[mod.ai] Why I am not a Methodological Epiphenomenalist

cugini@icst-ecf.UUCP.UUCP (01/30/87)

> >  Me: Consciousness may be as superflouous (wrt evolution) as earlobes.
> >  That hardly goes to show that it ain't there.
>        
> Harnad: Agreed. It only goes to show that methodological epiphenomalism may
> indeed be the right research strategy. 
> 
> >  I don't think [the existence of consciousness] does NEED to be so.
> >  It just is so.
> 
> Fine. Now what are you going to do about it, methodologically speaking?
> 
> ... Methodological epiphenomenalism recommends we face it [the inability
> to objectively measure subjective phenomena] and live
> with it, since not that much is lost. The "incompleteness" of an
> objective account is, after all, just a subjective problem. But
> supposing away the incompleteness -- by wishful thinking, hopeful
> over-interpretation, hidden (subjective) premises or blurring of the
> objective/subjective distinction -- is a logical problem.

A few points:

1.  Insofar as meth.. ep.. (ME) is simply the following kind of counsel:
"when trying to get a computer to play chess, don't worry about the
subjective feelings which accompany human chess-playing, just get the
machine to make the right moves", I have no particular quarrel with it.

2.  It is the claim that the TTT is the only relevant criterion (or,
by far, the major criterion) for the presence of consciousness that
strikes me as unnecessarily provocative and, almost as bad, false.
It is not clear to me whether this claim is an integral part of ME,
or an independent thesis.  At any rate, such a claim is clearly
a philosophical one, having to do mainly with the epistemology of
consciousness, and as such is fair game for philosophically-based
(rather than AI-research-based) debate.  If the claim instead were
that the TTT is the major criterion for the presence of intelligence
(defined in a perhaps somewhat austere way, as the ability to
perform certain kinds of tasks...) then, again, I would have no
serious disagreement.

3.  Is the incompleteness of objective accounts of the world "just
a subjective problem" ?  Is it true that "not that much is lost"?
Well, I guess each of us can decide how much to be bothered by this
incompleteness.  I agree it's no argument against AI, psychophysics
or anything else that they "leave consciousness out" any more than it
is that they leave astronomy out.  But there are astronomers around to
cover that ground (metaphorical ground, of course). It does bother me
(more than it does you?) that consciousness, of all things,
consciousness, which may be subjective, but, we agree, is real,
consciousness, without which my day would be so boring, is simply not
addressed by any systematic rational inquiry.

John Cugini <Cugini@icst-ecf>
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