rapaport@buffalo.CSNET.UUCP (02/19/87)
STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK AT BUFFALO
GRADUATE GROUP IN COGNITIVE SCIENCE
MICHAEL J. TYE
Department of Philosophy
Northern Illinois University
A PICTURE THEORY OF MENTAL IMAGES
The picture theory of mental images has become a subject of hot debate
in recent cognitive psychology. Some psychologists, notably Stephen
Kosslyn, have argued that the best explanation of a variety of experi-
ments on imagery is that mental images are pictorial. Although Kosslyn
has valiantly tried to explain just what the basic thesis of the pic-
torial approach (as he accepts it) amounts to, his position remains dif-
ficult to grasp. As a result, I believe, it has been badly misunder-
stood, both by prominent philosophers and by prominent cognitive scien-
tists.
My aims in this paper are to present a clear statement of the picture
theory as it is understood by Kosslyn, to show that this theory presents
no threat to the dominant digital-computer model of the mind (contrary
to the claims of some well-known commentators), and to argue that the
issue of imagistic indeterminacy is more problematic for the opposing
linguistic or descriptional view of mental images than it is for the
picture theory.
Monday, March 9, 1987
3:30 P.M.
Park 280, Amherst Campus
Co-sponsored by: Department of Philosophy
Informal discussion at 8:00 P.M. at a place to be announced. Call Bill
Rapaport (Dept. of Computer Science, 636-3193 or 3181) or Gail Bruder
(Dept. of Psychology, 636-3676) for further information.
William J. Rapaport
Assistant Professor
Dept. of Computer Science, SUNY Buffalo, Buffalo, NY 14260
(716) 636-3193, 3180
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