ARMS-D-Request@MIT-MC.ARPA (Moderator @MIT-MC.ARPA) (12/07/85)
Arms-Discussion Digest Saturday, November 23, 1985 10:31PM
Volume 5, Issue 28
Today's Topics:
Challenge Solution
Re: Cartoons of SDI
Re: Soviets Should Love Star Wars
One of Will Martin's questions
recursive cut/choose
SDI Goals
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: Thu, 21 Nov 85 20:13:05 PST
From: Richard K. Jennings <jennings@AEROSPACE.ARPA>
Subject: Challenge Solution
Surreptitiously buy CBS news.
Your move.
Richard.
------------------------------
Date: Fri, 22 Nov 85 10:26 EST
From: Jong@HIS-BILLERICA-MULTICS.ARPA
Subject: Re: Cartoons of SDI
I think the well-worn SDI scenarios are from the Department of
Defense.
Regarding the point about SDI computers being unable to
distinguish laser-killed warheads from undamaged ones: That is a
good question! And in general, how does the system discriminate
between targets and debris created by impacting defensive
projectiles?
------------------------------
Date: Fri, 22 Nov 85 10:30 EST
From: Jong@HIS-BILLERICA-MULTICS.ARPA
Subject: Re: Soviets Should Love Star Wars
I find myself in some agreement with Mr. Miller about spending
U.S. dollars on Star Wars instead of conventional forces. On
the other hand, the Soviets DON'T appear to love Star Wars.
Perhaps they can't afford having both guns and butter to the
extent we can. (That sounds too sarcastic -- of course they
can't.) The spending war would be very hard on them.
------------------------------
From: aurora!eugene@RIACS.ARPA (Eugene miya)
Date: 21 Nov 1985 2151-PST (Thursday)
Subject: One of Will Martin's questions
Will Martin says:
> b) It was my impression that the laser hits would NOT cause any
> explosions, but merely burn a hole or several into the warheads and
> damage them so that they would not explode if they reached their
> intended targets, or so that their guidance and/or stabilization systems
> would fail and they would either burn up on reentry or hit some random
> point (again without exploding?).
This was a problems with the X-ray neutralization scheme used suggested
using the Spartan missile. Question: did the warhead get neutralized?
If yes, you have debris raining down just more clutter on radar.
If not you have to decide to use another laser blast, or use point
defense (Sprint in the earlier systems) or newer SDI schemes.
Frankly, I am surprised that no one had criticized the ambiguity
problems of radar (range and azimuth) and how computers would be
able to discriminate (detect) targets, decoys, chaff, jamming,
Pulse problems, and so forth.
--eugene miya
NASA Ames Research Center
{hplabs,hao,dual,ihnp4,vortex}!ames!aurora!eugene
eugene@ames-nas.ARPA
------------------------------
Date: Fri, 22 Nov 85 11:26:19 EST
From: Bruce Nevin <bnevin@bbncch.ARPA>
Subject: recursive cut/choose
David Krowitz <drogers%farg.umich.csnet@csnet-relay> rightly brings
up the problem of internal negotiations on either side. This problem
has been cited recently as a principle reason why Gorbachev can offer
very little this time around (All Things Considered on NPR yesterday
evening).
The obvious thing to do is to apply the same cut/choose principles
internally. No one gives something up unless they value it less than
they value what others are giving up in exchange. It works precisely
because each side assigns different values and uses different scales
of values--the very things that make straightahead (bullheaded) negotiation
with incommensurate value systems so difficult.
A is willing to give up small token a in exchange for B giving up small
token b because A thinks a provides less power (protection, threat, . . .)
against B than B's b does against A. On the other side, B is willing to
give up b in exchange for A giving up a because, in B's view, b is not
worth as much as getting rid of A's a. Each side perceives itself as
gaining an advantage. The steps must involve small increments, with pauses
between to reassess the situation.
Applying these principles internally does involve more than binary
negotiations, but that problem is not intractible. (A values a' more
than a because A feels a need for a' to counter C's c--that valuation
of a' is just part of A's value system, which is a black box to B
anyway, or at least B does not fully understand it. It boils down to
simultaneous binary negotiations.)
Why should each side care enough about their negotiations to apply
these principles to the task of agreeing on what may be sacrificed
and what various tokens on the other side are worth? In other words,
why should they *want* to make it work? Because, by definition, it
is always to their subjectively defined advantage to make it work.
Bruce Nevin
bn@bbncch.arpa
BBN Communications
33 Moulton Street
Cambridge, MA 02238
(617) 497-3992
------------------------------
Date: 22 Nov 85 19:01:44 EST
From: Hank.Walker@UNH.CS.CMU.EDU
Subject: SDI Goals
A recent post alluded to different and confusing statements about the goals
of SDI. This came up in the MIT debate too. President Reagan has
repeatedly stated that his goal is a population defense. This is how SDI is
advertised to Congress and the public. However SDI organization officials
say that they are building a hard-target defense system, or more vaguely, a
system that strengthens deterrence by creating uncertainty.
Major Simon Warden, assistant director of SDIO, stated explicitly in a
debate at CMU that "no one believes" a population defense is possible, and
so that wasn't what they were trying to build. He said that this erroneous
assumption led to much of the opposition, since many of those who say an
area defense is not possible agree that a hard-target defense is possible.
He also stated that it was obvious no defense system would work without arms
control and must also satisfy Paul Nitze's three criteria of cost,
survivability, and something else I forgot. The issue then becomes not one
of feasibility, but of policy, and is essentially a rerun of the previous
ABM debates. When challenged, he denied that the Administration was selling
SDI as a population defense. Without naming names, he made some disparaging
comments about the rabid area defense supporters, such as High Frontier, and
the anti-arms controllers, such as Richard Perle.
------------------------------
End of Arms-Discussion Digest
*****************************