[mod.politics.arms-d] Arms-Discussion Digest V5 #32

ARMS-D-Request@MIT-MC.ARPA (Moderator) (12/02/85)

Arms-Discussion Digest                Sunday, December 1, 1985 11:02PM
Volume 5, Issue 32

Today's Topics:

                          REAL Star Wars...
     Star Wars - The Wall Street Journal and Scientific American
                          C-5s full of drugs

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Date: Fri 29 Nov 1985 18:31:39 EST
From: Paul Dietz <dietz%slb-doll.csnet@CSNET-RELAY.ARPA>
Subject: REAL Star Wars...

While thinking about Star Wars and possible Soviet countermeasures, I
thought back to Niven & Pournelle's latest book ("Footfall").




To battle the invading aliens, the good guys built an Orion-style pulse
rocket.  The US was working on this in the early sixties but dropped it
when the Atmospheric Test Ban Treaty was signed.  The idea is well
known: a massive spacecraft is propelled by exploding shaped nuclear
charges under it.  The charges send streams of high velocity material
(polyethylene, say) against a massive steel pusher plate/radiation
shield.  One launch uses tens of bombs and puts thousands of
tons in orbit.

There's nothing high tech about this.  If we could do it in the early
sixties the Russians could probably do it today.  They have lots of
bombs and lots of steel, and the technology is more like shipbuilding
than rocketry.

Orion's justification was as a space battleship.  What a ship!  By
turning its pusher plate against oncoming warheads it could withstand
a one megaton blast 500 feet away.  It could use its own propulsion
charges as weapons.  It has plenty of mass budget for shielding against
lasers, particle beams, rocks, or whatever, and for its own offensive
weaponry.  An Orion-type ship pitted against an SDI-type defense would
be like a cat amongst the pidgeons.  The only way to counter it
is build your own.

Orion-style ships could lift armored reentry vehicles and scads of
decoys into space.  Even worse, such a ship could be lifted into
a retrograde orbit where it could scatter large quantities of gravel.
An effective ploy would be to scatter 1000 tonnes of 1 milligram
tungsten particles (say) in retrograde equatorial orbits out to several
earth radii.  Any satellite intersecting this disk would be hit within
several months.  Near-earth space could be seeded much more heavily,
rendering the shuttle useless.

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Date: Sun, 1 Dec 85 15:44:05 pst
From: "Dave Caulkins; Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility; 415-322-3778" <cdp!caulkins@glacier>
Subject:  Star Wars - The Wall Street Journal and Scientific American

 Some interesting quotes from "Analyzing Risks - In Star Wars
Debate, Tactical Issues Nearly Get Lost In The Shuffle", a front
page piece in the Oct 15, 85 western edition of the Wall Street Journal.

"...A glimpse of how US strategists think about SDI comes from
[retired] Lt. Gen. Blenn Kent ... who now works for the Rand
Corp. ..."

"In Case I [of Kent's strategic models] neither side has
defenses.  The [Soviet first strike] destroys the entire US ICBM
force in its silos, but the US still is able to unleash a
devastating retaliation with 3,000 submarine-based warheads.
The Soviets, in this scenario, face assured destruction. 

In Case II, both sides have defenses, each capable of destroying
5,000 incoming warheads.  US defenses blunt the Soviet first
strike and protect nearly all of America's ICBM force.  But
SOVIET defenses render the US retaliation nearly impotent,
because they can destroy both the 2,000 surviving ICBM warheads
and the 3,000 submarine-based warheads.  The US, in this case,
has lost most of its retaliatory punch [and there is still a big
payoff for a first strike in a situation where deterrence is
supposedly 'defense based']. ...

"SDI's technological challenges, though difficult, probably
aren't insurmountable. ... If each layer [boost, mid-course,
early reentry, and late reentry] meets the SDI target of 80%
kill rate, then only 1.6 warheads per 1,000 would penetrate.
Analysts argue that destroying objects in the boost and reentry
phases will be relatively easy, even with existing technology.
The real problem, they say, will be developing sensors that can
discriminate between warheads and decoys in the during the
midcourse phase, and designing computer software for the vast
battle-management system. ...

The [SDI] Advantages

-Strengthening Deterrence.  SDI probably can't achieve the
Reagan goal of replacing deterrence with 'assured survival', but
it could help enhance deterrence by protecting US retaliatory
capability.  With a limited SDI, for example, the US could
protect its currently vulnerable ICBM force and severely
complicate an attacker's plans. ...

-NATO Benefits
An SDI system in Europe could provide better options in the case
of a limited Soviet non-nuclear attack aimed at preventing the
US from resupplying NATO ...

-Soviet Retooling
Simply by threatening to deploy SDI, the US could force the
Soviets to revamp their existing missile force in ways that
might lessen its first-strike capability.  Specifically the
Soviets would have to shorten the "burn-time" of their missiles
[no mention is made of the simpler countermeasure of
increasing the number of missiles and/or warheads; these things
would plainly be bad for the US] ...

The Drawbacks

-The Tricky Transition
SDI could increase the instability of the US-Soviet nuclear
balance.  A workable SDI would create the possibility, for the
first time since the American nuclear monopoly of the late
1940s, that one side could strike first and emerge without
severe retaliatory damage.  A nation that saw its adversary
headed toward such invulnerability would do everything possible
to derail SDI, and failing that, might be tempted to launch a
pre-emptive strike.

-Soviet Defenses
SDI would be fine if the US had it and the Soviets didn't.  But
Gen. Kent's calculations, summarized above, indicate that if
both sides have symmetrical defenses the US loses. ...

-Anti-SDI Weapons
SDI deployments would trigger a further spiral in the arms race.
... In an SDI world ... the temptation to go first will
increase, unless the defenses are invulnerable.  The key
judgement about SDI will be about vulnerability. ..."

I found this quite interesting, considering that up until now the
WSJ has been a supporter of Reagan and his Star Wars policies.

Star Wars software in Scientific American

For those who haven't seen it, "The Development of Sofware for
Ballistic-Missile Defense" by our own Herb Lin appears on P46 of
the December 85 Scientific American.  Herb explores the
difficulties involved in building a software system of the size
and complexity required for Star Wars.  I recommend it.

Dave C

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Date: Sun,  1 Dec 85 23:01:09 EST
From: amdcad!phil at decwrl.DEC.COM (Phil Ngai)@MIT-MC.ARPA
Subject:    C-5s full of drugs

>From: delftcc!sam at nyu.arpa
>
> since C-5 cargo planes full of drugs come in regularly over the
>southern border.)  

I find this hard to believe since C-5s are military planes still in
active service. I doubt the drug smugglers have gotten hold of any.
What is your source for this assertion?

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End of Arms-Discussion Digest
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