ARMS-D-Request@MIT-MC.ARPA (Moderator @MIT-MC.ARPA) (12/07/85)
Arms-Discussion Digest Thursday, November 21, 1985 5:57PM
Volume 5, Issue 27
Today's Topics:
Sought: pointer to us satellite photo of ussr aircraft carrier.
[BERLIN: Social Responsibility and the Game Designer]
cut/choose and arms negotiations
Winning Hearts and Minds/A Challenge
Soviets should Love Star Wars
Nuclear strategy, tactics, and a bit about SDI
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Date: Wed 20 Nov 85 15:34:01-PST
From: Paul Roberts <ROBERTS@SU-SUSHI.ARPA>
Subject: Sought: pointer to us satellite photo of ussr aircraft carrier.
About a year ago The (London) Times, and many other newspapers, published
a photograph of a Soviet aircraft carrier under construction in the USSR.
This had been taken by a US Satellite, and a considerable storm followed
re: it's 'unauthorised disclosure' to the press.
I'm trying to find the date on which this picture was published in The Times.
Almost as useful: does anyone remember when the whole story broke? - Given
this, I can look through back copies and find it. Thanks in advance.....
Paul
[roberts@su-sushi]
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Date: Wed, 20 Nov 85 23:48:59 EST
From: "Steven A. Swernofsky" <SASW@MIT-MC.ARPA>
Subject: [BERLIN: Social Responsibility and the Game Designer]
MSG: *MSG 4749
Date: 11/20/85 13:49:57
From: BERLIN at MIT-XX.ARPA
Re: Social Responsibility and the Game Designer
Received: from MIT-XX.ARPA by MIT-MC.ARPA 20 Nov 85 13:49:42 EST
Date: Wed 20 Nov 85 13:46:39-EST
From: Steve Berlin <BERLIN@MIT-XX.ARPA>
Subject: Social Responsibility and the Game Designer
To: bboard@MIT-MC.ARPA
Message-ID: <12160803117.29.BERLIN@MIT-XX.ARPA>
/--------------------------\
| Tom Snyder |
| of |
| Tom Snyder Productions |
\--------------------------/
"Social Responsiblity and the Game Designer"
Tom Snyder will discuss his latest ideas and products, including
'The Other Side', a global conflict resolution simulation. Tom Snyder
Productions is successful producer of educational software based on the
belief that computer games can foster cooperation.
TODAY
Wednesday, November 20, at 7:30
8th floor lounge, 545 Tech Square
Sponsored by Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 21 Nov 85 02:34:22 EST
From: "David M. Krowitz" <David Rogers <drogers%farg.umich.csnet at CSNET-RELAY.ARPA>@MIT-MC.ARPA>
Subject: cut/choose and arms negotiations
Surprisingly, it seems that the problems with a cut/choose strategy
in superpower nuclear negotiations is not in the choosing, but in
the cutting: a single side would find it very difficult to select
some table of values for its assets without arousing internal
resistance. An example would be Salt II, where one internal group
accused the other of giving away the store. I suspect that
essentially ANY agreement would suffer the same internal fate,
with the selection of the group depending on whose ox is gored.
No need to worry, or course: we all know that internal political
sniping wouldn't be allowed to stand in the way in something as
important as nuclear armament/disarmament... -:)
David Rogers
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Date: Thu, 21 Nov 85 12:47 MST
From: Jong@HIS-PHOENIX-MULTICS.ARPA
Subject: Winning Hearts and Minds/A Challenge
Two recent submissions -- one to RISKS at SRI-CISL (Vol. 1, No.
24), and one to SPACE at S1-B (Vol. 6, No. 23, and reproduced
here by J. Miller) -- illustrate the kind of crossed purposes
to which SDI arguments are directed. The submissions are not in
themselves revelatory, but make an interesting pair.
The RISKS submission reproduced an article by Professor Philip
W. Anderson of Princeton University, a Nobel laureate in
physics. The article originally appeared in the Princeton
Alumni Weekly (9/25/85). It contained this passage:
> Fortunately, most of the scientific issues that come up in
> discussing Star Wars are very simple ones which require
> neither specialized nor especially technical -- and therefore
> classifiable -- knowledge. One needs to know that it costs
> everyone about the same amount to put a ton of stuff into a
> given orbit and that this is a major portion of the cost of
> any space system; that signals can't travel faster than the
> speed of light; that it takes roughly as much chemical fuel to
> burn through a shield with a laser as the shield itself
> weighs; that Americans are not measurably smarter than
> Russians; and a few other simple, home truths. Given these,
> almost everyone comes to much the same conclusions.
The other submission was by Paul M. Koloc, President,
Prometheus II, Ltd., College Park, MD. It touched on Soviet
Star Wars research, and contained this passage:
> ........ I suspect the Russians have made a monumental discovery
> and are not willing to share it with us, and if I am correct as
> to what is is, I don't blame them because in a few more years it
> will give them a massive military edge. I also think the concept
> of their program is considerably more aggressive (offensive) than
> ours.
Now, Professor Anderson directs his arguments against the head of
the reader. Mr. Koloc, I suggest, is aiming somewhat lower. (He
cites "personal information" as his source.) And these messages
are fairly representative of the two approaches. I suppose I'm
susceptible to both methods: I like the security of the Peaceshield,
but I don't accept it as feasible.
Now, a challenge (debators, to your keyboards!): As a
paperless thought experiment, assume I have the U.S.
deterrent forces; but I give you pawn and move -- you can
construct any Star Wars-type defense you wish, no matter how
long it takes or how much it costs. Can you describe a system
that can reliably protect yourself against: (1) my ICBMs, (2)
my sub-launched Poseidon missiles, (3) B-52s armed with
gravity bombs and cruise missiles, AND (4) fighter-bombers
from Europe and Japan? Three out of four is NOT sufficient.
There are two variations on this experiments. First, I could
be allowed an Israeli-style pre-emptive strike against any
space-based system as it was being orbited. Second, you could
consider how your system would work if you were allowed to
build it, then launch a counterforce first strike. If you
were the Russians and the Americans actually started putting
up Star Wars hardware, would you try and take it out? If not,
would you fear my second variation?
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Date: Thu, 21 Nov 85 11:51:16 EST
From: Jeff Miller AMSTE-TEI 4675 <jmiller@apg-1>
Subject: Soviets should Love Star Wars
I think the smartest thing the Soviets can do is to find ways to
encourage US SDI research.
Every dollar we spend on such systems is a dollar we divert from efforts
to redress the overwhelming disparity between our conventional forces and
theirs.
All of the Soviets' successes in force projection have come from the use
of conventional forces, in some conjunction with political and economic
tactics. Their successes in the Third World have little to do with their
nuclear arsenal.
Our diversion of resources to strategic systems greatly limits our
capabilities to counter their moves. They know this. They can start a string
of brushfire conflicts with the knowledge that we can really only handle a one
theater, or possibly a "one and a half theater" war. (I'm not talking about
open conflict between superpowers, simply the flare-up of war between proxies
which would demand the presence of both sponsors' forces. Combine any one
flare-up [ a heated-up NPA insurgency in the Phillipines with the Soviet fleet
standing by-] with a concurrent demonstration of strength by the WP along the
East-West European border, and you have US forces stretched dangerously thin.
And the Soviets know we won't use nukes to keep them out of a Third World
nation.
So they have utilised, for many years, what Dr. Richard Sears refers to
as "salami tactics", slicing off pieces that are too small for the west to
challenge individually, but, which in the end constitute the whole salami.
Our strategic-tactical imbalance makes for a situation analogous to a judge
whose only sentencing option is the gas chamber. The punks on the street
would act with impunity since none need worry about being put to death for
stealing hub caps.
If one assumed that both sides' ruling elites comprised rational,
pragmatic men, then either side would realize that an opponent's strategic
defense system would not be sufficient to insure an unanswered first strike,
and that its owners would realize the same. Therefore an opponent's resources
consumed by the implementation of such a system- its adverse effects on other
military spending, would produce useful opportunities in the short run far
outweighing any dangers in the long run.
-This opinion is based on a firm conviction that any future US-USSR con-
flict will not be viewed over radars aimed at the North Pole, but over weapon
sights in the savannahs of Africa, the jungles of SE Asia, or the rocks and
dunes of the Near East.
J.Miller
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From: aurora!eugene@RIACS.ARPA (Eugene miya)
Date: 21 Nov 1985 1402-PST (Thursday)
Subject: Nuclear strategy, tactics, and a bit about SDI
Recent posting have mentioned the considerations of nuclear
winter and missile basing. I think this is an incredibly naive
point of view. When opponents are fighting battle, they are
only concern with the near-term and less so than the far-term.
I am certain Pentagon planners would only laugh: why think about
nuclear winter if "your country lay in ashes?"
This idea of basing brings up two ideas I've thought about in
the past, and SDI adds a new twist. That is the actual management
of nuclear conflicit. In the case of SDI, I think that Reagan,
and most of the public are a bit too one-sided in what they talk
about regarding nuclear exchanges. We have recently heard about Defensive
measures, but battles are planned as integrated sub-attacks, defense,
and counter-attacks. I've heard nothing about what the US offensive
force would be doing if SDI were "working." My thinking is the
offensive forces would not be sitting idle and would not trust leak-proofness
of SDI and this implies a limited "use them or lose them" thinking.
This also brings up the issues of strike accessibility and plans for
"second" phase strike (as opposed to "second strike"), i.e.,
both sides have launched some missiles, with remaining missiles,
why retarget to empty (non-reusable) silos or targets hit. If 60
warheads are targets to a Capital (I've not see the PBS series on war,
but that was the number I got from the net) why fire fire 59 or 50 if
one or ten got through? We track launch site, and figure out target,
we can say, "Empty, don't waste that one." Bombers at least had
secondary and teritary targets, but you can't change in flight missiles,
but what of the degree still on the ground?
This is the ype of stuff you cannot get from a bomb designer. And I've
read several texts on the subject (obsolete now with SDI).
--eugene miya
NASA Ames Research Center
{hplabs,hao,dual,ihnp4,vortex}!ames!aurora!eugene
eugene@ames-nas.ARPA
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End of Arms-Discussion Digest
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