[mod.politics.arms-d] Arms-Discussion Digest V5 #46

ARMS-D-Request@MIT-MC.ARPA (Moderator) (12/06/85)

Arms-Discussion Digest              Thursday, December 5, 1985 11:40PM
Volume 5, Issue 46

Today's Topics:

                    Arms-Discussion Digest V5 #45
                     Motherhood about Bargaining
                                SADMs
                            LOW Discussion
                      Exploiting any information

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Date: Thu,  5 Dec 85 10:39:42 EST
From: Oded Feingold <OAF@MIT-MC.ARPA>
Subject:  Arms-Discussion Digest V5 #45


	"Two things worry me about your comment.  First is your sense
	of proportion.  So you really think that..."

	"I sincerely  hope  that  you do  not  work  with  classified
	material, or that you have  not done so in the past. In  that
	case I could  understand a  certain  amount of naivete  about
	classified data."
                     ------------------------------

    Jeff Miller is  back in  form, passing superior  comments about  how
naive the rest of us are.  Does the gummint pay him for this?

------------------------------

Date: Wed, 4 Dec 85 14:41:04 pst
From: Charlie Crummer <dual!scgvaxd!aero!crummer@ucbvax.berkeley.edu>
Subject: Motherhood about Bargaining

I have been having a hard time with one of the two commandments of bargaining.
As I understand them they are:

1) Don't give something away if you can bargain with it. (no problem with this)

2) Don't let the other guy know at the outset of the bargaining session what
   your "bargaining chips" are.

I have never seen this strategy used in real life.  If a poker player doesn't
put his chips on the table, they have no effect.  Maybe there is a confusion
between the cards and the chips.  A bargainer may not reveal his strategy or
his cards but if he wants to play with the big boys he will certainly have his
big chips on the table.  

Of course the poker analogy is rather restricting in itself because it 
presupposes a zero-sum game, i.e. someone loses if another wins.

  --Charlie

------------------------------

Date: 5 Dec 85  19:27 EST (Thu)
From: _Bob <Carter@RUTGERS>
Subject: SADMs


    From: Gary Chapman <PARC-CSLI!chapman at glacier>

    I looked up some data on SADMs.  They have a yield in the range of 0.01 Kt
    to 0.25 Kt.  
    SADM stands for "Special Atomic Demolition Munition."  All the information
    you could ever want is in Army Field Manual 9-47, "Special Ammunitions
    Unit Operations."

You suggested these were for specially-trained units only.  Where are
they in the TO&E?  Division?  Army?  What tactical mission did the
training contemplate these munitions beings used for?  How were units
to be inserted/extracted while accomplishing these missions?

_B

------------------------------

Date: Thu,  5 Dec 85 23:23:46 EST
From: "James E. O'Dell" <Jim McGrath <J.JPM at LOTS-A>@MIT-MC.ARPA>
Subject:    LOW Discussion

Feel free to forward this reply to Cliff if appropriate.

I agree with your comments in the most recent issue of ARMS-D.  There
is not, and can never be, any procedural bar to the President making a
wrong decision due to lack of information or lack of response time.

Precedent makes clear that the President has the authority to commit
armed force without the consent of the Congress.  Not even the
Congress's budgetary powers (which are much more firmly based than its
war powers) can stop a President from deploying forces as he wills
(e.g. TR's naval actions at the turn of the century).  The only
significant attempt to challenge this has been the enactment of the
War Powers Act.  The Act has never been tested in court, and every
President since its adoption has declared it to be unconstitutional.
Even if constitutional, the Act does not bar the President from
commiting armed force.  It only states that such a commitment will
terminate in a fixed time unless authorized by Congress (irrelvant in
this case), or may be vetoed by Congress (which is almost certainly
unconstitutional, given the earlier rejection by the Court of the
legislative veto).  Thus it seems clear to me that only be action of
two-thirds of both Houses (overriding a veto) can a Presidental
decision of this nature be countermanded by Congress, and in any event
would take at least 10 days to become effective.

It is clear that the delegation to Congress of the power to declare
war was made in the expectation that a reasonable time to debate the
matter would be possible.  Clearly that is not the case in the modern
world.  While many (including myself) may wish to see a formal
amendment to the Constitution to correct this situation, the courts
have historically been quite willing to "amend" the Constitution
through its own decisions.  Thus I am certain that no Court would
uphold the validity of any law which, on its face, made it impossible
to respond effectively to foreign attack.

On questions concerning a more subtle form of interference by
Congress, the court would either side with the President or invoke the
"political question" doctrine.  Indeed, I am almost certain that, if
the case in question passing the standing and jurisdiction tests, the
court will invoke this doctrine to dismiss it.  The courts have
learned, through hard experience, that it simply connot get involved
in these sorts of questions, especially those involving foreign
policy.  The precedents are numerous, and I'll cite them on request
(although many Constitutional Law casebooks have a full section on
this issue alone).

In short, while LOW may be bad policy, I am certain that the courts
will ultimately direct that its merits be fought out in the political
arena, with Congress having a very indirect role (it can refuse funds
to implement the CCC needed for LOW, and can carry out policy
debates), and the President ultimately having the final say.


Jim

------------------------------

Date: Thu,  5 Dec 85 23:39:56 EST
From: Herb Lin <LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA>
Subject:  Exploiting any information

I am curious as to how you (J.Miller) would suggest that the American
public educate themselves about issues of national security in light
of classification of government materials related to national
security.  I don't think you would advocate blind faith in those with
approved access; if not that, then what?

    most non-techspec data is made available
    in unclassified form after it has been "sanitized" so as to protect
    sources.

Maybe you haven't heard, but the current Administration is clamping
down on even unclassified information.  That is a matter of public
record by its own statements.

Moreover, I have been told by people with high clearances that
the most sensitive documents in the classification system are in fact
the non-techspec documents that detail negotiating positions and the
like.  That's different than information on who's who in the Soviet
hierarchy and the organization of the KGB and who's a Soviet agent
(things that you might plausibly argue should be classified -- though
except for the last, I wouldn't), but it just isn't true that the
information you can get is sanitized only of sources; LOTS of other
stuff gets left out too.

    What is not revealed may involve a higher order of detail,
    or of imagery resolution, or names, or places.  In the presentation of
    such data, the data is what is important, not the publicizing of the
    source. 

But surely the source of the information is important, isn't it?
Sources build up reputations for credibility.  Of course, real names
need not be used, only dummy names, as long as they are assigned
consistently. 

     Government spokesmen should never support a position by alluding to
    classified data which cannot be revealed.  The proper course is to try
    to use declassified versions of the original data, or if not feasible,
    no comment.

Government spokesmen should announce conclusions without disclosing
reasoning or evidence (with their "no comment")?  How is the public
then to judge between the presence of valid but secret justification
and no justification.  I understand that there is a genuine dilemma in
sorting out the conflicting interests of public argument in a
democracy and legitimate security classifications; what those without
clearances fear is that the current Administration places too much
empahsis on the security side.  For example, RR has eliminated the
test that requires balancing these two interests.

     As for your quite valid point that everyone likes to equate
    misinformed opinion with opposite opinion, I will assume something in
    my examples touched upon one of your personal beliefs.

Do you make such an equation when you consider the public debate, or
the debate here on ARMS-D?

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End of Arms-Discussion Digest
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