AIList-REQUEST@SRI-AI.ARPA (AIList Moderator Kenneth Laws) (01/12/86)
AIList Digest Sunday, 12 Jan 1986 Volume 4 : Issue 3 Today's Topics: Bindings - AI-Related Lists, Definition - Paradigm, Logic - New CSLI Reports, Reviews - Spang Robinson Report 2/1 & Rational Agency Seminars (CSLI) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Fri 10 Jan 86 12:18:09-PST From: Christopher Schmidt <SCHMIDT@SUMEX-AIM.ARPA> Subject: AI-Related Lists [...] To add to your list of AIList-related lists, Info-1100@SUMEX and Bug-1100@SUMEX are DL's concerning the Xerox 1100 series lisp machines and Interlisp, and Info-TI-Explorer@SUMEX and Bug-TI-Explorer@SUMEX are DL's concerning the TI Explorers and associated software. --Christopher ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 8 Jan 86 16:38:34 EST From: Bruce Nevin <bnevin@bbncch.ARPA> Subject: paradigm The term paradigm was specialized in philosophy of science by Thomas Kuhn in his 1965(?) book _The_Structure_of_Scientific_Revolutions and subsequent works. I would question whether AI is a mature enough field to have a paradigm in the sense that Kuhn intends for a mature science. Instead, there appears to be a fair selection of more or less divergent examples/models/agendas for each area of investigation. Many of these are associated with the more prominent investigators in AI. Bruce Nevin bn@bbncch.arpa BBN Communications 33 Moulton Street Cambridge, MA 02238 (617) 497-3992 [Disclaimer: my opinions may reflect those of many, but no one else need take responsibility for them, including my employer.] ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 8 Jan 1986 19:37 EST From: MINSKY%OZ.AI.MIT.EDU@MC.LCS.MIT.EDU Subject: AIList Digest V4 #2 about "paradigm" -- the dictionary is out of date because this word now almost universally refers to the notion in Thomas Kuhn's "Structure of Scientific Revolutions." It seems to mean powerful and influential idea, or something. ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 9 Jan 86 11:04:40 GMT From: Mmaccall%cs.ucl.ac.uk@cs.ucl.ac.uk Subject: Re: AI Paradigm An approximate meaning for the word `paradigm' is `template'. Gordon Joly gcj%qmc-ori@ucl-cs.arpa ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 10 Jan 86 16:53:46 GMT From: Mmaccall%cs.ucl.ac.uk@cs.ucl.ac.uk Subject: Re: AI Paradigm As an afterthought. The place where I first saw the term "paradigm" was in "Games People Play" by Eric Berne. Here, he has a model of the (transactional) relationship between two people, with three states of parent-adult-child. They are then put side by side with the parent above adult and the adult above child, each being represented by a circle. Lines are drawn to indicate which relationships are active in a given "game". The Chambers 20th Century Dictionary, as well as the Random House, gives the notion of "side by side". I hope this has a meaning for the "AI Paradigm"! Gordon Joly, gcj%qmc-ori@ucl-cs.arpa ------------------------------ Date: Thu 9 Jan 86 12:09:33-PST From: Wilkins <WILKINS@SRI-AI.ARPA> Subject: Paradigm Your dictionary is correct about "paradigm". This word has been used extensively in the Ai literature in an incorrect way. People incorrectly use it to mean "methodology" or "school of thought" or some such. David ------------------------------ Date: Thu 9 Jan 86 15:29:34-PST From: Michael Walker <WALKER@SUMEX-AIM.ARPA> Subject: ai paradigm? If you have a paradigm, there's always a chance that you'll get a paradigm shift, in which case people will fund your research for the next 20 years. On the other hand, if you say your example shifts, they'll think you're fudging your data. Mike ------------------------------ Date: Wed 8 Jan 86 16:53:32-PST From: Emma Pease <Emma@SU-CSLI.ARPA> Subject: New CSLI Reports on Logic NEW CSLI REPORTS Report No. CSLI-85-41, ``Possible-world Semantics for Autoepistemic Logic'' by Robert C. Moore and Report No. CSLI-85-42, ``Deduction with Many-Sorted Rewrite'' by Jose Meseguer and Joseph A. Goguen, have just been published. These reports may be obtained by writing to Trudy Vizmanos, CSLI, Ventura Hall, Stanford, CA 94305 or Trudy@SU-CSLI. ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 10 Jan 86 17:28:42 cst From: Laurence Leff <leff%smu.csnet@CSNET-RELAY.ARPA> Subject: Spang Robinson Report, Volume 2 No 1 Summary of Spang Robinson Report, Volume 2 Number 1, January 1986 featuring AI Hardware Vendors state that the biggest problem in marketing AI hardware is educating both internal people and the market place. An interview with a gentleman who evaluated AI type machines for use in developing software for silicon compilation research at Philips Labs. Discussion of various ways to enhance IBM PC's for AI (or other development needs) and the use of the Macintosh and Commodore's Amiga for AI research. C. J. Petrie of MCC described a system to parse text from a "how to" book into rules. Interview with Dag Tellefsen of Glenwood Management, a venture capitalist. They have funded Natural Language Products and AION. Kurzweil Applied Intelligence, that develops voice recognition hardware, has signed a joint marketing agreement with FutureNet which supplies electronic engineering work stations. Reasoning Systems has signed an agreement with Lockheed Missiles and Space Corporation to develop knowledge based systems for communications. (Reasoning Systems is involved with the commercialization of some of the techniques from the University of Southern California work in automating software development. See the IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering November 1985 Special Issue on AI and Software Engineering for more info.) "Logicware Inc. and Releations Ltd., both in Canada, have signed a long-term agreement to design an Artificial Intelligence language leading to a computer system which will emulate the thinking process of the human brain. It will be the first AI language designed for vector-processing by a super computer." Composition Systems has released two Artificial Intelligence kit that links VAX Lisp with such DEC product as FMS, RDB, GKS and DECNET." Review of the IEEE Computer Society Second Conference on Artificial Intelligence. ------------------------------ Date: Wed 8 Jan 86 16:53:32-PST From: Emma Pease <Emma@SU-CSLI.ARPA> Subject: Review - Rational Agency Seminars (CSLI) [Excerpted from the CSLI Newsletter by Laws@SRI-AI.] RATIONAL AGENCY GROUP Summary of Fall 1985 Work The fall-quarter meetings of the Rational Agency Group (alias RatAg) have focused on the question: what must the architecture of a rational agent with serious resource limitations look like? Our attempts to get at answers to this question have been of two kinds. One approach has been to consider problems in providing a coherent account of human rationality. Specifically, we have discussed a number of philosophically motivated puzzles, such as the case of the Double Pinball Machine, and the problem of the Strategic Bomber, presented in a series of papers by Michael Bratman. The second approach we have taken has been to do so-called robot psychology. Here, we have examined existing AI planning systems, such as the PRS system of Mike Georgeff and Amy Lansky, in an attempt to determine whether, and, if so, how these systems embody principles of rationality. Both approaches have led to the consideration of similar issues: 1) What primitive components must there be in an account of rationality? From a philosophical perspective, this is equivalent to asking what the set of primitive mental states must be to describe human rationality; from an AI perspective, this is equivalent to asking what the set of primitive mental operators must be to build an artificial agent who behaves rationally. We have agreed that the philospher's traditional 2-parameter model, containing just ``beliefs'' and ``desires'', is insufficient; we have further agreed that adding just a third parameter, say ``intentions'', is still not enough. We are still considering whether a 4-parameter model, which includes a parameter we have sometimes called ``operant desires'', is sufficient. These so-called operant desires are medial between intentions and desires in that, like the former (but not the latter) they control behavior in a rational agent, but like the latter (and not the former) they need not be mutually consistent to satisfy the demands of rationality. The term ``goal'', we discovered in passing, has been used at times to mean intentions, at times desires, at times operant desires, and at times other things; we have consequently banished it from our collective lexicon. 2) What are ``plans'', and how do they fit into a theory of rationality? Can they be reduced to some configuration of other, primitive mental states, or must they also be introduced as a primitive? 3) What are the combinatorial properties of these primitive components within a theory of rationality, i.e., how are they interrelated and how do they affect or control action? We have considered, e.g., whether a rational agent can intend something without believing it will happen, or not intend something she believes will inevitably happen. One set of answers to these questions that we have considered has come from the theory of plans and action being developed by Michael Bratman. Another set has come come from work that Phil Cohen has been doing with Hector Levesque, which involves explaining speech acts as a consequence of rationality. These two theories diverge on many points: Cohen and Levesque, for instance, are committed to the view that if a rational agent believes something to be inevitable, he also intends it; Bratman takes the opposite view. In recent meetings, interesting questions have arisen about whether there can be beliefs about the future that are `not' beliefs that something will inevitably happen, and, if so, whether concomitant intentions are guaranteed in a rational agent. The RatAg group intends to begin the new quarter by considering how Cohen and Levesque's theory can handle the philosphical problems discussed in Bratman's work. We will also be discussing the work of Hector-Neri Castaneda in part to explore the utility of Castaneda's distinction between propositions and practitions for our work on intention, belief and practical rationality. Professor Castaneda will be giving a CSLI colloquium in the spring. RatAg participants this quarter have been Michael Bratman (project leader), Phil Cohen, Todd Davies, Mike Georgeff, David Israel, Kurt Konolige, Amy Lansky, and Martha Pollack. --Martha Pollack ------------------------------ End of AIList Digest ********************