
bwk@mitre-bedford.ARPA (Barry W. Kort) (03/21/88)
Psychologists like to speak of "psychic reality". If the brain/mind/psyche (choose one) constructs an internal model, map, or representation of the external environment, then we must be clear on the distinction between the map and the territory. My internal map or model of the world is undergoing continual evolvement and refinement. I know that at every instant, my mental model of the world is incomplete and innacurate. It is like a mosaic, which has a granularity which limits the precision to which I can resolve detail. It also has a frontier beyond which I have as yet few pieces of the picture. My map is real. But my map is not the territory. I believe my map, to the extent that I rely on it to navigate through the world. But I also disbelieve my map, to the extent that I expect to find errors and inaccuracies that cause me to walk into walls now and then. I find that I am attracted to people who seem to have more accurate maps than me. I also find that I am attracted to people who have less accurate maps than me, provided they wish to benefit from consultation with my map. I find that I am repelled by people who wish to overwrite my map with their own, without my consent. Of course, one of the most interesting (to me) corners of my map, is the little piece that contains a model of the mapmaker himself. I like to watch the mapmaker at work, making a map of the mapmaker at work.... --Barry Kort
sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) (03/22/88)
In article <27440@linus.UUCP> bwk@mbunix (Kort) writes: >My map is real. But my map is not the territory. I believe my map, to >the extent that I rely on it to navigate through the world. But I also >disbelieve my map, to the extent that I expect to find errors and >inaccuracies that cause me to walk into walls now and then. Very enjoyable article. A lot of people forget that the map is just as real as the territory. In my view, the map may be *more* real than the territory, in that the territory (new territory) is constantly being *inferred* from the existing map, thus adding to the existing map and resulting in a revised map. Many people have pointed out that the only time when we are acutely aware that the map is not the territory is when existing maps break down and need to be replaced. To paraphrase Nelson Goodman: worlds are made out of existing worlds. So the existing map is epistemologically *prior* to any future territory that will be experienced by inference from an existing map. It also seems possible that there is no territory -- only a gradually evolving map. -- "Absolute knowledge means never having to change your mind." Sarge Gerbode Institute for Research in Metapsychology 950 Guinda St. Palo Alto, CA 94301 UUCP: pyramid!thirdi!sarge
gf@dasys1.UUCP (G Fitch) (03/23/88)
Once upon a time there were five blind men who encountered an elephant and Sarge Gerbode. The first grasped the elephant's trunk. "Aha!" he said, "the elephant is like a snake!" The second grasped the elephant's leg. "No!" he said, "the elephant is like a tree!" The third felt the elephant's side. "Not at all," he said, "the elephant is like a wall!" The fourth felt the elephant's tail. "You're all wrong," he said, "the elephant is like a rope!" The fifth blind man said, "I think, if we perform further experiments, and reason about the results, we can construct a fairly good idea about what an elephant is. It may be that we can even put this elephant to good use." "No," said Sarge Gerbode. "There is no objective reality. And there is no elephant." And he got on the elephant and rode away into the sunset. -- G Fitch {uunet}!mstan\ The Big Electric Cat {ihnp4,harvard,philabs}!cmcl2!cucard!dasys1!gf New York City, NY, USA (212) 879-9031 {sun}!hoptoad/
vu0112@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu (Cliff Joslyn) (03/23/88)
In article <363@thirdi.UUCP> sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes: >In article <27440@linus.UUCP> bwk@mbunix (Kort) writes: > >>My map is real. But my map is not the territory. I believe my map, to >>the extent that I rely on it to navigate through the world. But I also >>disbelieve my map, to the extent that I expect to find errors and >>inaccuracies that cause me to walk into walls now and then. > >In my view, the map may be *more* real than the territory, in that the >territory (new territory) is constantly being *inferred* from the existing >map, thus adding to the existing map and resulting in a revised map. I agree with something Sarge said in an earlier posting: that fundamental questions on the existence of objective reality are non testable. Thus, on an absolutist view we must admit that skepticism is possibly true (infinitesimally likely?). I haven't read much in this area per se, but neither have I come accross a really knock-out argument against skepticism. So reality of the territory is undecidable. What about reality of the map? Sarge, I think you'd claim that an individual's truth claims about their mental phenomena are incorrigible. When I was reading in Cognitive Science I did come accross some pretty heavy arguments against this view. So, what if reality of the map is *also* undecidable? Well, then, uh, I guess. . .gosh, I'd better be pretty careful going to work today. . .never know when I met run into a reality pit and spit out a white hole. O----------------------------------------------------------------------> | Cliff Joslyn, Professional Cybernetician | Systems Science Department, SUNY Binghamton, New York, but my opinions | vu0112@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu V All the world is biscuit shaped. . .
jsb@actnyc.UUCP (The Invisible Man) (03/23/88)
In article <363@thirdi.UUCP> sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes: )In article <27440@linus.UUCP> bwk@mbunix (Kort) writes: ) )>My map is real. But my map is not the territory. I believe my map, to )>the extent that I rely on it to navigate through the world. But I also )>disbelieve my map, to the extent that I expect to find errors and )>inaccuracies that cause me to walk into walls now and then. ) )Very enjoyable article. A lot of people forget that the map is just as real as )the territory. I agree that the article was enjoyable. But the map is only real as 'map territory', mapable as meta-map. Will some Zen master please hit Sarge with a stick? ) )In my view, the map may be *more* real than the territory, in that the )territory (new territory) is constantly being *inferred* from the existing )map, thus adding to the existing map and resulting in a revised map. Many )people have pointed out that the only time when we are acutely aware that the )map is not the territory is when existing maps break down and need to be )replaced. To paraphrase Nelson Goodman: worlds are made out of existing )worlds. So the existing map is epistemologically *prior* to any future )territory that will be experienced by inference from an existing map. ) )It also seems possible that there is no territory -- only a gradually evolving )map. New territory cannot really be *inferred* from a map any more than the existance of New Jersey is implicit in the existance of Staten Island. You can debug a program for syntax errors but without specifications for what the program is suppose to do, you cannot debug it logically. 1 man's bug is another man's feature. Of course, a map is also territory in its own right just as programs can be data for other programs. The fact that we are often unaware that the map is not the territory until it breaks down is because we spend a great deal of time in our heads. And for most practical purposes it is more convenient to deal with an abstraction then the thing abstracted but, in my view, (and while were at it, please preface all of my sentences with the phrase "in my view") it is to the extent that we deal with maps that we cannot be destinguished from a suitibly programmed Turing machine (in principal since AI is not that far advanced yet) and conversely in so far as we do not use maps to mediate with reality (uh oh, it's "reality" again) we cannot be simulated electronically. Since, short of hitting with a stick, one cannot communicate without resorting to maps (The Tao that can be named is not the Tao-- you know the routine) I doubt I am making this sufficiently clear except to those who know what I'm saying already. There was a TV show on tonight about the mathematician Ramanujan in which he was quoted as saying that he got his formula from a Hindu goddess (whose name I don't remember but it would really class up this posting). Clearly this is not the kind of map most of us have for where our ideas come from, but for me it has a lot to recommend it: First of all, it says ideas come from something alive. That we prefer to think of the mind as something dead (i.e. mechanical) is (in my view) limiting and ultimately, if I may get Freudean for a moment, a defense. Secondly, it recognizes a non-rational source to creativity; that it is not the result of some fancy search tree pruning algorithm tied to a random number generator. (This also has bearing on the paradox of how free will can arise from determinism. For some other posting...) I also think one has a tendancy to try to understand (i.e. map) too quickly (just as one easily forgets ones dreams on awakening) until one believes the map existed before the mapped. )-- )"Absolute knowledge means never having to change your mind." ) )Sarge Gerbode "Absolute knowledge means you have nothing to learn" -- The check is in the e-mail jim (uunet!actnyc!jsb)
sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) (03/23/88)
In article <984@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu> vu0112@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu (Cliff Joslyn) writes: >So reality of the territory is undecidable. What about reality of the >map? Sarge, I think you'd claim that an individual's truth claims about >their mental phenomena are incorrigible. When I was reading in >Cognitive Science I did come accross some pretty heavy arguments against >this view. >So, what if reality of the map is *also* undecidable? Well, then, uh, I >guess. . .gosh, I'd better be pretty careful going to work today. . >.never know when I met run into a reality pit and spit out a white hole. If reality of the map is undecidable, then, as you imply, we are really f**ked. We can't go on living with that assumption, so, in practice, it's unmakable. And I don't think anyone would really agree that they couldn't have a *representation* of reality, at least. -- "Absolute knowledge means never having to change your mind." Sarge Gerbode Institute for Research in Metapsychology 950 Guinda St. Palo Alto, CA 94301 UUCP: pyramid!thirdi!sarge
sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) (03/24/88)
In article <741@actnyc.UUCP> jsb@actnyc.UUCP (The Invisible Man) writes: >In article <356@thirdi.UUCP> sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes: >]I was only pointing out that reality is >]what exists for a person. I think what we normally think of as "validity" is >]really "credibility", and it refers to the possibility of getting others to >]agree, not to a standard of correspondence with some absolute standard. A >]person with a very credible reality would have an easier time getting >]agreement from others than one with a less credible reality. A major aspect >]of credibility is conformity to what others already believe. Another is >]logical consistency. Another is aesthetics. But I think it is relatively >]meaningless to speak of the "validity" of a reality. >At the risk of sounding like the 'ordinary language' folks, I have to say that >this is not the way we use the word "reality". We can talk about someone being >out of touch with reality. We don't mean merely that we don't agree with her >reality. Whether we *mean* that or not depends on what our definition of "reality" is. But, empirically, I would say when we say that someone else is out of touch with reality, we do in fact disagree with that other person. And if we were to say that we were ourselves out of touch with reality, that would betoken a loss of confidence in what we believe and an inner conflict. Can you think of a counter-example? >I believe in my ordinary life (and I suspect so do you) that reality is "out >there" and that my senses give me a workable picture of it, sufficient, at >least, to cross the street without getting run over. Sure: *anyone's* reality is perceived as being "out there", in that it is perceived, conceived, and known to be outside the person. >I further believe that >others have access to that same "out there" reality. In other words, reality >is (at least partially) independant of what "exists for me" and if (ignoring >life after death issues) I were to cease to exist, there would still be a "you" >(gentle reader) out there in reality. (Not very 'New Age' of me, I know) Well, this isn't talk.religion.newage, so you're safe! Well, I certainly prefer your view to the solipsistic one I sometimes run across. My translation of the above is to say that there is considerable *agreement* amongst people and that that agreement will exist even when I am no longer around. >]I think anyone who asserts an absolute reality is being [an ideological] >]imperialist. It is really only *his* reality, but in asserting >]it as absolute, he is trying to enforce it on others. >Are you asserting this view as "absolutely" true? Does that make you a >meta-imperialist? Interesting point. Is there no escape from imperialism? Well, I prefer to think that I am *offering* this reality to others as a useful one with a great deal of credibility, one that will enhance their world-view if accepted. So it's more of a sales job than an enforcement. It's not the *presentation* of a reality that I object to. It's the enforcement of one reality and the invalidation of others that I object to. It's like the difference between conquest and acculturation. >But your definition does not correspond to the way the word is normally used. True, but I am offering a different conceptualization that will fit most of the instances where the word "reality" is used, one that I think has some useful consequences. >]I think [realities seem to have so much in common] because *people* have so >]much in common. There are certain rules >]that most people follow in organizing their worlds -- such as that of logical >]consistency, the pleasure principle, trying to create a simplicity and an ease >]of operation, much as one would try to do in designing the front end of a >]computer program. So they will tend to agree on things that promote these >]characteristics in their worlds. >This begs the question. Why do most people follow the same rules in organizing >their world? Do they accidently choose the same rules? Or are these "rules" >part of a "reality" they have in common? Interesting question. I don't know. All I know is that we seem to follow those rules. The rules don't, of course, mandate the *particular* realities people experience, only various characteristics of those realities. Completely different systems, for instance, may be logically consistent internally but quite different from each other. My point is really a skeptical one: there *might* be some external reality that we share, but all each of us really knows is the reality *he* has and, to some extent, how it has been derived from prior realities. Maybe the commonalities we experience are due to the presence of some external reality that is not knowable directly, or maybe the commonalities have to do with some higher unity of consciousness. Maybe, as Sagan speculated in "Contact", God is trying to communicate to us through what we perceive as the physical universe and the discovery of truth concerning the physical universe amounts to a correct interpretation of what God meant. All these are fun as speculations. But it is best to start from what we are certain of: the existence of our own worlds and the principles by which they are ordered. >]Consciousness in oneself does not require proof, since it can be *experienced* >]and, in fact, is a necessary condition for having any experience at all. >]Consciousness in others, similar to what we experience, cannot be directly >]experienced (absent telepathy) and therefore must be proved -- e.,g., by >]behavioral means. >How would you go about "proving" somebody (or some machine) is concious? I don't think it can be proved with certainty. I think we can only infer from similarities (either of form or behavior) the probable presence of other consciousnesses. There has been a big controversy raging about Turing machines in talk.philosophy.misc on this point. >]Certain logical positivists notwithstanding, something can be *meaningful* >]without being *provable*. I can get an idea of what it would mean for a >]machine to be intelligent without being able to prove it. >Is this 'idea' verbalizable? Is it a judgement made on the basis of observable >evidence? Or is it a feeling, such as we have watching the image of an actor on >the screen that this image is concious? Maybe it's verbalizable, though it's difficult. It has something to do with having a viewpoint and having intention. If a machine had a viewpoint and had intention, the same way I have a viewpoint and have intention, I would say it's intelligent (or, rather, conscious). I don't happen to think a machine *could* have these qualities, but if it did, it would be conscious. I wouldn't say an idea is a feeling, though ideas are commonly *accompanied* by feelings. A feeling is a phenomenon, an internal or external perception. Also, an idea is not a judgment. An idea is something that can be *judged*, as to its truth or falsity. In itself, it is not an assertion, so it can't be "proven". It simply exists, as a possibility. -- "Absolute knowledge means never having to change your mind." Sarge Gerbode Institute for Research in Metapsychology 950 Guinda St. Palo Alto, CA 94301 UUCP: pyramid!thirdi!sarge
sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) (03/24/88)
In article <3503@dasys1.UUCP> gf@dasys1.UUCP (G Fitch) writes: >Once upon a time there were five blind men who encountered >an elephant and Sarge Gerbode. > >The first grasped the elephant's trunk. "Aha!" he said, "the >elephant is like a snake!" > >The second grasped the elephant's leg. "No!" he said, "the >elephant is like a tree!" > >The third felt the elephant's side. "Not at all," he said, >"the elephant is like a wall!" > >The fourth felt the elephant's tail. "You're all wrong," he >said, "the elephant is like a rope!" > >The fifth blind man said, "I think, if we perform further >experiments, and reason about the results, we can construct >a fairly good idea about what an elephant is. It may be >that we can even put this elephant to good use." > >"No," said Sarge Gerbode. "There is no objective reality. >And there is no elephant." And he got on the elephant and >rode away into the sunset. Wonderful! I'm going to be hard-pressed to find a quality comeback to this one! Actually, what I would say is: "Perhaps if we pooled our experiences and ironed out our differences, and if we applied the rules of logic and other rules by which we all organize our respective worlds, we could come to an agreement about what the nature of an elephant is." And we all got on the elephant that we had agreed on and rode off into the sunset. -- "Absolute knowledge means never having to change your mind." Sarge Gerbode Institute for Research in Metapsychology 950 Guinda St. Palo Alto, CA 94301 UUCP: pyramid!thirdi!sarge
sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) (03/25/88)
In article <746@actnyc.UUCP> jsb@actnyc.UUCP (The Invisible Man) writes: >[T]he map is only real as 'map territory', mapable as meta-map. Will some >Zen master please hit Sarge with a stick? Please don't! I hate violence, even from a Zen master. Besides, I *agree* that the map is only real as map territory. I can't conceive its being real as anything else. So you don't have to hit me. Pleeeze! >New territory cannot really be *inferred* from a map any more than the >existence of New Jersey is implicit in the existence of Staten Island. I don't really understand this point. We make models of the universe all the time and predict hitherto unobserved phenomena from them by extrapolation. That is a principal means of discovery. And can we ever know the territory directly? I think not. As has been pointed out ad nauseum, all our sensory data comes to us pre-filtered and per-interpreted. So all we have, each of us, is his own map. Certainly, as you imply, we have different levels of maps -- maps of maps. And for each higher-level map, the territory is a lower-level map. But do we ever reach a level so low that we have reached a territory that is not a map? I don't think so. -- "The map may not be the territory, but it's all we've got." Sarge Gerbode Institute for Research in Metapsychology 950 Guinda St. Palo Alto, CA 94301 UUCP: pyramid!thirdi!sarge
gf@dasys1.UUCP (G Fitch) (03/25/88)
In article <363@thirdi.UUCP> sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes: } }It also seems possible that there is no territory -- only a gradually evolving }map. }-- But a map is a map -- which means it's a map of something, if only a bigger map. (It could be a map of itself, but that would be too boring, except to Douglas Hofstadter.) -- G Fitch {uunet}!mstan\ The Big Electric Cat {ihnp4,harvard,philabs}!cmcl2!cucard!dasys1!gf New York City, NY, USA (212) 879-9031 {sun}!hoptoad/
jsb@actnyc.UUCP (The Invisible Man) (03/26/88)
In article <368@thirdi.UUCP> sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes:
)
)But, empirically, I would say when we say that someone else is out of touch
)with reality, we do in fact disagree with that other person. And if we were to
)say that we were ourselves out of touch with reality, that would betoken a loss
)of confidence in what we believe and an inner conflict. Can you think of
)a counter-example?
Yes. I disagree with your "mapping" of reality but I don't think you are out of
touch with reality.
)Sure: *anyone's* reality is perceived as being "out there", in that it is
)perceived, conceived, and known to be outside the person.
It looks like you are making a stronger statement here than the one you wish to
avoid. You say that the question of whether there is an external reality is
"meaningless" regardless of how we perceive it to be, yet you don't hesitate to
speculate on what goes on in the perceptions of others which we cannot directly
perceive.
me:
)>But your definition does not correspond to the way the word is normally used.
)
)True, but I am offering a different conceptualization that will fit most of the
)instances where the word "reality" is used, one that I think has some useful
)consequences.
And what meta-map can tell me how to choose between the ordinary and new map of
reality? As for myself, I kinda like the old "out-there" reality since it is
more intuitive. What's more, I'm willing to bet that you act in the world as if
there were an objective reality despite your claim of meaninglessness.
me:
)>This begs the question. Why do most people follow the same rules in organizing
)>their world? Do they accidently choose the same rules? Or are these "rules"
)>part of a "reality" they have in common?
)
)Interesting question. I don't know. All I know is that we seem to follow those
)rules. The rules don't, of course, mandate the *particular* realities people
)experience, only various characteristics of those realities. Completely
)different systems, for instance, may be logically consistent internally but
)quite different from each other.
)
)My point is really a skeptical one: there *might* be some external reality
But you seem to be very selectively skeptical. You end up assuming things
more improbable. Take the following for example:
me:
)>How would you go about "proving" somebody (or some machine) is concious?
)
)I don't think it can be proved with certainty. I think we can only infer from
)similarities (either of form or behavior) the probable presence of other
)consciousnesses. There has been a big controversy raging about Turing
)machines in talk.philosophy.misc on this point.
) ... It has something to do with
)having a viewpoint and having intention. If a machine had a viewpoint and had
)intention, the same way I have a viewpoint and have intention, I would say it's
)intelligent (or, rather, conscious). I don't happen to think a machine *could*
)have these qualities, but if it did, it would be conscious.
Does a chess playing program have the intention of winning? Somehow I think
your "requisites" for conciousness are harder to pin down than conciousness
itself.
)"Absolute knowledge means never having to change your mind."
You could always change your mind just for the fun of it...
)Sarge Gerbode
--
Being an AI program means never having to say you're sorry.
jim (uunet!actnyc!jsb)
sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) (03/26/88)
In article <3558@dasys1.UUCP> gf@dasys1.UUCP (G Fitch) writes: >[A] map is a map -- which means it's a map of something, if only >a bigger map. (It could be a map of itself, but that would be too >boring, except to Douglas Hofstadter.) Maybe it's an infinite series of maps of maps, or maybe at the bottom level, it not a map but something one has created. After all, we can also create things that are not maps, like mental pictures, then map them. -- "The map may not be the territory, but it's all we've got." Sarge Gerbode Institute for Research in Metapsychology 950 Guinda St. Palo Alto, CA 94301 UUCP: pyramid!thirdi!sarge
dan@lclark.UUCP (Dan Revel) (03/26/88)
In article <746@actnyc.UUCP> jsb@actnyc.UUCP (The Invisible Man) writes: >I ... think one has a tendancy to try to understand (i.e. map) too quickly >(just as one easily forgets ones dreams on awakening) until one believes the >map existed before the mapped. I agree: The trick is to appropriate the map, as a map. Many maps are inherited, learned and followed by rote without the understanding that they are 1) provisional and 2) tools ( not rules, I know it rhymes, but I mean it ). In retrospect maps that other people have used and left behind provide an interesting view into the world in which they lived. In the same way our maps reflect our daily concerns, whether we are aware of those concerns or not. (A road map not only lets one find one's way around but it also implies some interest in doing so, the location of a freeway means somewhat less if you don't have a car.) >"Absolute knowledge means you have nothing to learn" "Absolute knowledge means dasein ;^)"
edk@gryphon.CTS.COM (Ed Kaulakis) (03/27/88)
In article <356@thirdi.UUCP>, sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes: > Consciousness in others, similar to what we experience, cannot be directly > experienced (absent telepathy) and therefore must be proved -- e.,g., by > behavioral means. This is true of skeptical discourse. What does it say about reality?
vu0112@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu (Cliff Joslyn) (03/27/88)
In article <373@thirdi.UUCP> sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes: >...maybe at the bottom level, it >not a map but something one has created. At the bottom level, our maps, our minds, our selves, everything that is and allows us to even talk about maps, is our bodies. It is *impossible* for me to visually perceive the world in a way inconsistent with my retina, optic nerves, optical ganglia, and visual cortex. I *cannot* *perceive* the world of X-rays, or of ultra-sonics, or of micro-scopics, or of quantum tunneling, or a myriad of other modes of existence of the world (i.e. "reality"). So what, these things don't exist? There *are* more things in heaven and earth. . . O----------------------------------------------------------------------> | Cliff Joslyn, Professional Cybernetician | Systems Science Department, SUNY Binghamton, New York, but my opinions | vu0112@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu V All the world is biscuit shaped. . .
jsb@actnyc.UUCP (The Invisible Man) (03/27/88)
In article <371@thirdi.UUCP> sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes: )In article <746@actnyc.UUCP> jsb@actnyc.UUCP (The Invisible Man) writes: ) )>[T]he map is only real as 'map territory', mapable as meta-map. Will some )>Zen master please hit Sarge with a stick? ) )Please don't! I hate violence, even from a Zen master. Besides, I *agree* that )the map is only real as map territory. I can't conceive its being real as )anything else. So you don't have to hit me. Pleeeze! Well, I hope I don't have to. But map this: If I did you would experience something directly. (if not I'd do it again till you did :-) Now you may argue that it isn't *really* directly since there's all this intervening nervous system and the like but I would reply that you had it all backwards. Perception, as an interpretation of how we relate to the world, is just an after the fact mapping; an organization of our direct experience (which in this case paradoxically defines it as indirect). You say that maps are all we've got. But to paraphrase Buckaroo Bonzai, what ever we've got..., thats what we've got. Arguments that there is more than *that* are just mis-mappings. You can't argue with tautologies! )>New territory cannot really be *inferred* from a map any more than the )>existence of New Jersey is implicit in the existence of Staten Island. ) )I don't really understand this point. We make models of the universe all the )time and predict hitherto unobserved phenomena from them by extrapolation. )That is a principal means of discovery. Yes, but the prediction doesn't make it true. It just tells you where to look. )And can we ever know the territory directly? I think not. As has been )pointed out ad nauseum, all our sensory data comes to us pre-filtered and )per-interpreted. So all we have, each of us, is his own map. Certainly, as )you imply, we have different levels of maps -- maps of maps. And for each )higher-level map, the territory is a lower-level map. But do we ever reach a )level so low that we have reached a territory that is not a map? I don't )think so. Where's my stick? And by the way, that obnoxious fellow in "newage" who responded to you has a point. Don't dismiss him out of hand. )-- )"The map may not be the territory, but it's all we've got." ) )Sarge Gerbode -- 286,000 miles per second. It's not just a good idea, it's the law! jim (uunet!actnyc!jsb)
glg@sfsup.UUCP (G.Gleason) (03/27/88)
In article <371@thirdi.UUCP> sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes: >In article <746@actnyc.UUCP> jsb@actnyc.UUCP (The Invisible Man) writes: >>[T]he map is only real as 'map territory', mapable as meta-map. Will some >>Zen master please hit Sarge with a stick? Is this possible over the net? >Please don't! I hate violence, even from a Zen master. Besides, I *agree* that >the map is only real as map territory. I can't conceive its being real as >anything else. So you don't have to hit me. Pleeeze! Yes, but perhaps the reward is enlightenment, would that make it worth- while? Try not to turn everything into concepts, it makes it difficult to taste and feel the world. >>New territory cannot really be *inferred* from a map any more than the >>existence of New Jersey is implicit in the existence of Staten Island. >I don't really understand this point. We make models of the universe all the >time and predict hitherto unobserved phenomena from them by extrapolation. >That is a principal means of discovery. I would spend some more time looking at what he said, and why your posting prompted him to say it. Sure, we try to predict what will happen, or what we will discover sometimes, but are rarely very successful. The more succussful way of being-in-the-world is not predicting, but spontaneous. With a clear mind we confront new situations ready to flow with events. Learning shows up in our ability to interpret events, and synthesize actions in respnse. When learning is complete, action is spontaneous, and we are not even conscious of what is happening. No contemplation, no prediction, just action. Gerry Gleason
vu0112@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu (Cliff Joslyn) (03/28/88)
In article <2960@sfsup.UUCP> glg@/guest4/glgUUCP (xt1112-G.Gleason) writes: >In article <371@thirdi.UUCP> sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes: >>>New territory cannot really be *inferred* from a map any more than the >>>existence of New Jersey is implicit in the existence of Staten Island. > >>I don't really understand this point. We make models of the universe all the >>time and predict hitherto unobserved phenomena from them by extrapolation. >>That is a principal means of discovery. > >Sure, we try to predict what will happen, or what we will discover >sometimes, but are rarely very successful. Um, I really have to agree w/Sarge here. To my mind, the primary (only?) use of information (i.e. knowledge, "maps") is in terms of prediction. This is true at a vast number of levels. When the dog learns to salivate at the bell, it is acquiring information (augmenting its map) with which it predicts the future: when it hears a bell, it predicts food. When I have a good theory, it is informative in that I can use it to make predictions about experiments in the future. The cell is full of information (genetic "maps") about the state of the world, etc. When certain conditions happen, it produces an enzyme, "predicting" that that enzyme will be useful. At a common sense level, when I walk into a dark room that I know very well, I use my knowledge (literally a visual image, map) to predict the location of furniture and avoid obstacles. On the contrary to Gerry, these kinds of predictions are overwhelmingly common and succesful. It's just the exceptions that stand out that make it appear otherwise. >The more succussful way of >being-in-the-world is not predicting, but spontaneous. With a clear >mind we confront new situations ready to flow with events. Learning >shows up in our ability to interpret events, and synthesize actions >in respnse. When learning is complete, action is spontaneous, and >we are not even conscious of what is happening. I agree to the extent that you limit information and prediction to conscious events. My examples above show otherwise. There is a complex interaction between the conscious and the unconsciuos, and sometimes conscious knowledge and decision making are necessary. To advocate not using conscious prediction and decision, but rather a kind of non-thinking going-with-the-flow, can be a prescription for disaster. That is in fact the world situation now: not predicting global warming, not predicting global debt, not predicting population growth. Skill is nothing without wisdom, and vice versa. >Gerry Gleason O----------------------------------------------------------------------> | Cliff Joslyn, Professional Cybernetician | Systems Science Department, SUNY Binghamton, New York | vu0112@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu V All the world is biscuit shaped. . .
laura@hoptoad.uucp (Laura Creighton) (03/29/88)
In article <369@thirdi.UUCP> sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes: >I'm going to be hard-pressed to find a quality comeback to this one! > >Actually, what I would say is: > >"Perhaps if we pooled our experiences and ironed out our differences, and if >we applied the rules of logic and other rules by which we all organize our >respective worlds, we could come to an agreement about what the nature of an >elephant is." > >And we all got on the elephant that we had agreed on and rode off into the >sunset. I don't think so. That ``ironing out the differences'' stuff is going to be difficult. Methink that the elephant will die of old age. Will that be an objectively dead elephant? or only a subjectively dead one? Laura -- The universe is expanding, but I still can't find a parking space. Laura Creighton uunet!hoptoad!laura utzoo!hoptoad!laura sun!hoptoad!laura toad@toad.com
bwk@mitre-bedford.ARPA (Barry W. Kort) (03/29/88)
In article <4268@hoptoad.uucp> laura@hoptoad.UUCP (Laura Creighton) (Hi Laura!) writes: >The universe is expanding, but I still can't find a parking space. Gee, couldn't we just let Sarge & Company ride the elephant around the block? --Barry Kort
sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) (03/30/88)
In article <3011@gryphon.CTS.COM> edk@gryphon.CTS.COM (Ed Kaulakis) writes: >In article <356@thirdi.UUCP>, sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes: >> Consciousness in others, similar to what we experience, cannot be directly >> experienced (absent telepathy) and therefore must be proved -- e.,g., by >> behavioral means. > > This is true of skeptical discourse. What does it say about reality? That just shows what happens when one gets careless in one's mode of expression. Sorry for the misunderstanding. I did not mean that we needed to prove the existence of others in order to live life. I just meant that if we *did* want to prove it (for some bizarre reason), we would have to use behavioral criteria. One could raise the point, favorite amongst psychodynamic psychologists, that as infants we had to go through a stage of proving this to ourselves, but it's hard to say how this, in itself, could be proved. -- "The map may not be the territory, but it's all we've got." Sarge Gerbode Institute for Research in Metapsychology 950 Guinda St. Palo Alto, CA 94301 UUCP: pyramid!thirdi!sarge
sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) (03/30/88)
In article <4268@hoptoad.uucp> laura@hoptoad.UUCP (Laura Creighton) writes: >In article <369@thirdi.UUCP> sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes: >>"Perhaps if we pooled our experiences and ironed out our differences, and if >>we applied the rules of logic and other rules by which we all organize our >>respective worlds, we could come to an agreement about what the nature of an >>elephant is." >I don't think so. That ``ironing out the differences'' stuff is >going to be difficult. Methink that the elephant will die of old age. >Will that be an objectively dead elephant? or only a subjectively >dead one? As they say, "I never promised you a rose garden." Sure, it's hard to reach agreements. But by the evolution of scientific method, we have made great inroads into the process. The process of ironing out the differences is what I call science, demonstration, and rational discourse. -- "The map may not be the territory, but it's all we've got." Sarge Gerbode Institute for Research in Metapsychology 950 Guinda St. Palo Alto, CA 94301 UUCP: pyramid!thirdi!sarge
sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) (03/30/88)
In article <751@actnyc.UUCP> jsb@actnyc.UUCP (The Invisible Man) writes: >In article <368@thirdi.UUCP> sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes: >)I would say when we say that someone else is out of touch >)with reality, we do in fact disagree with that other person. >I disagree with your "mapping" of reality but I don't think you are out of >touch with reality. If you were in substantial disagreement with a large part of my reality mapping, for instance, if I thought that worldly events were influenced by invisible men from the dark side of the moon, wouldn't you think I was out of touch with reality? At points this side of such an extreme, how far you think I am out of touch with reality would, I submit, depend on the degree and scope of our disagreement. I bet you think I'm at least a *little* out of reality as things stand. Otherwise, why do you keep invoking that horrible Zen Master with his big stick to knock reality into my head? >)Sure: *anyone's* reality is perceived as being "out there", in that it is >)perceived, conceived, and known to be outside the person. >It looks like you are making a stronger statement here than the one you wish to >avoid. You say that the question of whether there is an external reality is >"meaningless" regardless of how we perceive it to be, yet you don't hesitate to >speculate on what goes on in the perceptions of others which we cannot directly >perceive. I obviously did not make myself clear. Sorry. What I said was that the concept of a *valid* reality was meaningless; that the correct term was "credible". And it may indeed be meaningless to speak of a "valid" reality, as though only one reality were valid. But I did not mean to say that reality is not experienced as external to a person. Of course it is. There is another confusion in the word "external", which could mean "independent of any particular viewpoint" or, simply, "outside". I mean it in the latter sense. I have my own views on what others perceive, based on what they have told me and what I have observed in their behavior. However, I do not claim any direct access to their experience. It *is* part of my reality that others experience things in a certain way. Others may disagree with this reality; my own views lead me to the conclusion that, upon sober reflection and full undrstanding of terms, they will not. I could be wrong about this, but I don't think I am. >And what meta-map can tell me how to choose between the ordinary and new map of >reality? As for myself, I kinda like the old "out-there" reality since it is >more intuitive. What's more, I'm willing to bet that you act in the world as if >there were an objective reality despite your claim of meaninglessness. As I said, I also have an "out-there" reality. But I don't expect that what is "out there" for others will be just the same as what is "out there" for me. What others believe with certainty is what is real for them. For some (perhaps you), that is an external reality that exists independent of individual viewpoints. I respect that reality as one that exists for them. It is just as real for them as my reality is for me. However, it is not my reality. >) ... It has something to do with >)having a viewpoint and having intention. If a machine had a viewpoint and had >)intention, the same way I have a viewpoint and have intention, I would say it's >)intelligent (or, rather, conscious). I don't happen to think a machine *could* >)have these qualities, but if it did, it would be conscious. >Does a chess playing program have the intention of winning? Somehow I think >your "requisites" for conciousness are harder to pin down than conciousness >itself. I don't think my requisites for consciousness are complex or hard to pin down. They are easily definable by ostension. If you have an idea of what it is to intend something and what it is to be aware, then you will know what I mean. In other words, you know when *you* intend something and when you are aware of something. Knowledge of these things is very direct and very primitive for a conscious being. If you *don't know what it is to intend and to be aware, then I will begin to suspect you of being a very clever program of some kind. So, in a way I am being selectively skeptical. What I chose to be least skeptical about are things like: 1. My own existence. 2. As a center of consciousness and intention. 3. The existence of an apparent world around me. 4. This world being composed of facts, phenomena, and concepts. 5. The specific experience of the world that I have, as an experience. I am much more skeptical about things inferred from the above, such as complex, unprovable neurological theories about where consciousness comes from and reductionist assumptions about the physicality of everything. -- "The map may not be the territory, but it's all we've got." Sarge Gerbode Institute for Research in Metapsychology 950 Guinda St. Palo Alto, CA 94301 UUCP: pyramid!thirdi!sarge
sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) (03/30/88)
In article <755@actnyc.UUCP> jsb@actnyc.UUCP (The Invisible Man) writes: >Well, I hope I don't have to [beat you with a stick]. But map this: If I did >you would experience something directly. Everything I experience, I experience directly. But that doesn't mean that a great deal of interpretation isn't interwoven into the experience. If you beat me with a stick, I would have all sorts of interpretations of the experience that would give a particular coloration to the pain, say a particular feeling of humiliation, or -- perhaps as you might wish -- an element of satori! >nervous system and the like but I would reply that you had it all backwards. >Perception, as an interpretation of how we relate to the world, is just an >after the fact mapping; an organization of our direct experience (which in >this case paradoxically defines it as indirect). I think we may have a terminological problem, here. You seem to differentiate between "perception" and "direct experience". I think I know what is manet by perception, and perception does, indeed, contain a strong admixture of interpretation, as has been amply proved. But I'm not sure what would qualify as "direct experience"? Some form of intuition that is direct contact with reality, as some have claimed? I don't get the sense that that is what you mean. >[To] paraphrase Buckaroo Bonzai, what ever we've got..., thats >what we've got. Arguments that there is more than *that* are just mis-mappings. >You can't argue with tautologies! Nor would I try to. I say the maps are what we've got and that they *are* reality, so far as we are concerned. In other words, though the map is not the territory that it is mapping, a map is a territory, itself, and it is a reality. And there is no reality of which we can say for certain that it is not a map of some other territory (or map). >)I don't really understand this point. We make models of the universe all the >)time and predict hitherto unobserved phenomena from them by extrapolation. >)That is a principal means of discovery. >Yes, but the prediction doesn't make it true. It just tells you where to look. It makes it true for us, often. The sun *will* rise tomorrow, so far as I am concerned, even though it has not done so yet. And I believe a certain wall is hard because I have bumped into it and predict that if I bump into it again, it will feel the same. A large part of our knowledge of the universe is beliefs with certainty in facts that have not yet occurred, or which we have not perceived personally. Most of these are extrapolations from our existing world-view. Yes, they tell me where to look, if I choose to look. But fortunately, it is usually not necessary to look. Otherwise I would waste a lot of time trying to look at things of whose existence I have not the slightest doubt. Fortunately, we have facts, not just phenomena. >)But do we ever reach a >)level so low that we have reached a territory that is not a map? I don't >)think so. >Where's my stick? Sigh! People always resort to violence when they cannot think of a convincing argument or demonstration. By the way, Jim, what's your last name? -- "The map may not be the territory, but it's all we've got." Sarge Gerbode Institute for Research in Metapsychology 950 Guinda St. Palo Alto, CA 94301 UUCP: pyramid!thirdi!sarge
sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) (03/30/88)
In article <998@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu> vu0112@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu (Cliff Joslyn) writes: >At the bottom level, our maps, our minds, our selves, everything that is >and allows us to even talk about maps, is our bodies. It is >*impossible* for me to visually perceive the world in a way inconsistent >with my retina, optic nerves, optical ganglia, and visual cortex. I >*cannot* *perceive* the world of X-rays, or of ultra-sonics, or of >micro-scopics, or of quantum tunneling, or a myriad of other modes of >existence of the world (i.e. "reality"). >So what, these things don't exist? If we take as fundamental the physical universe model of experience -- particles crossing space and impacting sense organs; these diddling brain cells, and so forth, then what you say about ganglia, etc., would be true. However, experience itself is that from which the physical model is derived. The physical universe model is, itself, but an *interpretation* of experience (though a particularly useful one, for certain purposes). What I am talking about is an epistemologically prior level of study: the study of experience itself: the rules by which it is formed, received, and changed, as seen from the inside looking out, as well as the rules by which one interpretation is considered more credible than another. This study would also include an enumeration and discussion of the most basic abilities a person has. These elements form the subject matter of what I call "metapsychology". My view is that any physical model of experience would be best founded in a sound metapsychology as an epistemological base. So discussions of experienced, as experienced by the individual, cannot rightly be contradicted by statements about the physical universe. Ganglia, optic nerves, and the like exist, according to our current model of experience. But a discussion about experience cannot be reduced to physical terms. -- "The map may not be the territory, but it's all we've got." Sarge Gerbode Institute for Research in Metapsychology 950 Guinda St. Palo Alto, CA 94301 UUCP: pyramid!thirdi!sarge
gf@dasys1.UUCP (G Fitch) (03/31/88)
In article <4268@hoptoad.uucp> laura@hoptoad.UUCP (Laura Creighton) writes: }In article <369@thirdi.UUCP> sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes: } >.... } >And we all got on the elephant that we had agreed on and rode off into the } >sunset. } } I don't think so. That ``ironing out the differences'' stuff is } going to be difficult. Methink that the elephant will die of old age. } Will that be an objectively dead elephant? or only a subjectively } dead one? Ah, the elephant. A good point, Laura. What will the _elephant_ think of this crew? Possibly it will roll them up like a scroll, along with their funny little universe, and amble away -- wherever away is. In other words -- how do you know your map isn't mapping you right back? As the Invisible Man said, "It's one thing to be an idea in the mind of God, and another to be an idea in the mind of the chair you're sitting on!" -- G Fitch {uunet}!mstan\ The Big Electric Cat {ihnp4,harvard,philabs}!cmcl2!cucard!dasys1!gf New York City, NY, USA (212) 879-9031 {sun}!hoptoad/
jsb@dasys1.UUCP (The Invisible Man) (04/02/88)
In article <381@thirdi.UUCP> sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes:
)
)What I am talking about is an epistemologically prior level of study: the
)study of experience itself: the rules by which it is formed, received, and
)changed, as seen from the inside looking out, as well as the rules by which
)one interpretation is considered more credible than another. This study would
)also include an enumeration and discussion of the most basic abilities a
)person has. These elements form the subject matter of what I call
)"metapsychology". My view is that any physical model of experience would be
)best founded in a sound metapsychology as an epistemological base.
So it looks as though we were talking about the *same thing* all along. We
never would have found that out the way we were heading... I find it odd to
refer to this "experience itself" as a map and wonder why you do so? I also
suspect that this area has been substantially mapped out by the filthy eastern
ways and can be read about in the Upanishads or some such.
Now as far as having intentions, etc. are concerned, it adds no explanitory
power for me to plain old conciouness which, in my reality, machines don't get
to have but merely to simulate. But if we need something to argue about, I
either don't understand or don't agree with your view of emotions (though I
agree they are "related" to wants). Maybe I should read your book to find
out how you use words?
--
)"The map may not be the territory, but it's all we've got."
)
)Sarge Gerbode
--
Jim Baumbach {uunet}!mstan\
Big Electric Cat New York City {bellcore,cmcl2}!cucard!dasys1!jsb
uunet!actnyc!jsb {sun}!hoptoad/
"Just say N20"