DAVIS@EMBL.BITNET.UUCP (02/10/87)
From: "CUGINI, JOHN" <cugini@icst-ecf> > I (and Reed and Taylor?) been pushing the "brain-as-criterion" based > on a very simple line of reasoning: > 1. my brain causes my consciousness. > ....... > Now, when I say simple things like this, Harnad says complicated things like: > re 1: how do you KNOW your brain causes your consciousness? How can you have > causal knowledge without a good theory of mind-brain interaction? > Re 2: How do you KNOW your brain is similar to others'? Similar wrt > what features? How do you know these are the relevant features? > ..... > We are dealing with the mind-body problem. That's enough of a philosophical > problem to keep us busy. I have noticed (although I can't explain why), > that when you start discussing the mind-body problem, people (even me, once > in a while) start to use it as a hook on which to hang every other > known philosophical problem: > 1. well how do we know anything at all, much less our neighbors' mental states ? (skepticism and epistemology). > ........ > All of these are perfectly legitimate philosophical questions, but > they are general problems, NOT peculiar to the mind-body problem. > When addressing the mind-body problem, we should deal with its > peculiar features (of which there are enough), and not get mired in > more general problems * unless they are truly in doubt and thus their > solution truly necessary for M-B purposes. * > I do not believe that this is so of the issues Harnad raises. Sorry John, but you can't get away with this sort of 'simple' stuff. Dressing up complex issues in straightforward clothing is not an answer. Firstly, as Ken Laws recently indicated with considerable flair (though to my mind, insufficient force), we have to deal with your assertion that 'my brain causes my conciousness'. Harnad's question may or may not be relevant, but *IF* we are going to get bogged down in subjective conciousness (which is of little rel1 1