ARMS-D-Request@MIT-MC.ARPA (Moderator) (12/09/85)
Arms-Discussion Digest Monday, December 9, 1985 12:46AM
Volume 5, Issue 49
Today's Topics:
The Baruch Plan
The Baruch Plan
The Baruch Plan
nuclear powered cruise missiles
Re: Info Exploitation - Reply
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Date: 8 Dec 85 01:27 EST (Sun)
From: _Bob <Carter@RUTGERS>
Subject: The Baruch Plan
From: Herb Lin <LIN at MIT-MC.ARPA>
You describe the Baruch plan incompletely. Note that:
ALL of the Security Council members except the SU were
allies.
Would you have approved of such a plan if you had no nukes
yet,the Security Council consisted of the SU, mainland China,
Cuba, Poland, and the US, with no veto power for the US, when the
SU alone had the bomb, and when the plan called for attacking the
US with nuclear bombs if the international agency decided you
were at fault?
Your analogy fails. The other permanent members (U.K., France,
Republic of China) were allies of the Soviet Union too. They had all
just won a war together.
The consensus of conventional historical opinion is that the U.S.
was eager to continue the wartime alliance, and I think it's fair to
give the Baruch plan as a late example of that attitude. The U.S.
had the power (along with the U.K.) to destroy the Soviet government
by nuclear attack, and was offering to give that power up.
Had Soviet leaders seriously doubted the bona fides of the U.S. they
could have considered that a few months earlier, the U.S. and U.K.
had possessed the power to destroy the Soviet regime by conventional
means, and had given that up too.
I don't think the goal of nuclear disarmament is helped by adopting
a revisionist view of the foreign policy of Joseph Stalin.
_B
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Date: Sun, 8 Dec 85 09:58:47 EST
From: Herb Lin <LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA>
Subject: The Baruch Plan
From: Herb Lin <LIN at MIT-MC.ARPA>
You describe the Baruch plan incompletely. Note that:
ALL of the Security Council members except the SU were
allies.
Would you have approved of such a plan if you had no nukes
yet,the Security Council consisted of the SU, mainland China,
Cuba, Poland, and the US, with no veto power for the US, when the
SU alone had the bomb, and when the plan called for attacking the
US with nuclear bombs if the international agency decided you
were at fault?
From: _Bob <Carter at RUTGERS>
Your analogy fails. The other permanent members (U.K., France,
Republic of China) were allies of the Soviet Union too. They had all
just won a war together.
Allies in what sense? The allied effort in WWII between SU and others
as one of convenience, not of shared values. The logic -- valid in my
opinion at that time -- was that the enemy of my enemy is my friend,
and so when Germany tried to take on the SU, we helped them, but not
out of any great love for them.
Have you forgotten that U.S. troops invaded the SU in 1917?
The consensus of conventional historical opinion is that the U.S.
was eager to continue the wartime alliance, and I think it's fair to
give the Baruch plan as a late example of that attitude.
A preference, yes, for a world without a troublesome Soviet Union. If
you look at the historical record carefully, you will find very
strongly anti-communist sentiments among many of the major players
before the end of the war. I personally agree with these sentiments,
but they must not have been very reassuring to the SU.
The U.S.
had the power (along with the U.K.) to destroy the Soviet government
by nuclear attack, and was offering to give that power up.
That's simply false. The U.K. had no nuclear program capable
of producing a nuclear weapon. The U.S. had a program, but no bombs.
It took the entire war to build three weapons, which it used.
Besides, how would it have used those weapons? Against what targets?
U.S. willingness to give up that power is also in question. For the
reasons I cited in my first note on the plan, it is not clear that the
plan was ever intended to be acceptable to the SU.
Had Soviet leaders seriously doubted the bona fides of the U.S. they
could have considered that a few months earlier, the U.S. and U.K.
had possessed the power to destroy the Soviet regime by conventional
means, and had given that up too.
Also false. War-weariness in the US and UK forced conventional
disarmament, not high level policy at the top or friendliness to the
SU. If you don't believe that, then you have to be able to argue that
the U.S. could conceivably have refrained from nuking Hiroshima and
Nagasaki.
Moreover, if you are trying to say that the US/UK could have
realistically invaded the SU and defeated it acre by acre as it did
Germany, I think you have to make an analytical case for it.
I don't think the goal of nuclear disarmament is helped by adopting
a revisionist view of the foreign policy of Joseph Stalin.
I agree whole-heartedly. If you believe I have a revisionist view of
Stalin's foreign policy, please point out where. I don't think that
ANYWHERE in this discussion have I said that Soviet post-war policy
was good; rather, I have said that I believe the Soviets had
justifiable cause for their actions, whether or not I like the outcome
(which I don't).
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Date: 8 Dec 85 15:31 EST (Sun)
From: _Bob <Carter@RUTGERS>
Subject: The Baruch Plan
From: Herb Lin <LIN at MIT-MC.ARPA>
Allies in what sense?
In the sense of the most successful large alliance in history. No
one dropped out or changed sides, and the victors collaborated in the
establishing of a comprehensive international organization. Compare:
the Axis powers; the Allies and Central powers in WWI; the First,
Second and Third Coalitions in the Napoleonic wars.
The allied effort in WWII between SU and others
as one of convenience, not of shared values. The logic -- valid in my
opinion at that time -- was that the enemy of my enemy is my friend,
and so when Germany tried to take on the SU, we helped them, but not
out of any great love for them.
you look at the historical record carefully, you will find very
strongly anti-communist sentiments among many of the major players
before the end of the war. I personally agree with these sentiments,
but they must not have been very reassuring to the SU.
This is where you begin to sound revisionist. Why should the Soviet
Union need "reassurance?" Or want "great love?"
It is a bad habit of democracies to frame public questions in gushing
sentimentalities. Because of this, it is sometimes hard for
Americans to keep from wanting to solve problems of international
relations by applying the tried algorithms of middle-class family
life. But the temptation should be resisted, because nation-states
are not human beings. They do not feel affection, they perceive
interests. They are not driven by unconscious process, but by
conscious calculus of advantage. They are capable of neither
gratitude nor guilt.
Soviet leadership has historically been cautious and remarkably
clear-eyed about power relationships. To treat a great power as if
it were an emotionally-disturbed child is not just patronizing, it
loosens our own grasp on reality and ends in apologetics. In a
matter as important as nuclear disarmament I don't think we can
afford to indulge ourselves in this way.
_B
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Date: Mon, 9 Dec 85 19:58:57 EST
From: Herb Lin <LIN@MIT-MC.ARPA>
Subject: The Baruch Plan
From: Herb Lin <LIN at MIT-MC.ARPA>
Allies in what sense?
From: _Bob <Carter at RUTGERS>
In the sense of the most successful large alliance in history. No
one dropped out or changed sides, and the victors collaborated in the
establishing of a comprehensive international organization.
No one changed sides during the war, but as you know, things changed
afterwards.
The allied effort in WWII between SU and others
as one of convenience, not of shared values. The logic -- valid in my
opinion at that time -- was that the enemy of my enemy is my friend,
and so when Germany tried to take on the SU, we helped them, but not
out of any great love for them.
you look at the historical record carefully, you will find very
strongly anti-communist sentiments among many of the major players
before the end of the war. I personally agree with these sentiments,
but they must not have been very reassuring to the SU.
This is where you begin to sound revisionist. Why should the Soviet
Union need "reassurance?" Or want "great love?"
Is it revisionist to suggest that the Soviet Union has legitimate
security concerns? You believe that the Soviets should just *believe*
our statments of peaceful intent?
American policy is based on two premises: that the US is good and the
Soviets are bad, and that the Soviets know the US is good and that the
Soviets are bad. The first I agree with; the second is a premise that
is highly suspect.
Because of this, it is sometimes hard for
Americans to keep from wanting to solve problems of international
relations by applying the tried algorithms of middle-class family
life. But the temptation should be resisted, because nation-states
are not human beings. They do not feel affection, they perceive
interests. They are not driven by unconscious process, but by
conscious calculus of advantage. They are capable of neither
gratitude nor guilt.
But leaders are human beings, and leaders are fundamentally important
to a nation's behavior, especially in the Soviet Union.
Moreover, if you believe that nation-states are NOT driven by
unconscious process, try reading Barbara Tuchman, The March of Folly,
for a good introduction to the failure of rational process in
nation-states.
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From: aurora!eugene@RIACS.ARPA (Eugene miya)
Date: 8 Dec 1985 1433-PST (Sunday)
Subject: nuclear powered cruise missiles
> From: Paul Dietz <dietz%slb-doll.csnet@CSNET-RELAY.ARPA>
>
> You'd want nuclear power for several reasons:
>
> (2) Speed. Current cruise missiles are subsonic; at high
> speed the fuel consumption is unacceptably high. A nuclear
> powered cruise missile could go much faster, making it harder
> to shoot down.
>
> (4) Power. With a more powerful engine one can add armor to the
> missile, reducing the effectiveness of antimissile weapons.
> Also, current cruise missiles must attack their targets on
> flat terminal trajectories, because they have insufficient
> power to climb & dive at steep angles.
Let me reinforce what Hank Walker pointed out. I have a table in an
introductory aerodynamics text which would be hard to put in here.
It's a chart on speed versus altitude and the resultant temperature.
The thermal requirements of flying such an object so close to the
ground make this impractical. I'm glad computer-only people
are not responsible for defense planning. Ah! the ambitions of mankind!
The sonic and thermal problems would make such a device the antithesis
of stealth. Perhaps we should build it?! Fund lots of jobs and
it should be real easy to find and shoot down (arms stablizing influence?).
It's surprising few people have mentioned cruise-counters like look-down
radars. The Soviets now have them and are using them.
--eugene miya
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Date: 8 Dec 85 19:28:38 EST (Sunday)
From: MJackson.Wbst@Xerox.ARPA
Subject: Re: Info Exploitation - Reply
[Jeff Miller writes:]
"People who should be busy protecting the Republic are too often busy
fighting the alligators of politics. An example; the press generally
agrees with the point that the services keep too many things secret.
Along come the Walkers and other neat spy scandals, and the same press
demands to know why we don't protect secrets better! So the resulting
rush to slash clearances and upgrade protection will undoubtedly result
in more criticism of overclassification. It really is a no-win
situation."
You allege a dilemma with unmatched horns. Overclassification forces an
increase in the numbers of individuals cleared (so that they can see the
data they need to do their jobs), hence burdening the "protection
apparatus" doubly (once for the increase in classified documents, once
for the increase in "cleared" individuals). Further, if you tell people
to treat as secret what patently should not be they will soon lose
respect for the process and become generally lax, thus further weakening
the system.
If classification were done "right" the public would have more
information and the security task would be easier. It's obvious,
however, which way the forces will run in any bureaucracy which has
classification available as a tool. Telling us to "trust our leaders"
doesn't do much to address this.
Mark
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End of Arms-Discussion Digest
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