taylor@hplabsc.UUCP (02/24/87)
The current issue of InformationWEEK (Feb. 16, 1987, pg. 17) has a short article on the effects of the recent definition of "sensitive, but not unclassified information" issued by John Poindexter, former NSC adviser to Reagan. He said that any information which the "disclosure, loss, misuse, or destruction of could adversely affect national security" would be subject to careful monitoring. The article then mentions some of the types of information that might fall in this category...then there is a very eye-openning paragraph: "Under these guidelines, the US Air Force, the CIA, and the National Security Council have asked the keepers of some fo the country's largest PUBLIC [my emphasis] databases, including Mead Corp.'s Nexus, to supply names of subscribers and install software that will allow the company to more accurately track who asks for what information and when." Under the broad definition of vital information, an agency of the government may decide that any other private information is valuable, and it can monitor or hinder, that flow of information. I was just imagining the next step...tie the government systems into the city and university libraries, then start checking into what we buy at book stores, followed eventually by monitoring what we read in the papers. I feel like some of my freedom is eroding again. Thoughts? Well, now I will have someone watching what I read and what I have in my urine. Isn't it nice to have all this attention? --Bi//
taylor@hplabsc.UUCP (02/25/87)
I can say a couple of words about Bill Daul's note on Sensitive classification. My research is on the verge of getting this classification. I have been told that my some work is no longer for distribution outside the US. It is undergoing further review. My work for those not aware is under the heading of parallel processing. Other obvious areas are things like AI, and other types of high technology. There are two principal motives for the sensitive classification: 1) the economic "threat of our neighbors (which hits me twice because of ancestory)," and the military threat of the technology appearing in weapons of the SU. It is useless to argue against these people from my position (maybe not other readers). Research should involve the exchange of information. I hate the thought that I request information from one set of people and in turn I would not be able to respond (reciprocate) in kind. Needless to say these are my views and NOT the views of my employer or the US Government. From the Rock of Ages Home for Retired Hackers: --eugene miya NASA Ames Research Center
taylor@hplabsc.UUCP (02/27/87)
I agree with the sentiment that the gov't is getting paranoid (especially of late). Someone told me this analogy, which I think is appropriate: The race to build and use technology is like the Indy 500. The scientists and researchers are trying to win this race by building faster and better cars. The government is trying to win by scattering tacks on the racetrack. Alan Wexelblat WEX@MCC.ARPA or WEX@MCC.COM
taylor@hplabsc.UUCP (03/24/87)
[through a number of hops...]
THE THREAT OF GOVERNMENT CONTROLS ON ELECTRONIC DATABASES
that contain "sensitive but unclassified information" has receded, at
least temporarily (WN 27 Feb 87). In a stunning reversal of policy,
Frank Carlucci, the new National Security Advisor to the President,
announced in a conciliatory letter to Rep. Jack Brooks (D-TX), Chairman
of the Government Operations Committee, that NTISSP-2, the notorious
"Poindexter Memorandum," was being rescinded. It was this directive
that defined "sensitive but unclassified information" as information
affecting "national security or other Federal Government interests," a
definition that could fit a giraffe. Carlucci also said that NSDD 145,
National Policy on Telecommunications and Automated Information Systems
Security, which in Brook's words created a "shadow government," was being
reviewed. The reversal is attributable to the solid opposition of groups
such as the library associations and scientific societies.
Although Carlucci declined to testify on grounds of executive
privilege, he refused to extend that protection to Poindexter. showed up before
the Committee on Tuesday, but confined himself to puffing on his pipe taking
the Fifth. Secretary of Commerce Baldrige and Deputy Secretary of Defense Taft
testified that responsibility for computer security should be moved to a
civilian agency.
Perhaps the most significant testimony on Tuesday came at the end,
after most of the press had left to file their stories. Harold Relyea of the
Library of Congress discussed the whole phenomenon of National Security
Decision Directives (NSDD's). Out of some 200 NSDD's, all but five are secret,
and are not generally available even to Congress. They have apparently been
used to authorize such things as the disinformation campaign against Libya and
$50M for Argentina to train Contras. He said they bring us very close to the
most dangerous practice of totalitarian government -- rule by secret law.
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