melissa@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Melissa Silvestre) (08/07/86)
In article <8608041647.aa08472@SEM.BRL.ARPA> ("Col. G. L. Sicherman") writes: >>[ME] >> Classic misconception here. There are two kinds of rights. There are >> negative rights, called liberties, and positive rights, sometimes called >> entitlements. John Gilmore (the >) is referring to negative rights. >> Dave Massey (indented) is referring to positive rights. Many of us believe >> that there is no such thing as positive rights, and that the sole >> purpose of government is to protect negative rights. >> Everyone can have and exercise negative rights all at the same >> time without conflict (by definition of "negative right"). > >The trouble with these absolute definitions is that no right is absolutely >negative. Most legislative debates are about whether an activity hurts >enough people to be worth regulating; i.e., how "positive" the activity >is. For example, the right of a factory owner to pour smoke into the air >was once regarded as a liberty, but is now regarded as an entitlement or >a privilege, because the right to breathe clean air has come to be regarded >as a "liberty" in your sense--though some people would call it an entitlement. > >The right to foul the air is a "negative" right, if the only criterion is that >everybody can exercise it at the same time. But it's not the sort of right >that I want to see protected! What I meant was that a "right" in the traditional sense can only be a right of its theoretically possible for everyone to exercise all of them. The only kinds of rights which can meet this criterion are negative rights, by definition. In your example, there is a clear conflict between the "right" to pour smoke into the air and the "right" to breathe free clean air. Clearly at least one of those, and maybe both, aren't true rights. Rights should be a closed set logically. The simplest set of rights is the null set. There are no internal conflicts. Almost as simple are sets with one member, that being one of the traditionally recognized "negative rights", like freedom of worship in your own home. The moment you add another element to this set, it must be checked against the existing members, as well as against itself. The object, of course, is make this set as large as possible under these restrictions. If you try to include just one "bad" (inconsistent) member, you've corrupted the set, and your philosophy has just become "anything goes, as long as it feels good". Is anyone up to the challenge? If you don't like my starting-off right, feel free to choose another. Remember it must be self-consistent. And I'd prefer to keep children and other "incompetents" out of it, since the question of whether they require an entirely different set isn't established. -- Melissa Silvestre (melissa@athena.mit.edu)
drears@ARDEC.ARPA ("1LT Dennis G. Rears", FSAC) (08/07/86)
> >What I meant was that a "right" in the traditional sense can only be a right >of its theoretically possible for everyone to exercise all of them. The only What???? >kinds of rights which can meet this criterion are negative rights, by >definition. In your example, there is a clear conflict between the "right" >to pour smoke into the air and the "right" to breathe free clean air. Clearly >at least one of those, and maybe both, aren't true rights. Before you can get into a discussion of rights. Isn't it better to define what a right is first. That word has so many connative definitions to render it meaningless unless it is defined by the audience first. You bring up the catagory of negative and positive rights. Others like to bring it out of the realm of law and say legal, god-given, human, and etc rights. >Rights should be a closed set logically. The simplest set of rights is the >null set. There are no internal conflicts. Almost as simple are sets with >one member, that being one of the traditionally recognized "negative rights", >like freedom of worship in your own home. The moment you add another element >to this set, it must be checked against the existing members, as well as >against itself. Unfortunately there are no rights that do not absolutely affect other individuals. The mere existence of one person affects other people negatively because of the resources he/she must have to exist. By consuming these resources he/she deprives others of them. This would negate the right to exist. If a person does not have a right to exist; how can he/she have any rights. I realize this is an extreme example but when you start mentioning absolutes it is time to bring out the extremes. By starting from scratch without assuming basic postulates and using absolutes you can go nowhere from there. >The object, of course, is make this set as large as possible under these >restrictions. If you try to include just one "bad" (inconsistent) member, >you've corrupted the set, and your philosophy has just become "anything >goes, as long as it feels good". See previous comment. What good is the philosophy if it can not make a reasonable attempt at describing the real world? >Is anyone up to the challenge? If you don't like my starting-off right, feel >free to choose another. Remember it must be self-consistent. And I'd prefer >to keep children and other "incompetents" out of it, since the question Unfortately be ky keeping children and other "incompetents" out of it you have invalidated your subject. Children and "incompetents" have rights too. By not even discussing their right you leave a big and important gap in your study. >of whether they require an entirely different set isn't established. >-- >Melissa Silvestre (melissa@athena.mit.edu) Dennis Rears
melissa@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Melissa Silvestre) (08/12/86)
I'd like to apologize for starting this discussion in info-law. I was reading it from rn via Usenet, and hadn't noticed that I'd left net.politics.theory. I'll be glad to discuss it with anyone over there, or be e-mail for anyone not receiving usenet. -- Melissa Silvestre (melissa@athena.mit.edu)