[mod.ai] Objective vs. Subjective Inquiry

harnad@seismo.CSS.GOV@mind.UUCP (Stevan Harnad) (01/22/87)

"CUGINI, JOHN" <cugini@icst-ecf> wrote on mod.ai:

>	...so the toothache is "real" but "subjective"...
>	But...if both [subjective and objective phenomena] are real,
>	then we know why we need consciousness as a concept --
>	because without it we cannot explain/talk about the former class of
>	events - even if the latter class is entirely explicable in its own
>	terms. Ie, why should we demand of consciousness that it have
>	explanatory power for objective events?  It's like demanding that
>	magnetism be acoustically detectible before we accept it as a valid
>	concept.

Fortunately, there is a simple answer to this: Explanation itself is
(or should be) purely an objective matter. Magnetism, and all other
tractable physical phenomena are (in principle) objectively
explainable, so the above analogy simply does not work. Nagel has shown
that all of the other reductions in physics have always been
objective-to-objective. The mind/body problem is an exception
precisely because it resists subjective-to-objective reduction. Now if
there's something (subjectively) real and irreducible left over that
is left out of an objective account, we have to learn to live with
that explanatory incompleteness, rather than wishing it away by
hopeless mixing of categories and hopeful pumping of analogies, images
and interpretations. (In fact, I think that if all the objective
manifestations of consciousness -- performance capacity and neural
substrate -- are indeed "entirely explicable [in their own objective]
terms," as I believe and Cugini seems to concede, then why not get on
to explaining them thus, rather than indulging in subjective
overinterpretation and wishful thinking, which can only obscure or
even retard objective progress?)

[Please do not pounce on the parenthetic "subjectively" that preceded
"real," above. The problem of the objective status of consciousness
IS the mind/body problem, and to declare that subjectively-real =
objectively-real is just to state an empty obiter dictum. It happens
to be a correlative fact that all detectable physical phenomena --
i.e., all objective observables -- have subjective manifestations.
That's what we MEAN by observability, intersubjectivity, etc. But the
fact that the objective always piggy-backs on the subjective still
doesn't settle the objective status of the subjective itself. I'll go
even further. I'm not a solipsist. I'm as confident as I am of any
objective inference I have made that other people really exist and have
experiences like my own. But even THAT sense of the "reality" of the
subjective does not help when it comes to trying to give an objective
account of it. As to subjective accounts -- well, I don't go in much
for hermeneutics...]

>	I can well understand how those who deny the reality of experiences
>	(eg, toothaches) would then insist on the superfluousness of the
>	concept of consciousness - but Harnad clearly is not one such.
>	So...we need consciousness, not to explain public, objective events,
>	such as neural activity, but to explain, or at least discuss, private
>	subjective events.  If it be objected that the latter are outside the
>	proper realm of science, so be it, call it schmience or philosophy or
>	whatever you like. - but surely anything that is REAL, even if
>	subjective, can be the proper object for some sort of rational
>	study, no?

Some sort, no doubt. But not an objective sort, and that's the point.
Empirical psychology, neuroscience and artificial intelligence are
all, I presume, branches of objective inquiry. I know that this is
also the heyday of hermeneutics, but although I share with a vengeance
the belief that philosophy can make a substantive contribution to the
cognitive sciences today, I don't believe that that contribution will
be hermeneutic. Rather, I think it will be logical, methodological
and foundational, pointing out hidden complexities, incoherencies and
false-starts. Let's leave the subjective discussion of private events
to lit-crit, where it belongs.

Stevan Harnad
{allegra, bellcore, seismo, rutgers, packard}  !princeton!mind!harnad
harnad%mind@princeton.csnet
(609)-921-7771