ARMS-D-Request@MIT-MC.ARPA (Moderator) (12/08/85)
Arms-Discussion Digest Saturday, December 7, 1985 4:13PM
Volume 5, Issue 48
Today's Topics:
Info Exploitation - Reply
SADM deployment
The Baruch Plan
Retaliation for Reagan's un-off-mike joke, signals of attack
nuclear-powered cruise missiles
nuclear-powered cruise missiles
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Date: Sat, 7 Dec 85 14:25:42 EST
From: "Jeffrey M. Broughton" <Jeff Miller AMSTE-TEI 4675 <jmiller at apg-1>@MIT-MC.ARPA>
Subject: Info Exploitation - Reply
1. It is true that the administrartion is clamping down on unclassified
information. I was not advocating unrestricted access by the public to the
thousands of tons of unclas stuff produced daily. There is an age old
security axiom which, far from being invented by the current regime, is simply
being re-emphasized, which is: a whole bunch of non-secrets put together often
equals a secret. My point was, data is available on the Soviets' strengths and
weaknesses, as well as their operating techniques (in my letter, specifically
the KGB desinformatsiya) in unclas form, published by the government. The
difference tends to be that if a report says the Transcaucasus Military
District has 600-750 T-XX tanks, it is known to really have 735.
2. Of course the source is important. That is why we like to keep them alive.
It may be an idealistically wonderful thing to use a precise source just to
help one's credibility with Sam Donaldson, but that is exceedingly difficult
to explain to a widow in Severomorsk. While the intelligence business is not
James Bond and Harry Palmer, let's realize that it is a dirty business,
practiced of neccessity by all powers, and conducted often at great risk to
the operators. In the cases where the sources are technological, the question
of protecting capabilities is involved. This is why "Soviet Military Power"
has so many drawings, not because the White House hired a Science Fiction
illustrator to make up fantasies. Resolution capabilities are a valid
concern.
3. I restricted myself when I said tech-spec secrets were the main kinds of
data which couldn't be released in unclas form. Another is strategic and
tactical planning. If you were a general in NATO, the last thing you would
think of doing would be to change a few grid coordinates, doctor a few units'
order of battle, and then broadcast to the world an unclas version of your
detailed General Defense Plan. Similarly, governments ruled by sane men do
not broadcast their negotiating strategy on arms reductions, or any other
issues to the public, and thereby, their opponents.
There is a plethora of published material which deals with the subject of KGB
activities (the subject of my letter which you reference.) I realize you are
endeavoring to expand your point about classification vs public trust beyond
that topic, presumably to the strategic intelligence on Soviet nuclear
capabilities viz our own.
The conduct of intelligence/counterintelligence, and the handling of secrets
are businesses infected with tremendous political sensitivities. People who
should be busy protecting the Republic are too often busy fighting the
alligators of politics. An example; the press generally agrees with the point
that the services keep too many things secret. Along come the Walkers and
other neat spy scandals, and the same press demands to know why we don't
protect secrets better! So the resulting rush to slash clearances and upgrade
protection will undoubtedly result in more criticism of overclassification.
It really is a no-win situation.
Finally, our best strength is our democracy. If you don't like the way this
administration handles secrets, organize and vote. Those who believe the
government could make all things known if it really wanted to are naive. Ask
Jimmy Carter. To a very great degree, we must trust the government to which
we give the mandate. We should be very careful before we accuse anyone of
using classification to illegal or unethical ends. If such is the case and
can be proven, then we vote that regime out of office.
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Date: Sat, 7 Dec 85 14:26:27 EST
From: Herb Lin <LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA>
Subject: SADM deployment
Actually, in my humble opinion, I think SADMs
are a stupid idea, and just an example of the Army playing "Me too!" The
Army has always been envious of the Air Force and the Navy being the really
"serious" purveyors of nuclear weapons, so they had to think up some way to
use nukes themselves. So we got SADMs and nuclear artillery shells, which
are both kind of stupid. Of course now the Army has Pershing 2s, so
they've managed to get into the major leagues at long last.
Actually, the Army has had for a long time responsibility for
strategic missile defense too (Safeguard and all that), and it also
had the intermediate range Thor (or was it Jupiter) missiles. The
USN/USAF muscled them aside with the long range systems, and now,
you're right -- they are back.
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Date: Sat, 7 Dec 85 14:30:09 EST
From: Herb Lin <LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA>
Subject: The Baruch Plan
In 1946, the Soviet Union
vetoed, in the UN Security Council, the Baruch plan, which would have put
all nuclear-related developments under the control of an international
agency WITH NO BIG-POWER VETO.
You describe the Baruch plan incompletely. Note that:
ALL of the Security Council members except the SU were allies.
The plan called for complete denuclearization of the world BEFORE the
US would surrender its nuclear weapons program to the international
agency.
It also called for punishment (strongly hinted to be nuclear) for
violators of the agreement.
Would you have approved of such a plan if you had no nukes yet,the
Security Council consisted of the SU, mainland China, Cuba, Poland,
and the US, with no veto power for the US, when the SU alone had the
bomb, and when the plan called for attacking the US with nuclear bombs
if the international agency decided you were at fault?
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Date: Sat, 7 Dec 85 14:31:58 EST
From: Herb Lin <LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA>
Subject: Retaliation for Reagan's un-off-mike joke, signals of attack
| Date: Wed, 4 Dec 85 11:42:07 EST
| From: Herb Lin <LIN at MIT-MC.ARPA>@MIT-MC.ARPA
| I also call the take-off of the POacific command post
| a strategically significant decision.
| Why? Indeed, why should any measure taken to enhance survivability
| that does not also imply a committment to offensive action be regarded
| as strategically significant (in the sense of making war more likely)?
A few years ago it was stated that if suddenly all our cities were
evacuated as a "drill" the soviets might think we were doing that in
preparation for a first strike, and they might strike first before our
evacuation could complete. Since evacuation doesn't attack the enemy,
it merely defends ourselves in event they attack us, wouldn't
evacuation and takeoff of command post be similar, indicating we were
preparing to attack, and thus inciting a pre-emptive counterattack?
Nope. Airplanes take off all the time; the Sovs don't know in real
time what happens in NORAD, so they saw an airplane take off. So
what? That's not like evaucating NYC, which you don't do every day.
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Date: Sat, 7 Dec 85 14:33:30 EST
From: Herb Lin <LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA>
Subject: nuclear-powered cruise missiles
It is very difficult for an aircraft of any sort (which is what a cruise
missile is) to carry enough armor to usefully protect it against anything
much heavier than a 30mm shell. That is about the level of protection
claimed for the A-10, possibly the most heavily-armored aircraft now flying.
As various people have pointed out, a few 75mm shells or a good antiaircraft
missile would probably wreck an A-10, armor notwithstanding. Armoring
cruise missiles does not seem a useful approach.
Not to defend the notion of armored cruise missiles, but if you have
essentially unlimited power, you could put tank armor on the missile.
Not smart, but doable.
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Date: Sat, 7 Dec 85 15:34:18 EST
From: Steve Kudlak <FFM@MIT-MC.ARPA>
Subject: nuclear-powered cruise missiles
Boy would the bloody thing be heavy and hard to sucessfully maneveuer
(sp??)
More Later
Have fun
Sends Steve
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End of Arms-Discussion Digest
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