ellis@chips2.sri.com (Michael Ellis) (06/12/89)
[[ I have forwarded this to a philosophy newsgroup
where it might be more pertinent -- mce ]]
> Brian Colfer >> me
>1) Behaviorism is only useful as a limited laboratory methodology.
>>Problems happen when a narrow technical methodology with
>>worthwhile but limited results starts being dictated as
>>some kind of a priori truth.
>> Until behaviorism can come up with hard results,
>> your're just blowing hot air.
> There are many examples of real world successful applications
> of behaviorism which have helped many people...
> The best example which has worked in every case I have heard about
> is in the application of behavioral analysis to the problem of
> phobic responses. Until behaviorism this problem plagued many
> people but now it can be cured. Other applications include
> promoting energy and water conservation and in increasing
> safe behavior at the work place.
Nobody denies that behaviorism does not provide us with limited but
useful results, and to that extent behaviorism is wonderful. The
point is that its results are *extremely limited*. And there are
fairly strong reasons to suspect that they will always be *extremely
limited*. See Chomsky's review of Skinner's _Verbal_Behavior_ for
starters: Either Behaviorism cannot account for language, or else
it must use mentalistic constructs in disguise. Catch 22.
>2) Evidence for free will is found in internal observation.
>
>> ... beliefs, thoughts and desires are causal determinants of
>> human action .... The evidence is plentifully available in the
>> form of 1st person experience...
> This is classic dualist retort.
One needn't believe in mental substance to believe in mind unless
you are some kind of substance ontologist. The only dualisms I see are
formal (what extensional logics can deal with versus what requires
intensional logic) and epistemological (what is public versus what is
private).
"Physical substance" itself is increasingly becoming an incoherent
idea. The future of reductionism is not very bright.
> The problem is then just shifted
> to where do beliefs, thoughts and desires come from.
That's another question. You have skirted the issue of what beliefs
and desires actually are.
>I am affirming a) that beliefs etc. are causes and b) that
>they are important to the person experiencing them.
You mean to say that the beliefs and desires of your lover aren't
important to you? I say (b) is just baloney if by that you mean
they are important *only* to the person experiencing them. They are
important to anybody who really cares about you. Furthermore, they
are important to anybody who cares about what is indeed true. Even
the "strong AI" dream of building a robot that passed the Turing
test would need to be able to manipulate formal objects that
represented the beliefs and desires of others as well as its own.
Stop confusing epistemology with ontology.
>I also am saying that they are scientifically unimportant since
> 1) there is nothing we can do about them directy (we can only change
> the things that control them) and
That's like saying I can't drive a car since I can't control it
"directly", say, by psychokinesis. Anyway, whenever I will something
I am as close to "directly" doing something as I'd ever care to get.
It is just a fact that my desires almost always control my actions.
Will just is a desire that is controlling my current action. This is
explicandum, not explicans. I want to know how it happens.
To say this is "scientifically unimportant" is most presumptious indeed
coming as it does from a discipline with as low credibility as behaviorism.
There are other competing scientific theories with other claims about
what counts as "scientifically important" besides behaviorism.
> 2) we can only have direct access to our own experience and no one
> can ever have direct access to our experience. In fact we actually
> only observe the effects of our brain since there are no significant
> sensory neuron receptors in the brain.
But that is no reason whatsoever why science cannot correlate 1st
person "subjective" reports with neurophysiological findings. In
fact, I'd go so far as to say that these amount to the some of the
most interesting scientific facts uncovered to date (such as the
Penfield experiments).
It is just this information that promises to be the most valuable
from my perspective: We have this interior mental life. What can
science tell us about it?
Your reply is to say "Nothing at all. Science isn't up to the task"
I say "Baloney!". Any science worthy of the name must investigate the
phenomena or else remain silent about them.
>3) The assumptions of materialistic determinism is fundamentally
> undermined by quantum-mechanics. BTW this is the argument
> Douglass Adams uses to allow for all sorts of metaphysical
> phenomena. (Adams is the author of Resteraunt at the end of the
> universe etc.)
I make no metaphysical claims. I only want an honest account of the
phenomena. Cross me off your list of metaphysical crazies.
> Boy this is a tough one. I don't know enough about QM but I
> think that it addresses observations at the very macro reaches of
> our observations and at the extreem micro levels we find it impossible
> to predict the events. From what I understand QM does not cancel
> Newton or Einstien but describes our limits to predict the subatomic
> extremities of our universe. I am talking about the the vast
> range in between.
QM + chaos theory provides just the rigorous scientific argument needed
to blast away any claims of deterministic mechanism for sufficiently
complex systems, of which the brain easily counts as an example.
Chaos theory predicts global sensitivity to minor fluctuations
*everywhere*. QM provides minor fluctuations *everwhere*.
Determinism loses. The real problem is how we manage so well to
control our actions in spite of all this metaphysical randomness.
> Materialistic determinism works as the starting
> assumption when confronted by a new disease and it would be silly
> to think otherwise.
No doubt deterministic theories are the best working hypothesis for
the technical specialist who, lets face it, knows practically nothing
about what's really going on. After all, we want to find predictive laws.
If and when they have a theory that successfully predicts the way people
do behave better than folk psychology, and when they have shown us how
beliefs and desires really do cash out into neurophysiological terms,
then these methodological claims (these are currently just methodological
heuristics, not even scientific findings themselves, and absolutely not
proven facts, remember?) will be worth taking seriously as a priori claims.
>4) The main threat of behaviorism is that it is systematic control.
>> It doesn't matter one whit to whether one's actrions are ...
>>... determined ... as long as they're not determined by the *intentional
>> manipulation* of another *conscious* being.
> It would seem that any part of society would fall under this,
> laws, schools, jobs and any where else ones behavior is being
> directed by others.
Manipulation isn't just wrong, it's counterproductive. It is not treating
a person honestly. Admittedly, there may be criminally or mentally
deranged people for whom such manipulation might count as the lesser evil
where honest approaches fail. And there may be people who rationally
consent to such treatment when they know they have lost rational control
of their own actions, as in the case of addictions.
You seem to confuse "behavior direction" with "convincing the other to
act". Only one who doesn't believe in beliefs and desires could fail to
see the difference.
> If you say that *any* of these are ok then you are saying that
> behavior control has a place in society.
> If you say that *all* of these are bad then you are merely a
> radical anarchist and there is no place for society.
If laws, schools, and jobs don't treat people as rational agents
is it any wonder so many of us are just bozos?
Maybe there isn't any place for me in a society, if that be one of bozoes.
>As a retort to Hilary Putnam's thesis about Functionalism ... it seems
>that the human brain is more of an open system than is a Turing Machine.
That's precisely one of Hilary Putnam's points if I am not mistaken.
-michaelbrianc@daedalus (Brian Colfer) (06/16/89)
In article <421@edai.ed.ac.uk> cam@edai (Chris Malcolm) writes: And here is M. Ellis >> >> Lots of "ifs" there. First, and least important, is that the brain >> isn't causally determined because of QM + Chaos theory (either one >> in themselves is not sufficient): Brain state n+1 is provably not >> "determined" by brain state n plus sense data. Also notice you >> neglected to mention "output" or "control data". Mike get off the QM (quantum mechanics) thing... according to this reasoning we should consider everything to be non-determined rocks, trees, movement of planets. We can say all sorts of nonsense by evoking mystical forces, here QM. And Chaos theory ... come on ... chaos theory **does** still express a causal relationship but just one that is so complex ( too many variables ) that we can not predict state N+1 ( where N is just before things become too complex). I'm saying that according to QM the brain is **just** as determined as everything else. If we deal with everything else (but the brain) as if it was determined why not treat the Brain the same way... Either the brain is *all* physical matter or it isn't ... which do think? If it is then the same "laws" applicable to the rest of the universe apply to it also. If it isn't then you must evoke spirtual metaphysical crap. (Flame throwers on..? Let me get my fire suit) Are thoughts, beliefs, desires etc. behaviors? >But what's QM? And why is Chaos in itself insufficient to carry your >point? They are not separate or together. Science is not a bunch of theories it is a method of investigation. There are two tensions in science: deductive and inductive reasoning. People will extrapolate to the Nth degree but the real meat of science is valid evidence ... For a discussion of validity in Science see Cook & Campbell _Quasi-experimentaion_ 1978, or even Kerlinger _Foundations of behavioral research_ 1973. ============================================================================= Brian | UC San Francisco | E-mail: USENET, Internet, BITNET Colfer | Dept. of Lab. Medicine |...!{ucbvax,uunet}!daedalus.ucsf.edu!brianc | S.F. CA, 94143-0134 USA | brianc@daedalus.ucsf.edu | PH. (415) 476-2325 | BRIANC@UCSFCCA.BITNET ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- "All things equal, a man with money is freer than a man without..." H. Muller =============================================================================
ellis@chips2.sri.com (Michael Ellis) (06/19/89)
> Brian Colfer >> Chris Malcolm >>> me >>> Lots of "ifs" there. First, and least important, is that the brain >>> isn't causally determined because of QM + Chaos theory (either one >>> in themselves is not sufficient): Brain state n+1 is provably not >>> "determined" by brain state n plus sense data. Also notice you >>> neglected to mention "output" or "control data". >Mike get off the QM (quantum mechanics) thing... according to this reasoning >we should consider everything to be non-determined rocks, trees, movement >of planets. We can say all sorts of nonsense by evoking mystical forces, >here QM. And Chaos theory ... come on ... chaos theory **does** still >express a causal relationship but just one that is so complex ( too many >variables ) that we can not predict state N+1 ( where N is just before >things become too complex). Ultimately, none of that stuff really is determined in the sense that you want. And knock off the "mystical forces" crap. Would you prefer I accuse you of "closet Theism" to support your 19th century determinism? If you are decide to seriously answer this article, please address this point: Chaos theory says that minor fluctuations at points of bifurcation in suitably complex systems have massive global effects. If those minor fluctuations are genuinely random (as in QM, not merely the classical lack of knowledge) then the global behavior also is *genuinely* random. Not just "too many variables": If we knew *all* the variables and had a computer of infinite capacity -- if we were Laplace demons -- we still could not predict. If anyone here is being mystical, it is you who refuse to face up to modern science. I'll get off this QM thing once you get off this 19th century determinism thing. >I'm saying that according to QM the brain is **just** as determined as >everything else. If we deal with everything else (but the brain) as if it >was determined why not treat the Brain the same way... And that's hardly very determined at all. What kind of prediction would we get even supposing we had complete knowledge and a computer of infinite capacity? If chaos theory and QM are correct, we would predict a gigantic number of globally divergent possibilities over even a fairly short interval of prediction, if the brain is even as complex as a dripping faucet or a rising smoke column. (And none of this is to address the truly awful issue of what kinds of functions map neurophysiological predicates to mental predicates!) I *am* treating the brain like anything else. Nothing physical in the universe is completely predictable. This doesn't usually matter for phenomena whose attributes we care about are approximated by linear differential equations, like most ideal objects in engineering books, or, similarly, those artifacts we have consciously designed after their example. It is a great testimony to the cleverness of science that we have designed things that behave so predictably under the press of a button. But the brain, like the weather, isn't one of those things. >Either the brain is *all* physical matter or it isn't ... which do think? >If it is then the same "laws" applicable to the rest of the universe >apply to it also. If it isn't then you must evoke spirtual metaphysical >crap. (Flame throwers on..? Let me get my fire suit) I'm not into the metaphysics of substance. Let's just say I prefer to bracket that question, especially considering how incoherent the notion of "material substance" has become this century *in the scientific community*. Anyway, even if mind/brain identity theories are correct, we are probably in deep trouble where meaningful predictions are concerned. To take an example from Fodor: Consider the function that maps physical objects to money. Some money is in the form of valuable metal. Other is in the form of slips of paper. And then there are electronic blips in computers, and so on. Even if all this physical stuff *were* metaphysically deterministic can we ever reasonably expect physical theories which predict the motions of all those physical objects to tell us anything meaningful about economics? Except for the grossest of predictions ("the gold itself will not suddenly transform into some other metal"), physics can tell us very little about economics. Token theories of mind/brain identity are sort of like that. Just what in the brain would correspond to the belief that your car needs a valve job or the desire that your lover would stop cracking her knuckles? Even simple beliefs and desires like these almost certainly correspond to a disjunction of an enormous number of radically dissimilar brain states (assuming "brain state" even refers to something real). Brain states can get us to gross predictions ("thoughts cease when we run over this brain with a steamroller"), but it isn't clear that brain state talk will ever get us to meaningful predictions about beliefs that are any better than folk psychology. In other words, brain state language deals with natural kinds that "go together"; mind state language deals with yet other natural kinds that "go together". Both languages really talk about the same stuff if that makes you feel better metaphysically. But the two different languages don't "go together" anymore than physics and economics (sort of like a nightmarish version of applying Nelson Goodman's predicate "grue" to emeralds). The realms of discourse are autonomous in that even if economics is theoretically reducible to physics, the reduction is humanly impossible and unknowable. Throw in what QM+Chaos theory and the reduction may well be theoretically impossible as well. >Are thoughts, beliefs, desires etc. behaviors? Not if behavior only counts what is publically observable. There is a crucial part of beliefs and desires that you have to be the subject in order to know. And not if behavior leaves out intentionality: What you are trying to do is an intrinsic part of what you are doing even if B.F. Skinner does not count it as scientifically important. Surely you know what beliefs and desires are. What nobody really knows is what they "are made out of" (if indeed, they are made out of anything) or "what they are caused by" or "how they are realized in our brains". >>But what's QM? And why is Chaos in itself insufficient to carry your >>point? QM is quantum mechanics. Without QM, one could still assert that things are *really* deterministic, however it is not humanly possible to perform the computations or acquire knowledge of all the variables. This is to say, metaphysically we would be deterministic, but there would be overwhelming epistemic problems in making any prediction. With QM, even if you knew *everything*, you could not predict. Quantum randomness is "metaphysical" in most viable interpretations. But the ardent determinist however, might still sleaze out by asserting that quantum randomness operates only at levels so small that it has no macroscopic consequences. Now chaos theory predicts that microscopic fluctuations at points of bifurcation have enormous effects on macroscopic global behavior. This is a *hard* prediction of chaos theory. Those who doubt this are urged to refer to any text on chaos theory. So Chaos theory + Quantum mechanics are both required to assert the metaphysical and epistemic randomness of global behavior for suitably complex systems. -michael If quantum mechanics is right, a lot of philosophers are in deep trouble. -John Searle