harnad@seismo.CSS.GOV@mind.UUCP (01/28/87)
Ken Laws <Laws@SRI-STRIPE.ARPA> wrote: > I'm inclined to grant a limited amount of consciousness to corporations > and even to ant colonies. To do so, though, requires rethinking the > nature of pain and pleasure (to something related to homeostatis). Unfortunately, the problem can't be resolved by mere magnanimity. Nor by simply reinterpreting experience as something else -- at least not without a VERY persuasive argument -- one no one in the history of the M/B problem has managed to come up with so far. This history is just one of hand-waving. Do you think "rethinking" pain as homeostastis does the trick? > computer operating systems and adaptive communications networks are > close [to conscious]. The issue is partly one of complexity, partly > of structure, partly of function. I'll get back to the question of whether experiencing is an all-or-none phenomenon or a matter of degree below. For now, I just wonder what kind and degree of structural/functional "complexity" you believe adds up to EXPERIENCING pain as opposed to merely behaving as if experiencing pain. > I am assuming that neurons and other "simple" systems are C-1 but > not C-2 -- and C-2 is the kind of consciousness that people are > really interested in. Yes, but do you really think that hard questions like these can be settled by assumption? The question is: What justifies the inference that an organism or device is experiencing ANYTHING AT ALL (C-1), and what justifies interpreting internal functions as conscious ones? Assumption does not seem like a very strong justification for an inference or interpretation. What is the basis for your assumption? I have proposed the TTT as the only justifiable basis, and I've given arguments in support of that proposal. The default assumptions in the AI/Cog-Sci community seem to be that sufficiently "complex" function and performance capacity, preferably with "memory" and "learning," can be dubbed "conscious," especially with the help of the subsidiary assumption that consciousness admits of degrees. The thrust of my critique is that this position is rather weak and arbitrary, and open to telling counter-examples (like Searle's). But, more important, it is not an issue on which the Cog-sci community even needs to take a stand! For Cog-sci's objective goal -- of giving a causal explanation of organisms' and devices' functional properties -- can be achieved without embellishing any of its functional constructs with a conscious interpretation. This is what I've called "methodological epiphenomenalism." Moreover, the TTT (as an asymptotic goal) even captures the intuitions about "sufficient functional complexity and performance capacity," in a nonarbitrary way. It is the resolution of these issues by unsupportable assumption, circularity, arbitrary fiat and obiter dicta that I think is not doing the field any good. And this is not at all because (1) it simply makes cog-sci look silly to philosophers, but because, as I've repeatedly suggested, (2) the unjustified embellishment of (otherwise trivial, toy-like) function or performance as "conscious" can actually side-track cog-sci from its objective, empirical goals, masking performance weaknesses by anthropomorphically over-interpreting them. Finally (3), the unrealizable goal of objectively capturing conscious phenomenology, being illogical, threatens to derail cog-sci altogether, heading it in the direction of hermeneutics (i.e., subjective interpretation of mental states, i.e., C-2) rather than objective empirical explanation of behavioral capacity. [If C-2 is "what people are really interested in," then maybe they should turn to lit-crit instead of cog-sci.] > The mystery for me is why only >>one<< subsystem in my brain > seems to have that introspective property -- but > multiple personalities or split-brain subjects may be examples that > this is not a necessary condition. Again, we'd probably be better off tackling the mystery of what the brain can DO in the world, rather than what subjective states it can generate. But, for the record, there is hardly agreement in clinical psychology and neuropsychology about whether split-brain subjects or multiple-personality patients really have more than one "mind," rather than merely somewhat dissociated functions -- some conscious, some not -- that are not fully integrated, either temporally or experientially. Inferring that someone has TWO minds seems to be an even trickier problem than the usual problem ("solved" by the TTT) of inferring that someone has ONE (a variant of the mind/body problem called the "other-minds" problem). At least in the case of the latter we have our own, normal unitary experience to generalize from... > [Regarding the question of whether consciousness admits of degrees:] > An airplane either can fly or it can't. Yet there are > simpler forms of flight used by other entities-- kites, frisbees, > paper airplanes, butterflies, dandelion seeds... My own opinion > is that insects and fish feel pain, but often do so in a generalized, > nonlocalized way that is similar to a feeling of illness in humans. Flight is an objective, objectively definable function. Experience is not. We can, for example, say that a massive body that stays aloft in space for any non-zero period of time is "flying" to a degree. There is no logical problem with this. But what does it mean to say that something is conscious to a degree? Does the entity in question EXPERIENCE anything AT ALL? If so, it is conscious. If not, not. What has degree to do with it (apart from how much, or how intensely it experiences, which is not the issue)? I too believe that lower animals feel pain. I don't want to conjecture what it feels like to them; but having conceded that it feels like anything at all, you seem to have conceded that they are conscious. Now where does the question of degree come into it? The mind/body problem is the problem of subjectivity. When you ask whether something is conscious, you're asking whether it has subjective states at all, not which ones, how many, or how strong. That is an all-or-none matter, and it concerns C-1. You can't speak of C-2 at all until you have a principled handle on C-1. > I assume that lower forms experience lower forms of consciousness > along with lower levels of intelligence. Such continuua seem natural > to me. If you wish to say that only humans and TTT-equivalents are > conscious, you should bear the burden of establishing the existence > and nature of the discontinuity. I happen to share all those assumptions about consciousness in lower forms, except that I don't see any continuum of consciousness there at all. They're either conscious or not. I too believe they are conscious, but that's an all-or-none matter. What's on a continuum is what they're conscious OF, how much, to what degree, perhaps even what it's "like" for them (although the latter is more a qualitative than a quantitative matter). But THAT it's like SOMETHING is what it is that I am assenting to when I agree that they are conscious at all. That's C-1. And it's the biggest discontinuity we're ever likely to know of. (Note that I didn't say "ever likely to experience," because of course we DON'T experience the discontinuity: We know what it is like to experience something, and to experience more or less things, more or less intensely. But we don't know what it's like NOT to experience something. [Be careful of the scope of the "not" here: I know what it's like to see not-red, but not what it's like to not-see red, or be unconscious, etc.] To know what it's like NOT to experience anything at all is to experience not-experiencing, which is a contradiction in terms. This is what I've called, in another paper, the problem of "uncomplemented" categories. It is normally solved by analogy. But where the categories are uncomplementable in principle, analogy fails in principle. I think that this is what is behind our incoherent intuition that consciousness admits of degrees: Because to experience the conscious/unconscious discontinuity is logically impossible, hence, a fortiori, experientially impossible.) > [About why neurons are conscious and atoms are not:] > When someone demonstrates that atoms can learn, I'll reconsider. You're showing your assumptions here. What can be more evident about the gratuitousness of mentalistic interpretation (in place of which I'm recommending abstention or agnosticism on methodological grounds) than that you're prepared to equate it with "learning"? > You are questioning my choice of discontinuity, but mine is easy > to defend (or give up) because I assume that the scale of > consciousness tapers off into meaninglessness. Asking whether > atoms are conscious is like asking whether aircraft bolts can fly. So far, it's the continuum itself that seems meaningless (and the defense a bit too easy-going). Asking questions about subjective phenomena is not as easy as asking about objective ones, hopeful analogies notwithstanding. The difficulty is called the mind/body problem. > I hope you're not insisting that no entity can be conscious without > passing the TTT. Even a rock could be conscious without our having > any justifiable means of deciding so. Perhaps this is a good place to point out the frequent mistake of mixing up "ontic" questions (about what's actually TRUE of the world) and "epistemic" ones (about what we can KNOW about what's actually true of the world, and how). I am not claiming that no entity can be conscious without passing the TTT. I am not even claiming that every entity that passes the TTT must be conscious. I am simply saying that IF there is any defensible basis for inferring that an entity is conscious, it is the TTT. The TTT is what we use with one another, when we daily "solve" the informal "other-minds" problem. It is also cog-sci's natural asymptotic goal in mind-modeling, and again the only one that seems methodologically and logically defensible. I believe that animals are conscious; I've even spoken of species-specific variants of the TTT; but with these variants both our intuitions and our ecological knowledge become weaker, and with them the usefulness of the TTT in such cases. Our inability to devise or administer an animal TTT doesn't make animals any less conscious. It just makes it harder to know whether they are, and to justify our inferences. (I'll leave the case of the stone as an exercise in applying the ontic/epistemic distinction.) >>SH: "(To reply that synthetic substances with the same functional properties >> must be conscious under these conditions is to beg the question.)" >KL: I presume that a synthetic replica of myself, or any number of such > replicas, would continue my consciousness. I agree completely. The problem was justifying attributing consciousness to neurons and denying it to, say, atoms. It's circular to say neurons are conscious because they have certain functional properties that atoms lack MERELY on the grounds that neurons are functional parts of (obviously) conscious organisms. If synthetic components would work just as well (as I agree they would), you need a better justification for imputing consciousness to neurons than that they are parts of conscious organisms. You also need a better argument for imputing consciousness to their synthetic substitutes. The TTT is my (epistemic) criterion for consciousness at the whole-organism level. Its usefulness and applicability trail off drastically with lower and lower organisms. I've criticized cog-sci's default criteria earlier in this response. What criteria do you propose, and what is the supporting justification, for imputing consciousness to, say, neurons? > Perhaps professional philosophers are able to strive for a totally > consistent world view. The only thing at issue is logical consistency, not world view. And even professional scientists have to strive for that. > Why is there Being instead of Nothingness? Who cares? These standard examples (along with the unheard sound of the tree falling alone in the forest) are easily used to lampoon philosophical inquiry. They tend to be based on naive misunderstandings of what philosophers are actually doing -- which is usual as significant and rigorous as any other area of logically constrained intellectual inquiry (although I wouldn't vouch for all of it, in any area of inquiry). But in this case consider the actual ironic state of affairs: It is cog-sci that is hopefully opening up and taking an ambitious position on the problems that normally only concern philosophers, such as the mind/body problem. NONphilosophers are claiming : "this is conscious and that's not," and "this is why," and "this is what consciousness is." So who's bringing it up, and who's the one that cares? Moreover, I happen myself to be a nonphilosopher (although I have a sizeable respect for that venerable discipline and its inevitable quota of insightful exponents); yet I repeatedly find myself in the peculiar role of having to point out the philosophically well-known howlers that cog-sci keeps tumbling into in its self-initiated inquiry into "Nothingness." More ironic still, in arguing for the TTT and methodological epiphenomenalism, I am actually saying: "Why do you care? Worrying about consciousness will get you nowhere, and there's objective empirical work to do!" > If I had to build an aircraft, I would not begin by refuting > theological arguments about Man being given dominion over the > Earth rather than the Heavens. I would start from a premise that > flight was possible and would try to derive enabling conditions. Building aircraft and devices that (attempt to) pass the TTT are objective, do-able empirical tasks. Trying to model conscious phenomenology, or to justify interpreting processes as conscious, gets you as embroiled in "theology" as trying to justify interpreting the Communal wafer as the body of Christ. Now who's the pragmatist and who's the theologian? Stevan Harnad {allegra, bellcore, seismo, rutgers, packard} !princeton!mind!harnad harnad%mind@princeton.csnet (609)-921-7771