PHayes@SRI-KL.ARPA (Pat Hayes) (09/29/86)
I try not to get involved in these arguments, but bruce krulwich's assertion that Searle 'bases all his logic on' the binary nature of computers is seriously wrong. We could have harware which worked with direct, physical, embodiments of all of Shakespeare, and Searles arguments would apply to it just as well. What bothers him ( and many other philosophers ) is the idea that the machine works by manipulating SYMBOLIC descriptions of its environment ( or whatever it happens to be thinking about ). It's the internal representation idea, which we AIers take in with our mothers milk, which he finds so silly and directs his arguments against. Look, I also don't think there's any real difference between a human's knowledge of a horse and machine's manipulation of the symbol it is using to represent it. But Searle has some very penetrating arguments against this idea, and one doesnt make progress by just repeating one's intuitions, one has to understand his arguments and explain what is wrong with them. Start with the Chinese room, and read all his replies to the simple counterarguments as well, THEN come back and help us. Pat Hayes -------
tanner@OHIO-STATE.ARPA (Mike Tanner) (10/10/86)
Pat Hayes made some cogent remarks about Searle's problems with AI being much deeper than the discussion here would indicate. But I wonder whether the argument is worth the effort. I have a lot of work to do and only so much time. I can work just fine on problems of intelligence without worrying about Searle's (or Dreyfus's) complaints. Just as the working physicist can work all day without once being bothered by the question of whether quarks *really* exist, so the working AIer can make progress on his problems without being bothered by Searle. -- mike tanner@ohio-state.arpa