janw@inmet.UUCP (09/23/86)
[ speter@mit-trillian.MIT.EDU /* ---- "Re: Nuclear Aftermath:killing or he" ---- */ ] >The survival of the human race after *all* the nukes that exist >have been launched is remote, at best. I am not sure about the Southern Hemisphere. [Michael C. Berch] >>Much more to the point is what to do about situations less than >>full-scale nuclear war: terrorist nukes, one or two-city exchanges, >>attacks on remote military targets with significant radiation release, >>fallout from a nuclear war on another continent, use of tactical warheads >>near civilian areas, or even non-nuclear mass disasters like a really >>big earthquake. >Since one side is likely to want to get the last say in, it would >be very very difficult to rely on a limited engagement. Well, that's true in diplomatic chicken games, too; and yet they *have* been known to back off (the Cuban crisis is the most memorable example). Traditionally, the Soviet leadership are very cool players, and good calculators. In U.S., that depends on the political situation. If a *third* party (e.g. terrorists) makes a strike, then escala- tion is quite unlikely; the superpowers may work in concert then. >What is even more scary is the fact that Communist Bloc officers >are not nearly as good as their Western counterparts. To wit: in >the Western forces authority to make decisions is relegated to >the lowest possible level. In the East it is just the opposite. >The definition of "possible" being: that level at which faith in >judgement exists. That's true, as far as I know (I've never served in the Soviet armed forces, but I heard from people who did). >Understand me clearly, I am very much in favor of a strong mili- >tary but the present level of nukes is entirely unacceptable. >Between the two powers there are approximately 20,000 warheads. >It is estimated that something less than 1,000 warheads being >used in any exchange will trigger a nuclear winter. Further, >those 1,000 warheads are more than enough to reduce the world >powers to nothing. Then cutting the numbers in half won't add *any* safety. And that's about the most diplomats dream of. Cutting by two orders of magnitude - and *verifying* that - seems unrealistic. The "nuclear winter" is, apparently, far from proved - but that's no cause for complacency. It is unproved because the ef- fects of nuclear exchange are so hard to predict. If not this, then some other, quite unpredicted effect is likely to get us. The real chances of survival lie in not fighting a global war, at least until space colonization is well under way, - not in fighting it, but limiting the arsenal first. Jan Wasilewsky