[net.micro.atari16] Info-Atari16 Digest V86 #2

Info-Atari16@SCORE.STANFORD.EDU (Info-Atari16 Digest) (11/03/86)

Info-Atari16 Digest   Monday, November  3, 1986   Volume 86 : Issue 2

This weeks Editor: Bill Westfield

Today's Topics:

           LIMIT ON TOTAL NUMBER OF FILES ON AN ST DISK ??
                     micro-C-shell and MT-C-shell
                             Re: UNITERM
                      Re: Volume of net traffic
              Re: UNITERM V1.5C PART 3 OF 4 (UNITERM.B)
                      Re: copy protection flame
                              phreakers

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: 0  0 00:00:00 EDT
From: "V5130B::MENTON" <menton@v5130b.decnet>
Subject
: LIMIT ON TOTAL NUMBER OF FILES ON AN ST DISK ??
To: "info-atari16" <info-atari16@su-score>
Reply-To: "V5130B::MENTON" <menton@v5130b.decnet>

	Is there a limit on the total number of files on an ST disk, either
single-sided or double-sided?

	While copying over 200 FORTRAN subroutines from an IBM PC/AT to
a VAX to the ST (total bytes well below the capacity of a SS disk), the
file copy bombed at about 111 files.  This same limit was reached (same
error message, something about a file not being opened to write ??) when
the destination disk was formatted DS.  I tried to copy an additional file
to the disk, to see if it was a limitation of the XMODEM program.  Nope - 
same error message - the disk would just not take another file, even though
it was well below its max capacity.

	Any thoughts on why this happened would be appreciated.  I don't
remember reading about a limit to the number of file names on an ST disk,
analogous to the 64-file limit with the 8-bit Atari disk drives.

					Bob Menton
					MENTON@NRL

	Buckaroo Banzai: "Take the wheel.  It drives like a truck".
	    John Parker: "Good.  What is a truck?"

------------------------------

From: mcvax!lasso!didier@seismo.CSS.GOV
Date: Fri Oct 31 17:07:41 GMT+1:00 1986
To: info-atari16@score.stanford.edu
Subject: micro-C-shell and MT-C-shell

Would some kind soul give me a serious description on the uCshell and MTCshell
packages ? The names are fairly suggestive, but I wonder how functionnaly
close to a Unix csh they may be. In particular, are they of any serious use for
systems without a hard disk ?
Are we talking freebees here, or are they $old (price ?) ?

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Didier Giralt                             LAAS-CNRS
                                          7 av du Colonel Roche
...!seismo!mcvax!inria!lasso!didier       31077 Toulouse Cedex
                                          France

------------------------------

Date: 29 Oct 86 12:05:10 GMT
From: mcvax!ukc!reading!minster!martin@seismo.css.gov
Subject: Re: UNITERM
To: info-atari16@score.stanford.edu

Did anyone in the UK get a working copy of UNITERM? I'm told that it
was distributed in 4 parts, but we saw none of these. If anyone has it
and would be willing to send it to me, could they please let me know by
mail? Did this program, which everyone says is very good, actually reach
Europe or the UK?
	Martin

PS.
	Apologies to those outside Europe, to whom this may not be
very interesting.

usenet: mcvax!ukc!minster!martin
surface:
	Martin C. Atkins
	Department of Computer Science
	University of York
	Heslington
	York Y01 5DD
	ENGLAND

------------------------------

Date: 30 Oct 86 18:31:53 GMT
From: mcvax!ukc!dcl-cs!bath63!pes@seismo.css.gov  (Paul Smee)
Subject: Re: Volume of net traffic
To: info-atari16@score.stanford.edu

I'm not convinced that 'descriptions and mail to requesters' would actually
cut the net traffic.  At present (bar accidents) net stuff crosses the Atlantic
once (to Holland, innit?), crosses the Channel once, and so on.  A separate
trans-Atlantic posting to each requestor would pretty obviously crank the
transmitted bitcount right up.

Similar arguments, of course, apply to non-international posting.  Also,
I think that this net has a higher connectivity than 'pure user mail',
so that solution would leave lots of people out, I spect.

Better, the idea (is it reelly going to happen) of a separate meeting for
the software, so that them as don't want it can more easily miss it out.

------------------------------

Date: 30 Oct 86 18:57:08 GMT
From: mcvax!ukc!dcl-cs!bath63!pes@seismo.css.gov  (Paul Smee)
Subject: Re: UNITERM V1.5C PART 3 OF 4 (UNITERM.B)
To: info-atari16@score.stanford.edu

Sigh.  Someone up there doesn't want me to have UniTerm 1.5c.  Our site
finally received parts 1, 2, and 3 of the 16th (19th? it's scrolled off
my screen) posting of 1.5c.  Assuming that the part 3 I got earlier was
correct (got it twice, and they both matched) the new part 3 was savagely
truncated =678 lines, missing about 600 if I counted right.  Part 2
('A') was also chopped off short.  So, I've now got

  Part 1 Read Me
  Part 2 ('A') 1 bad copy (truncated)
  Part 3 ('B') 2 good copies and one bad (truncated)
  Part 4 ('C') 1 good copy

Of course this all assumes that the Parts were all the same each time.
Anyone with UK PSS or JANET access (or US ARPA) willing to trade a part A
for one of my spare part B's :-).

  JANET: Smee at AUCC
  ARPA:  Smee at AUCC via UCL-CS.ARPA

(in whatever syntax your favorite mailer uses for at's and via's)

------------------------------

Date: 31 Oct 86 19:01:49 GMT
From: amdahl!drivax!holloway@csvax.caltech.edu  (Bruce Holloway)
Subject: Re: copy protection flame
To: info-atari16@score.stanford.edu

In article <246@bath63.UUCP> pes@ux63.bath.ac.uk (Paul Smee) writes:
>I had a go at copying the Epyx disk.  It appears to work, but when you
>try to run the copy, you get put into what appears to be an infinite
>'put disk A into drive A; put disk B into drive A' loop.  I actually
>gave that a try for a bit over 80 swaps, figuring that, since they hadn't
>said it was copy-protected, they might have simply made it 'unattractive'
>to copy by requiring that you somehow 'validate' the 80 tracks individually.
>Finally decided that's not the case.  It annoyed me enough to decide that
>I think I'll try to crack that one, though.

I copied Rogue over to my hard disk, and it runs fine from there, although
it requires the original disk in 'A'... it just accesses it for a couple
of seconds. Also, you can only save files to the original disk! But at
least the loading time is slashed, especially for those l-o-n-g picture
files.
-- 
....!ucbvax!hplabs!amdahl!drivax!holloway
(I'm not THAT Bruce Holloway, I'm the other one.)

------------------------------

Date: 31 Oct 86 10:45:13 GMT
From: ihnp4!chinet!cabbie@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU  (Richard Andrews)
Subject: phreakers
To: info-atari16@score.stanford.edu

This is an article that I found.  Read it and weep.

					Rich Andrews
					...ihnp4!chinet!cabbie
by
John "C". Sucilla

This sucker is pretty long (287 lines). I just downloaded it from Plantz'z
machine and thought it might be a good idea to make it available here.
I have no idea if this is for real or not at this time. I hope not!



                            The Night of the Hackers
                            ________________________
                          

      . As you are surveying the dark and misty swamp you come across what 
        appears to be a small cave.  You light  a  torch  and  enter.  You 
        have  walked  several  hundred feet when you stumble into a bright 
        blue portal.  .  .  With a  sudden  burst  of  light  and  a  loud 
        explosion you are swept into . . . DRAGONFIRE . . .  Press Any Key 
      

     .  You have programmed your personal computer to dial into
        Dragonfire, a computer bulletin board in Gainesville,  Texas.  But 
        before you get any information, Dragonfire demands your name, home 
        city  and phone number.  So,  for tonight's tour of the electronic 
        wilderness you become Montana Wildhack of San Francisco.  

     .  Dragonfire, Sherwood Forest (sic), Forbidden Zone,
        Blottoland,  Plovernet,  The Vault, Shadowland, PHBI and scores of 
        other computer bulletin boards are hangouts of a new generation of 
        vandals. These precocious teenagers use their electronic skills to 
        play hide-and-seek with computer and  telephone  security  forces.  
        Many  computer  bulletin  boards  are  perfectly legitimate:  they 
        resemble electronic  versions  of  the  familiar  cork  boards  in 
        supermarkets and school corridors,  listing services and providing 
        information someone out there is bound to find  useful.  But  this 
        is  a walk on the wild side,  a trip into the world of underground 
        bulletin  boards  dedicated  to  encouraging  --  and  making   -- 
        mischief.  

     .  The phone number for these boards are as closely guarded as a
        psychiatrist's home telephone number.  Some numbers are posted  on 
        underground  boards;  others  are exchanged over the telephone.  A 
        friendly hacker provided Dragonfire's number.  Hook up and you see 
        a broad choice of topics offered. For Phone Phreaks -- who delight 
        in  stealing  service  from  AT&T  and  other  phone  networks   .  
        Phreakenstein's Lair is a potpourri of phone numbers, access codes 
        and  technical information.  For computer hackers -- who dial into 
        other people's computers -- Ranger's Lodge is chock-full of  phone 
        numbers  and  passwords  for government,  university and corporate 
        computers.  Moving through Dragonfire's offerings,  you  can  only 
        marvel  at  how conversant these teen-agers are with the technical 
        esoterica of today's electronic age.  Obviously they have spent  a 
        great  deal  of time studying computers,  though their grammar and 
        spelling indicate they haven't been diligent  in  other  subjects. 
        You are constantly reminded of how young they are.

     .  "Well it's that time of year again. School is back in session
        so  let's get those high school computer phone numbers rolling in. 
        Time to get straight A's,  have perfect  attendance  (except  when 
        you've been up all night hacking school passwords), and messing up 
        you worst teacher's paycheck." 

     .  Forbidden Zone, in Detroit, is offering ammunition for hacker
        civil war -- tips on  crashing  the  most  popular  bulletin-board 
        software.  There  also are plans for building black,  red and blue 
        boxes to mimic operator tones and get free phone service.  And  he 
        re  are  the  details for "the safest and best way to make and use 
        nitroglycerine," compliments of Doctor Hex, who says he got it 
        "from my chemistry teacher."

     .  Flip through the "pages." You have to wonder if this
        information  is accurate.  Can this really be the phone number and 
        password for Taco Bell's computer?  Do these kids really have  the 
        dial-up numbers for dozens of university computers? The temptation 
        is  too much.  You sign off and have your computer dial the number 
        for the Yale computer.  Bingo -- the words Yale University  appear 
        on your screen.  You enter the password.  A menu appears. You hang 
        up in a sweat. You are now a hacker.  

     .  Punch in another number and your modem zips off the touch
        tones. Here comes the tedious side of all of this. Bulletin boards 
        are popular. No vacancy in Bates Motel (named for Anthony Perkin's 
        creepy motel in the movie "Psycho"); the line is busy.  So are 221 
        B.  Baker Street, PHBI, Shadowland and The Vault,  Caesar's Palace 
        rings  and  connects.  This is different breed of board.  Caesar's 
        Palace is a combination Phreak board and computer store in  Miami.  
        This  is  the  place to learn ways to mess up a department store's 
        anti-shoplifting system,  or make free calls  on  telephones  with 
        locks  on  the  dial.  Pure  capitalism  accompanies such anarchy, 
        Caesar's Palace is offering good deals on disc  drives,  software, 
        computers  and  all  sorts of hardware.  Orders are placed through 
        electronic mail messages.  

     .  'Tele-Trial': Bored by Caesar's Palace, you enter the number
        for Blottoland,  the board operated by one of  the  nation's  most 
        notorious computer phreaks -- King Blotto.  This one has been busy 
        all night, but it's now pretty late in Cleveland.  The phone rings 
        and you connect.  To get past the blank screen, type the secondary 
        password "S-L-I-M-E." King Blotto obliges,  listing his rules:  he 
        must have your real name,  phone number,  address,  occupation and 
       interests. He will call and disclose the primary password, "if you 
        belong on this board." If admitted, do not reveal the phone number 
        or  the  secondary password,  lest you face "tele-trial," the King 
        warns as he dismisses  you  by  hanging  up.  You  expected  heavy 
        security,  but this teenager's security is,  as they say, awesome. 
        Computers at the Defense Department and hundreds of businesses let 
        you know when you've reached them.  Here you need a password  just 
        to find out what system answered the phone.  Then King Blotto asks 
        questions -- and hangs up.  Professional computer-security experts 
        could learn something from this kid.  He knows that ever since the 
        414 computer hackers were arrested in August 1982, law-enforcement 
        officers  have  been  searching  for  leads  on  computer bulletin 
        boards.  

     .  "Do you have any ties to or connections with any law
        enforcement  agency  or  any  agency which would inform such a law 
        enforcement agency of this bulletin board?" 

     .  Such is the welcoming message from Plovernet, a Florida board
        known  for  its great hacker/phreak files.  There amid a string of 
        valid VISA and MasterCard numbers are  dozens  of  computer  phone 
        numbers  and  passwords.  Here you also learn what Blotto means by 
        tele-trial.  "As some of you may or may not know, a session of the 
        conference  court was held and the Wizard was found guilty of some 
        miscellaneous  charges,  and  sentenced  to  four  months  without 
        bulletin  boards."  If  Wizard  calls,  system operators like King 
        Blotto disconnect him. Paging through bulletin boards is a test of 
        your patience. Each board has different commands.  Few are easy to 
        follow,  leaving you to hunt and peck your way around.  So far you 
        haven't had the nerve  to  type  "C,"  which  summons  the  system 
        operator for a live, computer-to-computer conversation.  The time, 
        however,  however  has  come for you to ask a few questions of the 
        "sysop." You dial a computer in Boston.  It answers and you  begin 
        working your way throughout the menus. You scan a handful of dial-
        up  numbers,  including one for Arpanet,  the Defense Department's 
        research computer.  Bravely tap C and in seconds the screen blanks 
        and your cursor dances across the screen.

     .  Hello . . . What kind of computer do you have?

     .  Contact. The sysop is here. You exchange amenities and get
        "talking." How much hacking does he do?  Not much, too busy. Is he 
        afraid of being busted,  having his computer confiscated like  the 
        Los  Angeles  man  facing  criminal  changes  because his computer 
        bulletin board contained a  stolen  telephone-credit-card  number?  
        "Hmmmm  .  .  .  No,"  he  replies.  Finally,  he asks the dreaded 
        question:  "How old are  you?"  "How  old  are  YOU,"  you  reply, 
        stalling.  "15,"  he  types.  Once you confess and he knows you're 
        old enough to be his father,  the conversation gets very  serious.  
        You fear each new question;  he probably thinks you're a cop.  But 
        all he wants to know  is  your  choice  for  president.  The  chat 
        continues,  until  he  asks,  "What  time  is it there?" Just past 
        midnight, you reply. Expletive. "it's 3:08 here," Sysop types.  "I 
        must be going to sleep.  I've got  school  tomorrow."  The  cursor 
        dances "*********** Thank you for Calling." The screen goes blank.  


                                    Epilog:

     .  A few weeks after this reporter submitted this article to
        Newsweek,  he found that his credit had been altered, his drivers' 
        licence revoked,  and EVEN HIS Social  Security  records  changed! 
        Just in case you all might like to construe this as a 'Victimless' 
        crime.  The  next  time  a  computer fouls up your billing on some 
        matter, and COSTS YOU, think about it!  
                        _______________________________

                            
     .  This the follow-up to the previous article concerning the
        Newsweek reporter.  It spells out SOME of the REAL dangers to  ALL 
                      of us, due to this type of activity!  

                             
                        _______________________________
                           The REVENGE of the Hackers
                        _______________________________

     .  In the mischievous fraternity of computer hackers, few things
        are  prized  more  than  the  veil  of  secrecy.  As  NEWSWEEK San 
        Francisco correspondent Richard Sandza found out after  writing  a 
        story on the electronic underground's (DISPATCHES,  Nov.  12, 198\ 
        ability  to  exact  revenge  can  be  unnerving.  Also  severe.... 
        Sandza's report: 

     .  "Conference!" someone yelled as I put the phone to my ear.
        Then came a mind-piercing "beep," and suddenly my  kitchen  seemed 
        full  of  hyperactive  15-year-olds.  "You  the  guy who wrote the 
        article in NEWSWEEK?" someone shouted from the depths  of  static, 
        and  giggles.  "We're  going disconnect your phone," one shrieked.  
        "We're going to blow up your house," called another. I hung up.  

     .  Some irate readers write letters to the editor. A few call
        their  lawyers.   Hackers,  however,  use  the  computer  and  the 
        telephone, and for more than simple comment. Within days, computer 
        "bulletin  boards"  around the country were lit up with attacks on 
        NEWSWEEK's "Montana Wildhack" (a name I took from a Kurt  Vonnegut 
        character),  questioning  everything  from  my manhood to my prose 
        style.  "Until we get real good revenge," said  one  message  from 
        Unknown  Warrior,  "I  would like to suggest that everyone with an 
        auto-l modem call Montana Butthack then hang up when he  answers." 
        Since  then  the  hackers  of America have called my home at least 
        2000 times.  My harshest  critics  communicate  on  Dragonfire,  a 
        Gainesville,  Texas,  bulletin  board  where I am on teletrial,  a 
        video-lynching in which a computer user with grievance  dials  the 
        board  and  presses  charges  against  the offending party.  Other 
        hackers  --  including  the  defendant  --post   concurrences   or 
        rebuttals.  Despite  the  mealtime interruptions,  all this was at 
        most a minor nuisance; some was amusing, even fun.  

     .  FRAUD: The fun stopped with a call from a man who identified
        himself only as Joe.  "I'm calling to warn you," he said.  When  I 
        barked back, he said, "Wait, I'm on your side.  Someone has broken 
        into TRW and obtained a list of all your credit-card numbers, your 
        home address,  social-security  number  and  wife's  name  and  is 
        posting  it  on  bulletin boards around the country." He named the 
        charge cards in my wallet.  

     .  Credit-card numbers are a very hot commodity among some
        hackers.  To get one from a computer system and  post  it  is  the 
        hacker  equivalent  of  making the team.  After hearing from Joe I 
        visited the local office of the TRW credit bureau and got  a  copy 
        of my credit record.  Sure enough, it showed a Nov.  13 inquiry by 
        the Lenox (Mass.) Savings Bank,  an  institution  with  no  reason 
        whatever  to  ask  about me.  Clearly some hacker had used Lenox's 
        password to the TRW computers to get to my  files  (the  bank  has 
        since changed the password).  

     .  It wasn't long before I found out what was being done with my
        credit-card numbers,  thanks to another friendly hacker who tipped 
        me to Pirate 80,  a bulletin board in Charleston,  W.Va.,  where I 
        found  this:  "I'm  sure you guys have heard about Richard Stza or 
        Montana Wildhack.  He's the guy who wrote the obscene story  about 
        phreaking  in NewsWeek Well,  my friend did a credit card check on 
        TRW . . . try this number, it' a VISA . .  .  Please nail this guy 
        bad . . . Captain Quieg.  

     .  Captain Quieg may himself be nailed. He has violated the
        Credit  Card  Fraud Act of 1984 signed by President Reagan on Oct.  
        12.  The law provides a $10,000 fine and up to  a  15-year  prison 
        term  for  "trafficking" in illegally obtained credit-card account 
        numbers.  He "friend" has committed  a  felony  violation  of  the 
        California  computer-crime  law.  TRW  spokeswoman Delia Fernandex 
        said that TRW would "be more than  happy  to  prosecute"  both  of 
        them.  

     .  TRW has good reason for concern. Its computers contain the
        credit  histories  of  120  million people.  Last year TRW sold 50 
        million credit  reports  on  their  customers.  But  these  highly 
        confidential   personal   records   are  so  poorly  guarded  that 
        computerized  teenagers  can  ransack   the   files   and   depart 
        undetected. TRW passwords -- unlike many others -- often print out 
        when  entered by TRW's customers.  Hackers then look for discarded 
        printouts.  A good source:  the  trash  of  banks  and  automobile 
        dealerships,  which  routinely do credit checks.  "Everybody hacks 
        TRW," says Cleveland hacker King Blotto,  whose bulletin board has 
        security  system the Pentagon would envy.  "It's the easiest." For 
        her her part,  Fernandez insists that TRW "does everything it  can 
        to keep the system secure 

     .  In my case, however, that was not enough. My credit limits
        would hardly support big-time fraud,  but victimization takes many 
        forms. Another hacker said it was likely that merchandise would be 
        ordered in my name and shipped to me -- just to harass me.  I used 
        to  use  credit-card  numbers  against someone I didn't like," the 
        hacker said.  "I'd call Sears and have a dozen toilets shipped  to 
        his house." 

     .  Meanwhile, back on Dragonfire, my teletrial was going strong.
        The charges,  as pressed my Unknown Warrior,  include "endangering 
        all phreaks and hacks." The judge in this case is  a  hacker  with 
        the  apt name of Ax Murderer.  Possible sentences range from exile 
        from the entire planet" to "kill the dude." King Blotto has  taken 
        up my defense,  using hacker power to make his first pleading:  he 
        dialed  up  Dragonfire,   broke  into  its  operating  system  and 
        "crashed"  the  bulletin  board,  destroying  all  of its messages 
        naming me. The board is back up now, with a retrial in full swing. 
        But then,  exile from the electronic underground looks better  all 
        the time.  
      


 +----------------------------------------------+
 | END of COLOSSUS NEWSLETTER Issue 3, Volume 1 |
 | Please upload to MANY boards!                |
 +----------------------------------------------+

  (Chuck: Whew!)
  (Ed: My fingers cramped again!)

Dave I.

I'm not surprised.  If *I* ever get my hands on one of these little theives,
I'll show him or her how a professional can scramble their silicon...

Seriously, I don't know how anyone expected something different.  We can
teach kids all the tech skills necessary to do these things, but it's 
just not considered part of either the formal curriculum, or a parent's
duty, to teach a sense of ethics about use of such skills.  I once let
loose on a bunch of students at U of W who were on the system staff; they
considered it perfectly OK to read anyone's electronic mail that passed
through their machine, or between students and professors.  Not only that,
but if you annoyed one of them, you might find your files munged or missing.
By the time I got through, I'm sure that they got my message.  Don't believe
for a moment that they'd do anything about it, but they knew that when they
got out into the 'real world', if they ever did something like that and I
caught them, they'd be fired--or worse.

Oh, well...this is just one of my sore points.  These twits are going to ruin
it for all the rest of us, unless we police them ourselves...

meg

We get a few phreakers or hackers on M-Net now and then, at least they
claim to be, mostly we drive 'em out by means of some 'practical jokes'
we engineer, that and a combination of the fact that Mike states every
where and anywhere that if anyone comes investigating, all his files
and stuff are open and for the record.  That usually keeps it at a
minimum, and they are never around long enough to cause any trouble on
the board, nor do anything illegal.  

Was interesting tho, a conversation I had with someone who professed to
be a hacker, no longer on M-Net, and his absolute conviction that what
he was doing was perfectly alright and he honestly believed no one had
a right to complain.  I was completely dumbfounded, myself.


rob

Anyone have any ideas of how we can rid the computer world of these
types?  It's always the bad who receive publicity...

Arthur F.

I hate to say it, but business should have adopted a different equivalent of 
the ASCII code for transfering data

jjw

Easiest way to rid the world of these is to have intelligent people in charge
of setting up security in the first place, followed by more intelligent people
using it.
 I had my share of this s**t at Harper College, where a bunch of local phreaks
thought they could run the system out from under the school. I did them one
better - joined the school and ran it as secure as I could make it (within the
limits that the school itself imposed).
 Some general ideas - y'all remember a few years ago the kid that broke into
DePauls system? I knew him, and the other guy who helped was my friend's cousin
(both sorta twits). It helped that DePaul kept last years password list as
a readable ascii file, open to public inspection. Seems they used 3 character
passwords. Also, the first letter was between A and M. Took about 20 minutes to
break through. When they changed it, the new password followed the same format.
The program that allegedly did so much damage had been around for several
months. All the authorities denied that it could possibly crash the system, and
refused to listen to me when I told them. Eventually, HP came up with a fix 
that took care of it, but DePaul somehow didn't think it needed that fix.
 I'd kind of like to make the sys administrators liable for damages on any 
system that gets broken into. It would encourage them to take much better care
in designing the security.
 Oh, also, on my home BBS system (not yet up, but getting there slowly), I have
a sure way to prevent anybody from getting through. Even supposing that they
can crash the program, the modem's hooked up to the serial printer port. I do
*all* my own i/o, and if it crashes, they're not a console, they're a printer
and the system ignores them. Also, I am *not* going to allow so-called 'sysop'
stuff to be done from within the system. To do these functions, you'll have
to be physically in my apt, at my terminal, running programs outside of the
bbs system. The worst I can come up with would be to bring each user down,
but even that won't let anybody do anything un-cool.

kji

I like the idea of the i/o through the serial printer stuff.  I could
throw up a board in not time if I only had the smart modem.  Have all
the programs setup with tons of pd stuff, but no $ for the modem.

jcs

Here's an idea for twit control: Uzi's & Mac 10's are rarely argued with.

bhv

If kids can get into the credit bureaus, imagine what the professionals
can do.  It seems to me that the credit bureaus are the weak link in the
chain, and it would be better to work on increasing their security than
to try  and police every kid in existence.

greg

I have little worry of a serial port of any kind being turned into a tty
controlling the system since {there's no way to control the mouse via
that port.. and even if they could, they couldn't see what they were doing
anyway..

Problem solved...

rlk

I don't think the credit agencies themselves are bad, its the clients
who don't maintain security of their passwords.  I've seen several
places where access passwords were taped to the wall over the
terminal, and the terminals were in public access areas so that
everyone 'knew' the shop was computerized.  One place must have
had a nearsighted operator, 'cause the password had been written
using a magic marker.  You could read it from the lobby.

pgy

There is also the other extreme of security.  I'm currently working on
a team programming project for which we have a librarian who maintains
among other things, the include files for the system.  I came in today
and reran the make file for my current sub project.  I was immediately
informed that cc could not find the include files.  I thought that
perhaps the files had been reorganised (this is something I've been
told to expect soon).  But upon further investigation, I found that
read permission for the world had been removed from the include
directory.  In order to access these files I had to newgrp to the
special group which only the librarian defaults to, and then re-run
the make.  It was a small annoyance, but it was an an
annoyance.  These files are most decidedly NOT secret -- there was no good
reason to take read permissions off of that directory.  Especially in a
development environment, security should be only as tight as necessary.

jcs

There is a new guy in our department who was doing the same thing.
He had post-its with logins & passwords for all the Indian Hill machines
we use hanging all around his terminal. He even had his login/password
for our machine embedded in his function keys. It took about 10 minutes
to convince him that we WOULD use his login to wreak havoc on his files
if he didnt get rid of the stuff. He cleaned up his act in a hurry!
LMHY:
Sounds like you could use the Change Management System (CMS) available
from Bell Labs. It would make everybody's life easier there.
CMS=Change Management System.
Let's say you have a product that consists of N directories
with a couple hundred source files involved (ours consists of a few thousand
files). You have X number of developers working full time on the product
and the files are in a constant state of flux. Under CMS, only one developer
can modify a file(s) at a time. All other developers are denied access to
the file(s) until he is done with it. There are typically three "nodes"
available to the CMS user. 1) The "Official" node - where the last release
was generated from. 2) The "Approved" node - where files are kept after
they have been approved by the test team and before an integration has
been performed. Integration moves the files from approved to official.
3) The "Local" node - where changes are made and proved in by the developer.
Here is a simplified scenario of a change:
 Programmer jcs needs to change x.c for some reason. He generates an MR
 (modification request). Once the MR is approved by commitee (if there is one)
 and assigned he gets the latest version of the file from the official node.
 Thats right, SCCS is involved here. He makes the required changes to the file
 and builds the product in his local node. The build command utilizes 
 a viewpath which tells build where to look for the files it needs to create
 the product. If the viewpath looked like this - 

  VPATH=/prod/ofc:/prod/appr:/prod/localnode
 build would first search /prod/ofc for the files it needs then look in
 /prod/appr for any missing files then /prod/localnode. If a file in
 /prod/localnode is newer than a matching file in the other nodes it is
 used instead. Now that the product is built, the developer checks it out
 on whatever hardware it was built for and once he's satisified with it
 he passes it on to the test team. If the test team kisses the change,
 the change is moved into the approved node and eventually into the
 official node.

For large projects, CMS can't be beat. It's a logical way to synchronize
changes and prevent a lot of unnecessary confusion. 
For small projects it's probably a lot easier to rap the bozo next door
in the head for screwing around with your struct than it is to justify CMS.
CMS is available from Bell Labs.


Back to original topic for...

I find it hard to get worked up if someone looks through my files.  I think
damaging (deleting/changing/encrypting/etc) files is a different matter.
I dunno, but I certainly think your 'anti-hacker/phreak' stance is a bit
more extreme then warranted.

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