ARMS-D-Request@MIT-MC.ARPA (Moderator @MIT-MC.ARPA) (12/07/85)
Arms-Discussion Digest Sunday, November 17, 1985 2:04PM
Volume 5, Issue 22
Today's Topics:
Conference on Accidental War
SDI to Ground & and VMOS EC
Diversity in Deterrence and ALCMs
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Date: Fri, 15 Nov 85 15:07:20 PST
From: Michael_D._Wallace%UBC.MAILNET@MIT-MULTICS.ARPA
Subject: Conference on Accidental War
As those who follow this discussion are aware, there has been
considerable discussion of late regarding the possibility of
nuclear war by accident, particularly during a serious
international crisis.
Responding to the concerns of policy analysts and computer
professionals, the Canadian Institute for International Peace
and Security (an agency responsible to the Canadian
Parliament) has provided funds for a conference on the risk
of accidental nuclear war to be held in Vancouver, Canada,
May 26-30, 1986.
Confirmed speakers include Roger Shank, Bruce Blair, Ashton
Carter, Paul Bracken, Martin Hellman, and Henry Thompson.
Those wishing to participate in the conference should contact:
Professor Michael D. Wallace
Department of Political Science
University of British Columbia
Vancouver, B.C.
Canada
V6T 1K9
or phone:
(604) 222-5252 (0830-1630, PST)
or reply to the network address.
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Date: Sat, 16 Nov 85 08:52:12 PST
From: Richard K. Jennings <jennings@AEROSPACE.ARPA>
Subject: SDI to Ground & and VMOS EC
Two comments:
1. Concerning using SDI as a ground attack weapon -- it is certainly
possible but easy to counter and grossly inefficient, correct? The
value of a weapon is to cost your opponent more than it costs you.
While there may be some that believe that SDI doesn't meet this test at
all, I don't think it meets this test in the ground attack role. As
a result, I don't think the Soviets object to it for this reason.
2. Concerning EC (error correction?) in power transistors -- how does this work?
Certainly in not the same way as it does in RAMs. In RAMs, a state is
changed, in a VMOS power transistor an output spike could be generated.
Rich.
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Date: Sun, 17 Nov 85 00:55:42 PST
From: ihnp4!utzoo!henry@ucbvax.berkeley.edu
Subject: Re: Diversity in Deterrence and ALCMs
> Tests were actually performed on launching ICBMs from aircraft as early as
> 1974. The aircraft was a C-5A and the missile used was a Minuteman I.
Yes, and it worked fairly well, so the concept is viable. I'm not certain
about the accuracy issue, though; I'm not sure those tests got as far as
evaluating that aspect.
> The weight of this missile (65,000 lbs) is almost exactly the same as that
> of the Trident (C4) missile.
But it is a great deal bulkier, which is why I picked the Trident. The
Trident is also a rather more modern missile, and is designed for vehicle
launch (although that may not be very significant).
> Rather than a relatively expensive bomber-style
> aircraft, why not build a fleet of relatively inexpensive heavy lift long
> range transports?
Airborne endurance. The whole point of airborne deterrent forces is that
they can lose themselves in the sky on warning of an attack, and can postpone
actual commitment to attack. Missile carriers should be capable of staying
airborne as long as possible, to avoid tight "use it or lose it" deadlines.
One does not want a missile carrier that needs flight refuelling every few
hours, either -- the tanker force will be overcommitted already, assuming
much of it survives. There is nothing very special about the B-52 except
that with 25-year old wings and engines it still has twice the airborne
endurance of a modern transport.
Note also that missile carriers will need to be hardened against things
like EMP, since their major virtue is surviving an attack. Doing this to
a transport will run up the price, whereas the B-52 already has it.
> This would give the added capability of diverting part of our
> missile-carriers into regular transports during conventional warfare,
> improving our rapid response and logistic support capability.
Uh, either they are part of the deterrent or they aren't. The occurrence
of conventional warfare does not lessen (in fact, it might increase) the
need for the deterrent forces. The worst-case transport requirement is for
the "air bridge" in the event of conventional war in Europe... which would
be exactly the time when the deterrent forces would be on high alert. I
don't think this dual-role capability is much of an asset.
> While the 16 Cruise missiles carried on a B-52 are a more effective weapons
> system ...
This is somewhat debatable. Given that the Tridents are MIRVed, the number
of warheads is not grossly dissimilar. The extra accuracy of the ALCM is
not useful except for anti-silo attacks, which is the one thing that ALCMs
are totally inappropriate for because of their long flight times. It *is*
harder to see an ALCM coming, but then on the other hand it's easier to
shoot it down once you do. (And the Soviets have not let their air defences
run down the way we have.) The ALCMs have a bit more flexibility because
they are independent vehicles (e.g. you can launch only some of them), but
also a bit less flexibility because of their shorter range. I don't think
one system is conspicuously superior to the other.
Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
{allegra,ihnp4,linus,decvax}!utzoo!henry
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End of Arms-Discussion Digest
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