ARMS-D-Request@MIT-MC.ARPA (Moderator) (12/04/85)
Arms-Discussion Digest Wednesday, December 4, 1985 2:48PM
Volume 5, Issue 42
Today's Topics:
Still More on Launch on Warning
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Date: Wed, 4 Dec 85 11:42:03 EST
From: Clifford Johnson <GA.CJJ at Forsythe>@MIT-MC.ARPA
Subject: A real help
REPLY TO 11/25/85 18:32 FROM LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA: A "nonnegligible" probability
Herb:
(1) I'm wondering whether to expand my LOWC complaint to include
other predelegation categories; but don't think I will. Its
legality has been questioned by some.
(2) If the President is not available then we do have a problem,
you agree. The time frames may make that the case. But have
you read Kissinger's statement that "the only way you can implement
[LOWC] is by delegating authority down to some field commander
who must be given discretion so that when he thinks a nuclear war
has started, he can retaliate". (Ford's "The Button", p.34.)
(3) Re Looking Glass, you're right, that's not the focus of my
complaint.
(4) MacNamara had time to reassert control.
(5) Can I use your statement that you would be "VERY upset and
scared" if Reagan told underlings to launch if there wasn't time
to get to him after a warning? That's certainly something I
can argue is illegal. Legal stuff will be mailed.
(6) After Reagan's "joke", Moscow sent a "joke" message to its Siberian
forces to attack U.S. Pacific forces in 30 mins. The reaction was a
major alert of U.S./ Japanese forces, until Moscow's cancellation
order arrived 20 minutes later. We never even heard of this till
it was leaked months later.
(7) The analog to "fire when fire upon" is not faulty, it's just
that you've got to be abosolutely certain you're being fired upon
in peacetime. There's a legal analog in setting lethal booby traps;
when you might kill, you got to be sure of what you're doing.
Also, courts have in other cases ruled that computerization must
not substitute for human discretion (re jury selection procedures).
(8) Yes, I've been in touch with Jeremy Stone.
(9) We strongly disgaree re interpretation of the Hart/Goldwater
report. I call having nuclear bombers taxi-ing down runways
a change in nuclear force alert levels; so do Congressmen (e.g.
Jack Brooks). (Incidentally, I believe some missile crews were
alerted - not certain - and were certainly alerted in the Nov. 1979
false alert.) I also call the take-off of the POacific command post
a strategically significant decision. I thionk your assertion that
no strategically significant decision was taken kind of proves my
point - a chip took the decision for everyone.
(10) Yes, I am addressing a concern that has been around for some
time; since the "window of vulnerability" opened in the
mid-seventies. The way things are heading (Pershing IIs, Star
Wars), we're going to blow ourselves up.
Thanks again, this has been a real help.
Cliff
To: LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA
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Date: Wed, 4 Dec 85 11:42:07 EST
From: Herb Lin <LIN at MIT-MC.ARPA>@MIT-MC.ARPA
Subject: A real help
(1) I'm wondering whether to expand my LOWC complaint to include
other predelegation categories; but don't think I will. Its
legality has been questioned by some.
Frankly, I think you'd have a better chance with these other
categories.
(2) If the President is not available then we do have a problem,
you agree. The time frames may make that the case.
I'd like to see an argument to this effect. What are reasonable time lines?
But have
you read Kissinger's statement that "the only way you can implement
[LOWC] is by delegating authority down to some field commander
who must be given discretion so that when he thinks a nuclear war
has started, he can retaliate".
Well, Kissinger's wrong; it's not the only way.
(3) Re Looking Glass, you're right, that's not the focus of my
complaint.
But then he's the only one who could do LOW.
(5) Can I use your statement that you would be "VERY upset and
scared" if Reagan told underlings to launch if there wasn't time
to get to him after a warning? That's certainly something I
can argue is illegal.
So is robbing banks, but there are no proposals for the President to
rob banks. You would have to document that something like this was
said somewhere in official circles. Moreover, it STILL isn't clear
that it is illegal -- there are all kinds of things that are legal
that would scare me silly.
(6) After Reagan's "joke", Moscow sent a "joke" message to its Siberian
forces to attack U.S. Pacific forces in 30 mins. The reaction was a
major alert of U.S./ Japanese forces, until Moscow's cancellation
order arrived 20 minutes later. We never even heard of this till
it was leaked months later.
Documentation? That seems awfully suspect to me. What would "attack
Pacific Forces" mean, given the fact that the S.U. is usually on very
low levels of readiness.
(7) The analog to "fire when fire upon" is not faulty, it's just
that you've got to be abosolutely certain you're being fired upon
in peacetime.
I think that standard is too stringent. Consider the question at a
tactical level: if I am a destroyer, and I see a cruise missile coming
at me on radar (or even visually), am I obligated to wait for it to
hit before I attempt to defend myself? I think not. The question at
the strategic level is conceptually the same.
There's a legal analog in setting lethal booby traps;
when you might kill, you got to be sure of what you're doing.
I don't understand what this means. As far as I can tell, certainty
about what you're doing is known only after the fact; isn't the
standard what the canonical reasonable man would have done?
Also, courts have in other cases ruled that computerization must
not substitute for human discretion (re jury selection procedures).
I have only a hazy memory of this; my vague recollection is that jury
selection can be assisted by computer, but they you can't select
juries on the sole basis of a computer.
(9) We strongly disgaree re interpretation of the Hart/Goldwater
report. I call having nuclear bombers taxi-ing down runways
a change in nuclear force alert levels; so do Congressmen (e.g.
Jack Brooks).
Then you have to distinguish between the formal military definition
(the one involving DEFCONs) and the actual actions taken. I certainly
agree that flushing bombers could been seen as dangerous under some
circumstances. On the other hand, that is why the USAF wants bombers
-- so that they can be recalled if an alert is false.
Did they actually taxi? My recollection is fuzzy, but I think not; I
think they had crews enter the planes and engines were running.
(Incidentally, I believe some missile crews were
alerted - not certain - and were certainly alerted in the Nov. 1979
false alert.)
I'll check.
I also call the take-off of the POacific command post
a strategically significant decision.
Why? Indeed, why should any measure taken to enhance survivability
that does not also imply a committment to offensive action be regarded
as strategically significant (in the sense of making war more likely)?
I thionk your assertion that
no strategically significant decision was taken kind of proves my
point - a chip took the decision for everyone.
Again, that's just not true. A human being ordered the crews to their
planes, etc. At no point did any computer transmit any order. Humans
acted on the basis of computer supplied information, but as the June
1980 incidents show, humans in the loop do have some potential for
checking on the reliability of data.
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Date: Wed, 4 Dec 85 11:42:10 EST
From: Herb Lin <LIN at MIT-MC.ARPA>@MIT-MC.ARPA
Subject: A real help
One more note.
(10) Yes, I am addressing a concern that has been around for some
time; since the "window of vulnerability" opened in the
mid-seventies. The way things are heading (Pershing IIs, Star
Wars), we're going to blow ourselves up.
Going over my original note to you; I mentioned that my concern *for
conspiracy to subvert civilian control* had been around for some time.
Is that the bottom-line basis for your complaint?
Herb
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Date: Wed, 4 Dec 85 11:42:13 EST
From: Clifford Johnson <GA.CJJ at Forsythe>@MIT-MC.ARPA
Subject: When all's said and done ... do we have LOWC?
REPLY TO 11/27/85 12:22 FROM LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA: A real help
Herb:
I think the bottom-line basis for my complaint is that the
Constitution requires absolute control over the forces of war in
time of peace. Of course, "absolute" may be an impractical word,
but as regards an irreversible first nuclear launch decision, I
read the Constitution as requiring the safeguard of both
executive and Congressional authorization due the unlimited nature
of the commitment. You see I think a nuclear missile is not
conceptually the same as a tactical retaliation.
I am not so concerned with the "conspiracy" angle as the fact
that such a decision could be improperly and erroneously taken.
"Improper" means without CERTAIN information (in this context).
Let Congress authorize LOWC, and my complaint fails. I'm asking
the court to declare that such authorization is required by the
Constitution, that activating LOWC is beyond the scope of the
President's limited emergency powers except AFTER armed attack.
The reason it is said that World War II was the last
constitutionally declared war is because the U.S. waited out
Pearl Harbor. I agree there's two sides to the issue, but know
which side I'm on, and want a judicial opinion.
Re the "other" predelegation categories, the Lawyers Committee
on Nuclear Policy (Daniel Arbess) and the F.A.S. (Jeremy Stone)
are addressing these, and I see the value of my case as
addressing a vital element omitted from their analyses (Jeremy
Stone has said he thinks LOWC comes under the President's
authority to repel sudden attack, I say he's got ot be sure there
is a sudden attack in the first place).
Maybe in the factual analyses (not that the court is likely
to let the case that far) the Looking Glass facility would be
woven into the presentation.
Don't know how you missed the "joke" business; it was headlines
Oct. 3, 1984.
As I said, we disagree about interpretation of the
Hart/Goldwater incident. I say the fixed procedures predetermined
the so-called human decision to launch the Pacific Command.
Given the (spurious) inputs, that's the reaction the system was
programmed to provide for. Given even more spurious inputs, e.g.
radar as well as satellite, who knows what might have happened?
The procedures define the range of decisions, and if you can't
in any event be certain of attack warning, I say you musn't in
any event have procedures that permit a launch.
I think it quite clear that the maneovering of nuclear and
nuclear command forces in June 1980 was picked up by Russia,
especially the Pacific Command take-off. Past a certain point,
reinforcing false alerts might "take-off". LOWC in a two-person
scenario, is highly unstable, and if a few false indications
happened at once, control could be lost.
Yes, the standard is the canonical reasonable man, who wouldn't
set up a machine that might kill an intruder automatically. That's
an accepted common-law standard.
Thanks again, I've posted some stuff presenting a fullish
legal analysis. I would anticipate being dismissed this second
time around as a political question, though the court may say that
if the President has any say in a launch, it's legal ... but read the
oral transcript I've sent.
Cheers, Cliff
To: LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA
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Date: Wed, 4 Dec 85 11:42:18 EST
From: Clifford Johnson <GA.CJJ at Forsythe>@MIT-MC.ARPA
Subject: P.S.
REPLY TO 11/27/85 12:22 FROM LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA: A real help
P.S. Re distinguishing between formal military definitions and
actual actions - there is the substance of my case. It is thought
that the military understand "launch-under-attack" to mean launch
after radar confirmation of satellite warning, and NOT launch-after-
impact.
Where can I get a miltary definition of DEFCONs?
Cliff
To: LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA
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End of Arms-Discussion Digest
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