hoffman@cheshire.columbia.edu (Edward Hoffman) (08/13/86)
In article <15222@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU> gsmith@brahms.UUCP (Gene Ward Smith) writes: > We know that something exists. Suppose we grant that things cannot >exist without a reason (Leibniz called this "the principle of sufficient >reason"). It then follows that there must be a reason why something exists. Well, I think this is where the argument collapses. To state that things exist for a reason implies that there was an intent to put them there. This impli- cation in and of itself assumes the existence of a god. This existence, of course, is then supposed to be "demonstrated" by the argument. Thus, the argument is circular. > Clearly, with all the postulations and suppositions involved, this is >not a proof for the existence of God. It will be interesting to see if anyone >cares either to fix it or to rip it to shreds and stomp on the pieces. I wouldn't call this "ripping it to shreds", just pointing out the main flaw of the argument. Edward Hoffman ARPAnet: hoffman@cheshire.columbia.edu BITnet: CC4.EA-HOFFMAN@CU20A UUCP: ...![seismo,topaz]!columbia!cheshire!hoffman
gsmith@brahms.BERKELEY.EDU (Gene Ward Smith) (08/14/86)
In article <2938@columbia.UUCP> hoffman@cheshire.UUCP (Edward Hoffman) writes: >In article <15222@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU> gsmith@brahms.UUCP (Gene Ward Smith) writes: >> We know that something exists. Suppose we grant that things cannot >>exist without a reason (Leibniz called this "the principle of sufficient >>reason"). It then follows that there must be a reason why something exists. >Well, I think this is where the argument collapses. To state that things exist >for a reason implies that there was an intent to put them there. This impli- >cation in and of itself assumes the existence of a god. This existence, of >course, is then supposed to be "demonstrated" by the argument. Thus, the >argument is circular. Clearly the invocation of this "principle of sufficient reason" is one of the weaknesses of the argument. I don't think it makes the argument circular. A reason means an answer to a "why" question, and the principal asserts that "why" always has an answer. Intent is not stated or implied. ucbvax!brahms!gsmith Gene Ward Smith/UCB Math Dept/Berkeley CA 94720 ucbvax!weyl!gsmith Institute of Pi Research
stirling@fortune.UUCP (Patrick Stirling) (08/15/86)
I'm following up from talk.religion, so apologies if this has already been
discussed in net.origins!
Regarding this discussion, I have two questions:
1. What is 'existence'?
The best answer I can think of is "some kind of perturbation in some
kind of energy field" whch sounds rather vague. A more practical answer
might be "something exists if it is perceived by a normal person"
(limiting my argument to humans on purpose). This give rise to the
question "What's normal", which I can't answer, and also to fact that
(in my opinion) it's possible for one person to perceive something
that most people don't perceive, AND for the thing to exist.
2. Why does anything need a reason to exist?
This reminds me of a piece in my local sunday paper (the SF Ex-Chron)
recently, stating that "the house fly is totally useless to humans -
there is no known reason for its existence"! The colossal egocentricity
of this took my breath away!
Any comments on these questions or their relation to the discussion are
looked forward to!
patrick
{ihnp4, hplabs, amdcad, ucbvax!dual}!fortune!stirling
He thought he saw a rattlesnake
That questioned him in greek;
He looked again, and saw it was
The middle of next week.
"The one thing I regret", he said,
"Is that it cannot speak"
Lweis Carrol, Sylvie and Bruno.crm@duke.UUCP (Charlie Martin) (08/15/86)
This whole arghument is based on the idea of a "reason" for something to happen -- which seems to be identical to a "cause" for something existing; then the total/partial-ordering of reasons argument is just the old first-cause argument for the existence of a creator (often spelled with a capital letter.) But the underlying assumption in this is that all events must have a "cause" -- and observation does not bear that out, especially on a quantum level. Once there are non-causal events, then the ordering breaks down. As does the argument. -- Charlie Martin (...mcnc!duke!crm)
tim@hoptoad.uucp (Tim Maroney) (08/15/86)
Not at all, Gene. To say "X exists" is to say "Not-X does not exist." If
all events are simply mathematical potentials, rather than an ordered series
of causally-connected things; that is, if "the universe" is simply a set of
potentials, with no potential excluded; then Not-X also exists. Therefore,
the entire criterion of "existence" becomes invalid.
If your little mind is still befuddled, feel free to write again, but please
don't strain yourself thinking about it....
--
Tim Maroney, Electronic Village Idiot
{ihnp4,sun,well,ptsfa,lll-crg,frog}!hoptoad!tim (uucp)
hoptoad!tim@lll-crg (arpa)
Give me food, or give me slack (or kill me).m128abo@brahms.BERKELEY.EDU (Michael Ellis) (08/15/86)
> Tim Maroney > Easy to shoot down. There is no reason to assume that anything > exists. All events may simply be mathematical potentials, none more > real than any other. Our experiences are simply some of the > potentials. Therefore, since there is no objective reason to assume > that anything exists, the first premise of the argument is flawed or > at least unneccessary, and the argument becomes suspect. In that case, existence as an all-or-none affair is replaced by existence as a superposition of potentia. Doesn't weakening "strict objective existence" to "intersubjectivity" assert that existability, if not existence, exists? >(No, this is not a joke; yes, I am prepared to doubt that anything exists.) But are you prepared to doubt slack? -michael The fact that operant behavior seems "directed toward the future" is misleading. -BF Skinner
gsmith@brahms.BERKELEY.EDU (Gene Ward Smith) (08/15/86)
In article <998@hoptoad.uucp> tim@hoptoad.UUCP (Tim Maroney) writes: >Not at all, Gene. To say "X exists" is to say "Not-X does not exist." This is simply false. If Not-X is everything that is not X, then if X is not already everything, "X exists" *implies* "Not-X exists". On the other hand, if you mean "X exists" is to say "Not-Not-('X exists')", then this is a double negative which helps you not at all. >If all events are simply mathematical potentials, rather than an ordered series >of causally-connected things; that is, if "the universe" is simply a set of >potentials, with no potential excluded; then Not-X also exists. Therefore, >the entire criterion of "existence" becomes invalid. I translate your statement about potentials into "everything which *can* exist, *does* exist". Clearly if all potentials exist, something exists; in fact, a great deal exists. >If your little mind is still befuddled, feel free to write again, but please >don't strain yourself thinking about it.... You neither, Y'hear? ucbvax!brahms!gsmith Gene Ward Smith/UCB Math Dept/Berkeley CA 94720 ucbvax!weyl!gsmith "When Ubizmo talks, people listen."
carnes@gargoyle.UUCP (Richard Carnes) (08/15/86)
>2. Why does anything need a reason to exist? > >This reminds me of a piece in my local sunday paper (the SF Ex-Chron) >recently, stating that "the house fly is totally useless to humans - >there is no known reason for its existence"! The colossal >egocentricity of this took my breath away! Not only is it homocentric, the statement is a very ignorant one. The writer undoubtedly would have called fruit flies "totally useless to humans" before Drosophila proved its immense value to genetics. Flies, while often annoying (they've pushed me to the brink of insanity on mountain hikes) are of considerable benefit to humanity. First, they are decomposers: they feed on dead organic matter such as wastes and animal carcasses, recovering the nutrients in these materials for the food chain. Second, flies are food for many types of animals (and some plants!) which are of more direct benefit to people. Third, many flies are pollinators; without pollinators, a large proportion of plants could not reproduce. Finally, notwithstanding horror movies starring mutant arthropods, flies are beautiful, both in their structure and in their adaptations. Richard Carnes
gsmith@brahms.BERKELEY.EDU (Gene Ward Smith) (08/29/86)
In article <112@methods.UUCP> cary@methods.UUCP (Cary Timar (U of W co-op)) writes: >In article <15222@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU> gsmith@brahms.UUCP (Gene Ward Smith) writes: >> We can do this a little differently: we can look at everything that exists >>and the relation "<" of ontological dependence ... >>Zorn's lemma says that there are maxima under ontological dependence. >Extrapolating logic and set theory outside our universe is questionable, >at best. I see no reason why any theoretical god need be bound by some >descriptive laws invented by men to describe the behavior of >mathematical sets that they created to describe the universe around >them. Well, I agree with you, sort of. But I think logic and set theory are more universal than you think. In particular, set theory was invented to talk about mathematical reality (sets of real numbers, etc.) and not the universe around us. >In particular, I cannot see why we should grant Zorn's Lemma. >Mathematicians generally prefer to have proofs that do not depend on the >Axiom of Choice or its equivalents. Most mathematicians could care less, a few strange ones do. By the way, there is an old joke to the effect that the existence of God is equivalent to the Axiom of Choice: since Zorn's lemma => God exists and God exists => God can do the choice routine, and hence the Axiom of Choice is true. >I feel that somehow any theoretical god is belittled by being dependent >for its very existence on Zorn's Lemma. This is not what the argument says, so I wouldn't worry about it. ucbvax!brahms!gsmith Gene Ward Smith/UCB Math Dept/Berkeley CA 94720 "*That* the world is, is the mystical." -- Ludwig Wittgenstein
jc@cdx39.UUCP (John Chambers) (08/30/86)
> ... We now have an ordering relation of ontological dependence: > universe = R0 < R1 < R2 ... where "<" means "explains" or "causes to be". > We may assume X < Y < Z => X < Y. Let us suppose also that X < Y & Y < X is > impossible; that is, two *different* things cannot provide mutual explanations > for the other's existence. Leaving aside the rest of this for others to hack apart, I'll jump into the fray by attacking this point. At first glance, this seems like an intuitively reasonable assumption, but that just goes to show how feeble a think intuition is. Biologists quite frequently invoke arguments in which X < Y & Y < X. How so? Well, consider the evolution of the ornate reproductive structures we call "flowers". It seems quite clear that these evolved in response to the pollinating behavior of insects (and possibly a few birds). On the other hand, the insects' behavior clearly evolved as to take advantage of the existence of flowers. Thus we have: X = Insects visit flowers, consuming nectar and/or pollen, and incidentally cross-pollinate the flowers. Y = Plants produce flowers that announce the presence of nectar and pollen. It seems quite clear that X < Y, and also Y < X. That is, without the presence of pollinators, flowers wouldn't have evolved; without the presence of flowers, insects would do little if any pollination. This is usually referred to as "co-evolution". A similar situation exists with the evolution of edible fruit, which are devices that plants use to trick large animals (mostly birds and mammals) into scattering the plants' seeds and fertilizing them as they sow them. Fruit evolved because there were animals around willing to eat them; the animals eat them because the plants supply them. Perhaps I should put "because" in quotes. The concept of "causation" here is a bit different than what most theologians and philosophers have dealt with. Note especially that this interpretation of the concept doesn't require purpose and/or intelligence on the part of the agents. -- John M Chambers Phone: 617/364-2000x7304 Email: ...{cthulhu,inmet,harvax,mit-eddie,mot[bos],rclex}!cdx39!{jc,news,root,usenet,uucp} Smail: Codex Corporation; Mailstop C1-30; 20 Cabot Blvd; Mansfield MA 02048-1193 Telex: 922-443 CODEX A MNSF !fortune -o
kck@g.cs.cmu.edu (Karl Kluge) (09/08/86)
In article <165@BMS-AT.UUCP>, stuart@BMS-AT.UUCP (Stuart D. Gathman) writes: > This is exactly right! The only consistent cosmologies I have ever > encountered are built on either > > a) Total meaninglessness (existentialism). > b) A first cause (God). > > Note that quantum mechanics does not provide evidence for either view. Not quite true. For instance, Berkley's argument for the existance of God runs something like there has to be a Meta-observer who is responsible for the world staying consistent when we aren't around to observe it. The paradox of Schroedinger's Cat and experiments which seem to establish the existance of systems in juxtapositions of states, where the waveform only collapses into a particular state when the state of the system is observed, would seem to refute this argument, as the existence of the Meta-observer would cause the system to fall into some state. > Just because we are incapable of observing a cause does not mean that > it doesn't exist (unless you subscribe to (a) in which case it doesn't > matter). On the contrary, it matters a great deal in trying to work out whether or not there is free will. > matter). The Heisenberg uncertainty principle can mean either > > 1) There is a certain amount of randomness in nature which makes > measurements beyond a certain precision meaningless. > > 2) There is a certain level of detail in nature which we are incapable > of observing due to our finite nature. (After all, there are more > atoms in the universe than in all our brains and computers put together.) > The Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle says exactly what the math states, which is that the product of the uncertainty of the meausurement of the position of a particle and the uncertainty of the measurement of the velocity is at least a certain constant. It has nothing to do with our finite nature and everything to do with the fact the measuring the value of one of the variables to some precision inevitably effects the value of the other variable in a way that can't be untangled (to know the effect that the impact of the radiation you're using to measure the position of a particle is going to have on the velocity of the particle, you would need to know exectly the position on velocity of the particles in the beam of radiation, which can't both be measured to arbitrary precision because of the HUP). So as you can see, it also has nothing to do with "randomness". There are simply fundamental limitations on the knowledge one can have of the state of a quantum mechanical system. Chip Kluge (kck@g.cs.cmu.edu) All standard disclaimers apply except this one.