[mod.comp-soc] Computer testimony and the courts

taylor@hplabsc.UUCP (08/01/86)

This article is from nike!harvard!wanginst!infinet!rhorn (Rob Horn)
 and was received on Fri Aug  1 01:23:05 1986
 
The recent story about a Macintosh ``testifying'' included
considerable mis-understandings by the reporter.  The other cases  
described involve similar misunderstandings.  What was actually
going on in court is an equally interesting subject.  The courts are
using their extablished approaches for handling ``experts'' to
accomodate the introduction of computers.
 
I believe that the jurors in that case were probably reminded
repeatedly that they were listening to the testimony of the human
expert.  The Macintosh was testifying in the same way that a
blackboard or flip chart testifies.  It is used by the expert to
present his testimony.  It is evidence, but the credibility rests
with the expert.  I think the court would have no problem if it
were revealed that everything shown had been made up by the
expert rather than the result of the analysis programs.  What
matters is the credibility and skill of the expert.  (Which would
suffer greatly if it could be shown that the presentation was a
phoney.)
 
This is in fact part of a sophisticated approach to dealing with
the fallibility of computers.  The law has long had to deal with
experts.  Experts have various problems:
   - They may distort the evidence
   - They may present only partial views
   - They may have misunderstandings
   - They may overlook key information
   - They are selected with presentation and showmanship in mind
 
The law has grown a variety of mechanisms to deal with these
human failings, and they are trying to fit their existing
mechanisms to computers.  After all, human experts are at least
as innovative as programmers in finding ways to make mistakes.
If you can somehow make the computer like a human expert, then
you can use all your existing approaches.
 
I had to use a similar approach to satify the legal requirements for
automatic processing of data from toxic waste analyses.
At every point in the collection and processing of data,
*paper* records had to be kept that would allow a human to
independently verify any item in the database.  Where this was
impossible (for example with mass spectrometer processing) you
had to come as close as possible, plus provide regular
calibration records that were supervised by both operators and
Q/C personnel.  All through this there was constant use of dual
person dated signatures, in ink, on paper.  For example,
instrument outputs were both recorded in the database and printed
on a local strip printer so that they could be verified and
signed on the spot.  Finally about 2% of the samples were
manually verified by Q/C including .5% re-verified from the
original sample material.  They still got most of the benefits of
automation, since only a small percentage of the data was ever
really processed by hand while retaining enough information that
they could invoke human expertise whenever necessary in court.

You learn quite a bit about non-erasable paper, bound notebooks,
tracability requirements, etc. when working with hazardous
wastes.  Little things like just what it means to sign that slip
of paper.  You also get some truly superior quality paper and work
notebooks.  These notebooks will withstand both Coke and hot coffee
without smearing ink or tearing.  Any tampering with this material
is both very difficult and leaves obvious marks.   It will be a
long time before computers reach anything close to this level of
tracability.

				Rob  Horn
	UUCP:	...{decvax, seismo!harvard}!wanginst!infinet!rhorn
	Snail:	Infinet,  40 High St., North Andover, MA